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Abstract
CISGENDERISM IN GENDER ATTRIBTUIONS: THE WAYS IN WHICH SOCIAL,
COGNITIVE, AND INDIVIDUAL FACTORS PREDICT MISGENDERING
by
Erica Jayne Friedman
Advisor: Dr. Sarit A. Golub
The current program of research investigated the ways in which social representations of
gender, cognitive processes, and individual factors can be integrated to predict "misgendering,"
an example of cisgenderism in which people are categorized as a gender with which they do not
identify. I proposed an (In)consistency Processing Model of Gender Attribution in which
perceivers make a gender attribution by interpreting the stereotype-(in)consistencies of a target's
gender characteristics through either a biology- or identity-based schema. Five studies were
conducted to test different aspects of this model, the first of which was a secondary data analysis
on a sample of students from Hunter College who participated in the lab. Participants from the
remaining studies participated online and were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk.
Participants were more likely to reject a target's gender identity when the target's genitals
and chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with the target's gender identity. Gender
judgments were made quickly overall, but slower when target characteristics were stereotypeinconsistent. In other words, people processed gender consciously, rather than automatically,
when characteristics were unexpected. Participants who knew transgender people were less
likely to misgender and faster at making gender judgments, but only when targets had
stereotype-inconsistent chromosomes suggesting limitations to the knowledge they gained from
their contact with transgender people. Allies to transgender people and people with less gender
essentialist beliefs were less likely to misgender people and did so with similar response times to
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the rest of participants, suggesting they spent time consciously attempting to affirm targets
gender identity. People who were initially found to be less likely to misgender ("adjusters") were
more likely to misgender when their efforts to affirm target identity were constrained by a
distraction or by added stereotype-inconsistent information about the target.
Study findings imply that cisgenderism operates implicitly on the gender attribution
process. While some people may be able to temporarily focus their efforts on affirming people's
genders, these efforts are conditional and easily destabilized. These findings have important
practical implications for researchers, activists, service organizations, and governments invested
in the ethical recognition of people's own gender self-designations.
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
How is asking if someone is transgender or a man poking fun? She has the body of a women
[sic] and the facial characteristics of a man. This is honestly the first fucking time I have
heard/seen a woman with that amount of facial hair, but it would not be the first time I've
seen a transgendered individual. I'm a fucking asshole because I relate things to what I know.
--Kayoh44, 2012 (emphasis added)
This quote is one of many comments posted in September 2012 to an online forum called
“Reddit” (reddit.com). An individual had posted a photo categorized under Reddit’s “funny”
section with the title “I’m not sure what to conclude from this.” The photo was of a Sikh woman
(information that was learned later) who was glancing at her iPhone while waiting in line. She
wore a t-shirt and sweatpants, a Dastar, 1 and she appeared to have breasts and facial hair. At first,
some of the Reddit users commented on the photo in an attempt at explaining her gender. Some
pondered if she was a woman or a man, while others wondered if she might be a person who is
transgender. Additionally, a myriad of gender-based jokes were quipped and commenter's
reactions suggested an overall “gender panic” (Cavanagh, 2010; Lorber, 2012, p. 598).
The woman pictured in the photo, Balpreet Kaur, found out from friends that her photo
had been posted on Reddit. In response, she commented on the post and gave her own
explanation of her gender presentation. In her explanation, she acknowledged that her facial hair
made her gender appear “confusing,” but that her gender presentation was dictated through her
baptized Sikh faith—not through her gender as a woman. She explained:
Yes, I'm a baptized Sikh woman with facial hair. Yes, I realize that my gender is
often confused and I look different than most women. However, baptized Sikhs
believe in the sacredness of this body - it is a gift that has been given to us by the
Divine Being [which is genderless, actually] and, must keep it intact as a
submission to the divine will. Just as a child doesn't reject the gift of his/her
parents, Sikhs do not reject the body that has been given to us. (balpreetkaur,
2012; bracketed text are balpreetkaur’s remarks)
1

A turban traditionally worn by Sikh men.
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Statement of the problem
Kaur’s experience helps illustrate the kinds of gender judgments that people make, the
fact that these judgments can result in misgendering others, and the ways in which perceptions of
gender can shift depending on perceivers' interpretation of the stereotyped characteristics of the
individual being judged. Misgendering has been posited as an example of cisgenderism; “the
ideology that delegitimizes people's own designations of their genders and bodies” (Ansara,
2013) in favor of externally assigned designations of their genders and bodies. 2 Misgendering
occurs when people describe or refer to others as a gender different from the gender with which
they have identified or designated for themselves. Whether people misgender deliberately or
unintentionally, the effect is just the same: A gender has been designated for the person rather
than allowing the person to designate it for themselves. Kaur identifies as a woman. She does not
detail her own gender history, i.e., whether or not she has a gender independent from the one
assigned to her at birth. But she does acknowledge, in her own words, that people may
misgender her because her appearance contrasts with normative expectations of women in
society.
Kaur’s public defense of her gender parallels some of the experiences of seeking gender
affirmation for people who self-designate their genders independent from the gender assigned to
them at birth. Both Kaur and many people (e.g., some transgender people) tell others their gender
identity, or personal experience of their gender, in order to have their self-designated gender
affirmed. Kaur corrects people’s confusion about her gender by stating that she is a woman.
Similarly, people who self-designate their genders sometimes ask the people in their lives to

2

See Namaste (2000) for background supporting this concept and Ansara & Hegarty (2012) for another published
description.
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refer to them by their self-designated gender (e.g. woman) rather than the one they were given
(e.g. male).
One intention of seeking gender affirmation is to motivate people to adjust their initial or
previously held gender attribution (or lack thereof) to affirm a person’s self-designated gender.
Gender acceptance and affirmation is argued by psychologists and activists to be necessary in an
effort to promote the well-being of people with self-designated genders (Ansara & Hegarty,
2012; Hegarty, 2009; Menvielle & Tuerk , 2002; Mullen & Moane, 2013; Wilchins, 2004). For
example, the American Psychological Association (APA, 2008) created guidelines encouraging
the “legal and social recognition of transgender individuals consistent with their gender identity
and expression” in an effort to resolve the “detrimental” effects of such discrimination on
people’s “psychological, physical, social, and economic well-being” (APA, 2008). Nevertheless,
social psychologists have found evidence that misgendering and other forms of cisgenderism
continue to be enabled at multiple levels of society. Studies have shown specific evidence of
cisgenderism at the institutional level, e.g., in scientific journals and medical settings (Ansara,
2010; 2012; Ansara & Hegarty, 2012; 2013) and interpersonal level, e.g. between lay individuals
(Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000; Gamson, 1998; Israel, 2005; Namaste, 2000; Schilt & Westbrook,
2009; Serano, 2007).
In a review of peer-reviewed psychology journal articles, Ansara and Hegarty (2012)
found cisgenderism in the form of pathologizing (e.g. suggesting that a child’s gender selfdesignation is abnormal or invalid) and misgendering (e.g. referring to a child as a boy when she
has self-designated her gender as a girl). Ansara (2010; 2012) also found through patient
testimonies that people who seek basic healthcare or gender affirmative hormone therapies and
surgeries regularly experience cisgenderism in their interactions with health professionals. For
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example, therapists and endocrinologists often turn patients down, in spite of their psychological
“fitness,” for gender affirmative care, especially when patients were perceived by their doctors as
not "adequately" demonstrating or presenting themselves as the gender in which they wanted to
be affirmed (Ansara, 2010; 2012; Meyerowitz, 2002). In other words, people are denied basic
care because doctors interpret their gender presentations in cisgenderist ways—in this case, as
inconsistent with their gender self-designations. Patients seeking gender affirmative hormones
and surgeries have many reasons for presenting their genders as they do, ranging from personal
aesthetic or grooming preferences to the need to feel safe in a world that tends to be hostile
toward those who do not pass 3 as women or as men (Ansara, 2010; 2012).
Efforts to affirm a person’s self-designated gender are not always easily achieved even if
a strong effort is made to adjust (Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000). Some psychologists have
suggested that social knowledge about gender that is interpreted as irrefutable common sense
(e.g., that men have penises and women have vaginas) makes it difficult to accept a person’s
gender if they do not “pass” or are perceived to have characteristics that conflict with such
knowledge (Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 1978). Other psychologists have suggested
that the difficulties around affirming another person’s self-designated gender may have to do
with the cognitive effort it takes to revise the mental profile that someone has already created
about another person (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Devine, 1989; Israel, 2005). Still other
psychologists suggest that individual differences, e.g., people’s beliefs about gender, are a
reliable predictor of whether or not a person will outright reject the gender that people have
designated for themselves (e.g. King, Winter, & Webster, 2009; Tee & Hegarty, 2006).

3

Passing occurs when others make a judgment about a person’s gender that accords acceptance of that person’s selfdesignated gender. Passing is considered a privilege “…often taken for granted by people whose gender identities
match their assigned genders, while being considered ‘deception’” for those who self-designate their genders
(Ansara, 2010, footnote 7).
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Research has not yet empirically examined the links between these social,
cognitive, and individual factors and their mutual or combined potential as predictors of
cisgenderist responses to people’s self-designated gender identities and expressions.
Thus, the central question that motivated the current research was: What is the role of
social representations, cognitive processes, and individual traits, knowledge,
motivations, and beliefs in lay people’s judgments about other people’s gender?
Augoustinos and Walker’s (1995) integration of social representations theory with
various cognitive theories and constructs provides a useful framework for this area of
empirical inquiry. First, I present an overview of this theoretical lens and then integrate
its integration with social cognition. Later, I outline the program of research studies
conducted, the results found, and the conclusions drawn.
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Chapter 2:
Review of the Literature –Applying a Social representations Lens
For an instance of cisgenderism to occur, there first must be an ideological system of
knowledge about gender in place that impacts our gender attributions. While social cognitive
concepts and constructs (e.g., stereotypes) provide a basis for measuring the gender attribution
process, social representations theory provides the lens through which a prerequisite, ideological
system of knowledge can initially be identified and then interpreted. Social representations
theory defines social cognitive constructs as "...the visible tip of an iceberg whose submerged
portion comprises the very structures which enable the subject to construct meaningful attitudes
and attributions" (Duveen & Lloyd, 2013, p. 175). These submerged structures in social
representations theory resemble what ethnomethodologists refer to as our taken-for-granted or
"common sense" understandings about the world (Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 1978;
Medin & Ortony, 1989; Speer, 2005). The common sense understandings are what people trust
in, usually without question, to help them interpret the world around them. Thus, the current
research refocuses cisgenderism as the delegitmization of people’s designations of their own
genders by relying on social representations to make that designation for them.
Researchers have suggested that social representations theory can be used by social
psychologists to reposition our interpretation of various social cognitive processes within the
context of macro social systems (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Duveen & Lloyd, 2013; Rateau,
Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric, 2012). Below, I build toward an analysis of cisgenderism as a
knowledge system that can be measured through manipulating the variables that determine
people's gender attributions. First, I provide an overview of Serge Moscovici’s (1981) social

7
representations theory and then I integrate his theory with relevant cognitive concepts and
constructs in the sections that follow.
Overview
Social representations (Moscovici, 1981) are a useful concept for any study of people’s
perceptions because they help define how people interpret or judge objects, events, and other
people in their social and personal world. People gather information about their abstract
surroundings through their senses (e.g., sight, hearing, etc.) and then give it meaning or a
“representation” (Moscovici, 1981). Social representations are not the result of a passive process,
according to Moscovici. They are the result of humans acting as agents to describe their social
surroundings. The functional role they play is to enhance understanding and to communicate a
complex array of social phenomena, e.g., gender. Moscovici emphasized the functional role of
social representations between individuals and among cultures by explaining them as:
A system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish
an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material
and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take
place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for
social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various
aspects of their world and their individual and group history. (1973, p. xiii)
Moscovici’s description emphasizes the role of social representations in the facilitation of
individual thought as well as social communication around information that would otherwise
remain ambiguous and unfamiliar. Ambiguous or unfamiliar information is generated into social
representations through two processes: anchoring and objectification. Anchoring represents the
assimilation of unfamiliar information into existing knowledge structures and objectification
represents the transformation of unfamiliar information into its own common sense reality
independent of existing knowledge structures.
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Anchoring
We anchor unfamiliar social phenomena in what we already know when we do not have
enough information about it, or enough practice encountering it, to do otherwise. Augoustinos
and Walker (1995) explain anchoring as a cognitive process by which people classify social
phenomena that is unfamiliar to them by comparing them to culturally informed prototypes of
different categories. Anchoring is similar to the cognitive process of "subgrouping" which
explains the processes through which people sometimes mentally categorize individuals who
disconfirm group stereotypes as similar to those who confirm group stereotypes (see Richards &
Hewstone, 2001). For Moscovici (1984), this categorization process occurs at a group level such
that all people within a culture agree, without question, that individuals are categorized in a
particular way. Moscovici (1984) believed humans have a tendency toward categorizing aspects
of culture—especially unfamiliar aspects—within existing categories in order to give objects
shared meaning and shared understanding. Thus, anchoring has a positive role to play in
facilitating the communication of social knowledge
Simultaneously, anchoring can cause significant limitations in our interpretation of social
phenomena and in our ability to communicate accurately about social phenomena. Philogène
(2001) explains that anchoring occurs “through a socially created metasystem...that interferes
with us beyond our control… [and] shapes what we think and how we act toward [social
phenomena]” (p. 40). For example, scientists tend to explain new and unfamiliar phenomena in
supposedly "objective" ways when they actually rely on metaphors or analogies anchored in old
knowledge constructs to interpret their findings (see Hegarty & Pratto, 2010). When we anchor
new objects in old understandings, we are shaping them in old terms that may no longer be
relevant or may generalize them to the point that their unique qualities are made irrelevant. But
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we discuss new information via the old because doing so facilitates order and understanding in
our social interactions.
Objectification
The development of social representations independent of previously existing ones begins
with individual acts of agency, but these representations then become established and serve
functional purposes at the social level (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Hence, they are social
representations and not individual representations. The difference is elucidated in discussions of
exemplars in cognitive psychology in which people draw on their personal memories about
certain objects and phenomena in order to make generalizations about new, unfamiliar stimuli
(see Murphy, 2002). Exemplar theory emphasizes individual representations that are formed as a
result of people's subjective experiences, while social representations theory emphasizes social
representations that are formed as a result of an entire population's perpetuation of some object
or phenomenon as fact. According to Moscovici (1981), when social representations—including
ones that were once unfamiliar—become established in collective thought, they are processed as
common sense. The transformation of certain social phenomena into common sense defines the
objectification process. At the individual level, common sense understandings inculcate our
thoughts, behaviors, and interactions. As individuals, we can actively contribute to the
construction of social representations, but they simultaneously define and construct our own
thinking and behaviors. This social psychological process of constructing and being constructed
carries with it the risk that specific individuals’ interests and identities may be overlooked,
misperceived, and underrepresented.
To further understand how the objectification process operates, Abric (2001) posited that
social representations are structured around a central core of social knowledge. The central core
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includes pieces of information that have already gone through objectification and are taken for
granted or considered irrefutable common sense. The core has two functions: (1) it gives
meaning and value to the representation; and (2) it helps organize links between its various
elements that help stabilize the representation across contexts. The latter function suggests that
representations have a certain amount of resistance to change. Without its stabilizing central
elements, a representation would be socially discounted or thrown out at the slightest challenge.
Indeed, Moscovici (1984) believed that social representations do eventually “die out” as their
origin becoming “forgotten” (p. 13). Abric (2001) suggested that it is easier to change peripheral
elements than the elements that make up a social representation’s central core.
Peripheral elements have adaptive qualities that allow the representation to evolve
through different socio-historical contexts. In other words, the central core of a social
representation can go unchallenged even if peripheral elements are changed by new and
unfamiliar social phenomena. Abric (2001) explained that peripheral elements can actually help
to defend the stability of the central core by (1) marginalizing the new phenomena; (2)
reinterpreting the new phenomena; or (3) rendering the new phenomena as exceptional.
Cognitive psychologists might refer to this as "subtyping" which explains instances in which the
mental categorization of people who disconfirm membership in a group category are interpreted
as exceptions to their superordinate category "rule" (see Hewstone, 1994, for a review).
Defending the stability of the central core, or supporting their membership in a superordinate
category, explains how objects, events, or people can be peripherally incorporated into a social
representation without actually changing or threatening its underlying common sense notions.
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Objectification of expert knowledge
There are many authoritative sources from which social knowledge is transformed into
common sense including from religion, science, and government, to name a few. To describe the
effect of these authoritative sources on the objectification of knowledge, Moscovici (1981)
posited how scientific knowledge is transformed (objectified) from the reified, scientific universe
to the consensual, common sense universe. Scientists claim to identify and make sense of
phenomena in the social world “impartially and submissively” and with “intellectual precision
and empirical evidence” by “concealing [their personal] values and advantages” (Moscovici,
1984; p. 22). The view that this knowledge is objective gives people reason to accept it as fact.
This knowledge is then reappropriated by the press so that it can be exposed to and understood
by lay individuals (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).
As an example, Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) posited that the theory of hemispheric
specialization in the brain was made accessible to the public when neuroscience introduced the
idea that the left brain is the rational side and the right brain is the emotional side (also see Fine,
2010; Jordan-Young, 2010). Lay people and the press went on to use the split brain view to make
dualistic interpretations of a wide range of human and cultural behaviors, including the
explanation of gender differences through the essentialist notion of a feminized or masculinized
mind (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983; Fine, 2010). Augoustinos and Walker (1995) sum up this
transformative process by explaining that the “split brain view has proliferated so widely that it
is now endowed with an objective reality and has become part of common-sense knowledge: a
social representation” (p. 142).
Common-sense knowledge derived from science provides people with explanations of
certain groups over others (e.g., woman/men) and allows differences between groups to “operate
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invisibly and seem legitimate” (Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013, p. 178) because science is
socially regarded as “objective.” The result is that people may subconsciously or consciously use
expert knowledge to justify their judgments and, ultimately, their differential treatment of others.
Criticisms
Social representations are a compelling concept for understanding how social knowledge
develops and is established in society, but the theory has faced criticism for its theoretical
vagueness. Moscovici (1981) generally avoided specificity of sociological constructs in this
theory because he believed it would undermine the complexity and diversity of the kinds of
social representations that could be identified and studied. Moscovici (1981) maintained that
vagueness, especially around the methods needed to study social representations, is beneficial to
the discovery of the kinds of social phenomena that are central to societies. Especially when a
research topic has been fairly unexplored, such as representations of gender, an approach that
allows for a greater degree of discovery is particularly valuable. The social phenomena to be
examined, and the specific cognitive constructs in which those social phenomena may be
measured, are numerous. Researchers would need to decide which are the most beneficial to
achieve the goals of their particular inquiry. Therefore, methodological flexibility is appropriate
when studying collective thinking around diverse social phenomena. New ideas and
methodological approaches used to uncover such phenomena should, therefore, be as varied as
the societies and concepts upon which a study focuses. Inevitably, the theory has yielded a wide
range of methodological approaches (Breakwell & Canter, 1993) from both positivist traditions,
such as quantitative experiments (Doise, Clemence, and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993) and less
conventionally positivist traditions, such as ethnography (Jodelet, 1991; Psaltis & Duveen,
2006).
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An integrated solution
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) argue that the criticisms about the vagueness of social
representations theory could be resolved through a deliberate cognitive interpretation of the
theory. In turn, they suggest that criticisms about the lack of external validity of many cognitive
approaches to the study of social phenomena could benefit from the sociological perspectives
embedded in the social representations lens. In sum, the integration of these perspectives should
help resolve some of the criticisms of both.
Moscovici’s (1963) theory easily supports the incorporation of a cognitive perspective.
He saw the social and cognitive as intertwined, such as when he said that “…there is no break
between the exterior universe and interior universe of the individual (or the group). The subject
and the object are not fundamentally distinct” (Moscovici, 1969, p. 9). Moscovici was consistent
in his view that people help to construct social representations at the societal level and are
simultaneously impacted and influenced by them at the cognitive level in a mutually constitutive
relationship. The measurable objects or constructs of people's individual cognitions (e.g.,
stereotypes) correspond to representations that are socially agreed upon and taken-for-granted by
all people within social systems. Taking this a step further, Sampson (1981) argued for his fellow
cognitive psychologists "...to test and challenge the structures and practices of larger society
within which the various subjectivisms have developed" (p. 737) so that "...we would no longer
spend our time describing what is, thereby participating in its production; our aims would be
more transformative, designed to increase human welfare and freedom" (p. 741-742). Focusing
on identifying the ideological structures of cisgenderism and determining how they operate at the
social and individual levels may lead to conclusions that suggest the kind of transformation that
Sampson suggested.
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For Augoustinos and Walker (1995), this may be accomplished by integrating cognition
with social representations theory. Other researchers have shared this perspective such as Rateau,
Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric (2012) who reviewed the breadth of research into social
representations and concluded that "...the fruit of [social cognitive] processes (categories,
stereotypes, causal attributions) are to be found in the contents and the structure of social
representations" (p. 492). Cognition is viewed as a defining feature of social representations
theory such that social representations mediate our cognitive processes to give objects their
meaning (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Augoustinos and Walker (1995) describe several
cognitive theories and relate them to social representations. Following from their work and
other's work, I propose interpretations of social schema theory and attribution theory in the next
sections to help build a socio-cognitive methodological approach to studying social
representations.
Cognitive activation of social representations: Schemas
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) defined schemas as mental constructs made up of
knowledge derived from society. As in exemplar theory, schemas involve the use of our
memory. We commit information that comes from our social interactions and our individual
experiences to memory so that we may access it later on. Having access to schemas helps us to
make interpretations about the stimuli we encounter and gain a sense of mutual understanding
about our social world as we interact with others within it. Similar to anchoring processes under
social representations theory, we organize stimuli into pre-existing categories for easy access and
to help us encode stimuli at a later date. The categorization process is considered an integral
component to social schema theory. Similar to anchoring in social representations theory,
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categorization gives order to situations we encounter that are filled with a complex array of
social stimuli.
Schema theory differs from social representations theory in that it has been used to posit
a decontextualized, individualistic theory of information processing (Axelrod, 1973). Once
outside information is incorporated into memory, cognitive constructivists—as opposed to social
constructivists 4—consider the process to be entirely cognitive and individual from that point on
(Derry, 1996). A benefit of this approach is that the focus on individual cognition yields simple
quantitative measurement, such as response time, confidence, and memory during categorization
tasks. Measurements of these tasks provide insight into the extent to which a person has access to
a schema to categorize stimuli and the content that defines the schema that gets applied. Past
research has found that there is a positive relationship between shared features of stimuli and
categorization confidence, and a negative relationship between shared features of stimuli and
categorization response time (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). As
the features of new stimuli to a category increase in similarity, confidence increases and the time
it takes to make the categorization decreases. Recall of a sequence of items will typically show
content clusters in people’s categorical processing of the information from memory.
The cognitive approach to studying schemas has not yielded reliable results, however.
Meta-analyses (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) of social schema
research have found inconsistencies across studies examining response time and memory. For
example, experimental effects changed people's motivation to form either a complete impression
of a target or a straightforward impression of a target, which altered the accuracy of people's
recall of either incongruent or congruent information (see Stangor & McMillan, 1992, for a
review). Augoustinos and Walker (1995) suggested that these experimentally-created
4

See Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mrtimer, and Scott (1994) for a review of the debate between these two groups.
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inconsistencies across studies may correspond with the effects of social representations on
information that is schematically processed outside the lab.
Taking this work in the direction of social representations theory through experimental
manipulation would be consistent with the intellectual roots of social schema theory. Its roots are
found in the work of Bartlett (1932) who emphasized social context rather than the idea that
cognitive structures “originate” and “exist” in people’s heads, e.g., in their personal memories.
Reflecting these roots, Murphy and Medin (1985) posited that people's cohesive categorization
of objects are based in theories derived from world knowledges. Thus, schema research may
benefit from going back to its roots and applying a deliberate sociological lens, such as social
representations theory, to the methods and the interpretation of its study findings. The social
representations lens takes the emphasis off of individuals as responsible for the schemas they
have developed and, instead, emphasizes that the social environment influenced and helped to
sustain those schemas. With this lens, some instances of misgendering may be interpreted as
accidental products of circumstance, despite individuals' otherwise good intentions.
Cognitive application of social representations: Attributions
Much like schema theory, Augoustinos and Walker (1995) propose that attribution theory
is another area of social-psychological study that would benefit from a social representations
perspective. On the one hand, attribution theory focuses on the processes and conditions
involved in assigning certain kinds of explanations to different events. On the other hand, social
representations theory focuses on the social development and perpetuation of these explanations
through social interactions. According to Augoustinos and Walker (1995), social representations
theory can help identify the kinds of attributions people will make and under what conditions
they will make them.
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The study of attribution processes began with Fritz Heider (1958) who laid the
groundwork for attribution theory. He states that the theory tests the individual or “…the person
as the basic unit to be investigated” (p. 1). Heider posited a “common sense psychology” in
which individuals are “naïve scientists” who intuitively organize objects, events, and behaviors
into cause and effect relations. Similar to social representations theory, attribution theory
highlights the human need to assign meanings and explanations to understand their social world.
People are so inclined to organize their world that they will attribute cause and effect relations
even where no causal relationship exists (Heider and Simmel, 1944). Heider (1958) theorized
that causal relationships are more likely to be attributed to single causes rather than a complex
array or combination of causes, they are more likely to be made when there is similarity and
proximal closeness between two objects or events, and they are typically attributed to either
dispositional, internal causes or situational, external causes.
Research on attributions exposed evidence that cognitive processes in the judgment of
others often results in observable biases (for a full review, see Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). For
example, Jones and Harris (1967) found the first empirical support for the “fundamental
attribution error” in which people tend to overestimate dispositional causes and underestimate
situational causes of other people’s behaviors. Biases, such as the fundamental attribution error,
are conceptualized as biases because they deviate from the model that theorists, like Heider
(1958), previously prescribed as the rational rules for making attributions. Traditional attribution
theory proposes that people are cognitively capable of arriving at a logically formed judgment. In
the case of the fundamental attribution error, people theoretically should consider dispositional
and situational causes equally when judging other people’s behaviors, but this is not typically the
case.
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Social representations theory can help identify and interpret the cultural conditions that
cause individuals to asymmetrically rely on certain cognitive interpretations of people's
behaviors over other interpretations in their attributions. According to Hewstone (1989), social
representations mediate the attribution process by providing the normative expectations that
influence people’s cognitive judgments. For example, cross-cultural differences demonstrate that
the fundamental attribution error has its roots in the individualism that defines much of American
collective thought (Miller, 1984; Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). Miller compared the
attributions of Americans and Indian Hindus on various prosocial and deviant behaviors. He
found that older Americans and Hindus differed significantly. Americans made more references
to personality characteristics as the agent of behavior than did Hindus. Furthermore, an age
analysis demonstrated that Americans become more fixated on dispositions in their causal
attributions as they get older, while Hindu’s become more fixated on situations in their causal
attributions as they get older. These findings suggest that such fixations in the attribution process
are not innate; bias in attributions originates in the communication of widely held social and
cultural meaning systems. People's fixations should, therefore, shift in correspondence with
cultural shifts in attributions.
Measuring the current state of social representations
Despite the fact that attribution bias results from the apparent perpetuation of meaning
systems in societies and the resistance of social representations’ central core elements, social
representations are depicted as states, not traits, of societies. Moscovici (1988) proposed that all
people have the ability to create and/or modify social representations. In other words, there is
potential for misattributions or asymmetrical explanations of some people's behaviors over others
to be challenged or avoided if opposing theories are realized.
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Duveen and Lloyd (2013) framed social representations as a genetic or developmental
theory that has a psychological impact on people at three different sociological time points:
socio-genesis, onto-genesis, and micro-genesis. At each of these points, individuals have a
chance to instigate modifications or adjustments to social representations. Socio-genesis is
defined as the interactional exchange of social knowledge between social groups throughout
society. Onto-genesis is defined as the interactional exchange of social knowledge to children
and elaborated on by children. Micro-genesis is defined as the interactional exchange of social
knowledge in everyday interactions and communications between individuals. Onto-genesis and
socio-genesis develop out of the processes and experiences that take place at the micro-genetic
level (Duveen & Rosa, 1992). In other words, without small interactions and influences that take
place between individuals, social knowledge that is shared throughout society and communicated
to children would not evolve. The exchange of new and unfamiliar knowledge challenges the
current state of what we deem to be common sense.
Although an experiment conducted in a lab or lab-like setting changes the conditions of
everyday environments (micro-genesis), an experiment may provide a window into everyday
situations if it examines people’s individual processing of social phenomena that lead to
misattributions. Opposing theories that are starting to be realized within a culture may be
highlighted in people's individual processing of social phenomena. Some individuals may
attempt to avoid misattributions if they can recognize it before acting. The ability to recognize
misattributions and change them depends on the unique ability to hold two competing positions
at a time. Multiple explanations of reality can be present and at odds with each other within the
same culture or even the same person. For example, social representations theorists point to
cognitive polyphasia, which is described as the capacity for individuals (and societies) to

20
maintain different kinds of knowledge despite their conflicting explanations of reality
(Jovchelovitch, 2002; Voelklein & Howarth, 2005; Wagner, Duveen, Verma & Themel, 2000).
However, the extent to which these explanations actually destabilize a social representation—
i.e., the extent to which gender identity replaces biological characteristics (e.g., a beard) as a
typical measure of an individual’s gender—will depend on different factors related to the context
and the individual. Therefore, in the next section I describe which variables in the schema
activation and attribution processes may be beneficial to measuring the current state of a social
representation.
Response time: Automaticity and control
Earlier, I proposed response time as an example of a quantitative, cognitive measure used
to discern the time it takes people to activate particular schematic knowledge in order to make a
categorical attribution. People gain access to a schema through their awareness of and agreement
with relevant knowledge related to a social representation. Social representations may be
manipulated experimentally to determine their effects on cognitive processes such as the time it
takes people to categorize certain stimuli. This would help develop an understanding about
which social representations more strongly impact cognitive processes. For example, response
time may only differ as a result of manipulations of stimuli that are more strongly associated
with shared knowledge about those stimuli.
Awareness and agreement with that shared knowledge is established through a process
that is comparable to the development of other sociological constructs in social psychology
(Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). For instance, norms and stereotypes work similarly to schemas
in that they are established at the cognitive level through a step-by-step social-interactive
process. People gain exposure to specific categorization methods through interactions with others
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in society. The perpetuation of those methods by others aids in its commitment to memory over
time. Eventually, certain stimuli, individuals, or groups become viewed as more typical or
representative of a particular category than others (Cherniak, 1984; Rosch, 1975; Mummebdey &
Wenzel, 1999; Shafir, Smith, Osherson, 1990; Waldsuz, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003).
The features of new stimuli are compared to a prototype, or average of the category members, to
determine if it fits that category. As a result, stimuli may be judged subconsciously as typical or
atypical to their assumed category.
Kahneman and Miller (1986) posit a similar process in their theory of norms. 5 They
propose that when people judge stimuli they form a mental visualization or representation in the
form of a prototype that influences their perceptions of those stimuli as typical or atypical. This
visualization process is important to defining the features that people will reference as a basis for
comparison to new and unfamiliar stimuli that they encounter. Kahneman and Miller (1986)
suggest that visualized prototypes are informed by exemplars of stimuli and attributes that are
commonly associated with the stimuli in society. If a person is making a judgment about the
differences between two groups, social norms associated with each group inform people’s
prototype visualizations of those groups when making intergroup judgments. Often, these
visualizations produce asymmetric responses such that one group—usually the atypical group—
becomes a greater focus of people’s cognitions. For example, McGill (1993) found that
participants asymmetrically judged the performance of women and men on different tasks.
Participants contrasted unsuccessful men with successful men, regardless of the task, and
unsuccessful women with successful men on tasks typically performed by men and with

5

Augoustinos and Walker (1995) did not mention norm theory in their integrated approach probably because the
majority of research on norm theory has been conducted in the last decade or so (5 years after publication of their
book). They did, however describe norms and stereotypes as important constructs in the cognitive assessment of
social representations.
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successful women on tasks typically performed by women. In other words, the basis for
comparison was asymmetric in favor of successful men, unless the task was woman-specific and
women were performing it.
Through cognitive experiments like McGill's (1993), studies have demonstrated a
tendency for people to be asymmetrical in their judgments of groups depending on which group
was perceived as typical or atypical. When a social group has attributes that are processed as
surprising or atypical, the group often becomes “the effect to be explained,” or the target person
focused on that draws a greater need for explanation in comparison to groups with more typical,
unsurprising features (Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele , 2012; Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty &
Buechel,2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; 2004; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; Pratto, Hegarty, &
Korchmairos, 2007). Norm theory studies show one way of accomplishing Augoustinos and
Walker's (1995) suggestion for the integration of macro-social understandings in the assessment
of individualized thinking about others. They provide a cognitive interpretation for the
occurrence of asymmetries in people's explanations at the micro-genetic level and tie these
explanations to shared knowledge at the socio-genetic level. The results from studies based in
norm theory give insight into the effect of shared knowledge on the attribution process.
When traits are perceived as typical or expected, researchers have suggested that people
process this information at a fast-paced, automatic or implicit level (Bargh, 1989; Langer, 1989).
The above list of studies on norms in intergroup processing supports this claim. Specifically,
norm theory studies imply that people pay more attention to groups or persons with traits that are
rendered atypical or that go against a person’s social schema than to groups or persons with traits
that are typical or support a person’s social schema. Thus, determining which traits tend to be

23
relied on and seen as typical or atypical in the attribution process will be key to understanding
the implicitness of certain traits as either defining or contracting people's social representations.
The processing of expected norms is so automatic that explanations for those norms
simply “go without saying.” In fact, in naturalistic settings, people tend to explain situations that
are perceived as unexpected or negative (Weiner, 1985). For example, people are more likely to
make causal attributions for a sports team that wins a game if they do not originally expect that
team to perform well (Lau & Russell, 1980). If an undefeated team wins another game, the lack
of an explanation demonstrates that there is collective agreement about why an undefeated team
won again. Moscovici might suggest that the social representation (expected norm) of the team is
that it is a winning team. Therefore, the team’s victory is interpreted as common sense and it is
processed automatically. Indeed, research in many related areas of social-psychology, e.g.,
schemas (Bem, 1981), causal attributions (Rumelhart, 1984), heuristics (Fiske & Taylor, 1991;
Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) and norms (Bruckmüller,
Hegarty, & Abele , 2012; Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty & Buechel,2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001;
2004; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmairos, 2007), have all
demonstrated that people make quick judgments when expectations related to social
representations are met, but slow down to explain the unfamiliar or unexpected.
Shifts in attention can also take place simply as a result of categorical learning procedures
(Kruschke, 2003). The frequency of encountering certain stimuli can cause shifts in attention
when infrequent stimuli are presented. According to the inverse base-rate effect (Medin &
Edelson, 1988), people tend to associate distinct features with infrequently encountered
categories more often than they associate distinct features with frequently encountered
categories. When we are exposed to a new target after being frequently exposed to an old target,
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we focus attention on the new target and its unique features, while cognitively blocking out the
features it shares with the old target (Kruschke, 2003). This occurs simply due to the frequency
with which we were originally exposed to the old target; not just its unexpectedness.
Individual differences: Outcomes and prejudice
While some people may respond to unexpected stimuli by asymmetrically attending to
them, others may not. To help explain this, Gilbert (1989) drew on past research to posit that
people tend to make attributions sequentially. For example, when people favor situational
explanations over dispositional explanations of other people’s behaviors, Gilbert suggests that
people apply situational explanations second. People first “characterize” or apply dispositional
causes to explain a person’s behaviors. Then, if they do it at all, they “correct” or apply
situational causes to explain a person’s behaviors (Gilbert, 1989). For an example, recall that the
default in American society is to respond by overestimating dispositional causes of behaviors
(Jones and Harris, 1967). Characterization reflects the use of this default schema when analyzing
other people’s behaviors. But then, some people will recognize a misattribution and make the
decision to adjust their initial judgments. They actively choose to apply a different schema—one
based in applying situational causes to explain people’s behaviors.
Although some researchers have contested the notion that this process is sequential by
advocating for the idea that these processes occur simultaneously (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999),
the point that correction occurs for some people is highlighted here. Research on stereotypes and
prejudice explain how and why some people, under the right conditions, “correct” or adjust their
misattributions while others do not (e.g., Bargh, 1999; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Devine, 1989;
Fiske, 1989; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Stereotypes have been proposed as having a life of their
own as socially shared definitions or representations of certain types of persons or groups.
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Stereotypes are rehearsed so much by all members of society that all people automatically
associate stereotypes with their respective groups. At the same time as implicit measures
demonstrating these stereotyped associations, attitude measures show that people vary with
regard to their demonstration of prejudice toward certain groups (see Hoffman, Hawronski,
Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005, for a review). For example, Devine (1989) hypothesized that
individual differences in levels of prejudice do not correlate with the activation of stereotypes,
only with the subsequent application of them. Devine (1989) conducted several studies that
supported the idea that stereotypes are separate from prejudice in cognitive processing of social
representations. The primary result from these studies was that participants were similar in their
explicit or implicit generation of stereotypes regardless of measures that categorized them as low
in prejudice or high in prejudice.
Prejudice can be the result of an automatic response, but prejudice can also be avoided
through effortful control. Research on gender stereotyping suggests that it takes more effort for
people to adjust for prejudice than to simply allow automatic processes to take control of the
judgments they make (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000; Devine,
1989). Prejudice can result if cognitive resources taken to overcome prejudice are depleted.
Research has found that low levels of prejudice correlate with making less sexist attributions, but
this correlation disappears depending on the expense of cognitive resources at the time of making
the attribution. One study found that cognitive busyness through a distraction task caused people
to use sexist language who otherwise adjust for sexism in their attributions of women (Cralley &
Ruscher, 2005). In this example, the distraction task was able to reveal the strength of social
representations of women that cause people to use sexist language when describing people's
gender in spite of their individual efforts to counteract it. The impact of manipulations of
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attention on stereotyping has been supported in other research as well (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon,
1991; Harris & Perkins, 1995; Sherman, Macrae, Bodenhausen, 2011)
Gender and social representations
Up until this point, I have proposed different cognitive processes through the lens of
social representations. I’ve proposed that the socio-genesis, or current state, of social knowledge
can be interpreted through measuring the amount of time it takes to apply a schema (i.e.,
response time) and through individual differences in the actual outcomes of people’s attributions
(i.e., the content of people's attributions). But in order to truly understand the benefits of these
approaches, central and peripheral elements of social representations about gender need to be
identified. I begin with a brief explanation of the terms that I use when discussing the topic of
gender since my own perspectives and reasons for use of certain terms sometimes differ from
other theorists’ perspectives and use of similar terms. Then, I consider the findings of past
research to help delineate the relationship of gender-related traits and roles as well as physical
and biological characteristics to social representations about gender. After that, I propose gender
identity as a characteristic that is unique to current knowledge that may impact the social
representations that people have about gender. The focus on new knowledge has implications
that will help guide the next section on individual differences.
Gender and sex
Gender and sex are often viewed as distinct—gender being posited as the “psychological,
social, and cultural aspects of maleness and femaleness” and sex being the “biological
components of maleness and femaleness” (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, p. 7). In my own research,
I assume that both gender and sex are social constructions. This configuration of gender is
appropriate in keeping with a social representations lens because a widely held belief that people
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take for granted is the idea that sex is biological and therefore concrete, immutable, and binary.
Meanwhile, biological aspects of gender are just as diverse as the gender identities that are
encountered in society (see Fausto-Sterling, 2000). This interpretation of gender aligns with the
work of Kessler and McKenna (1978) who inform the direction of the studies conducted in this
dissertation. Therefore, when I refer to gender in my own writing, I adopted their approach,
which is the following:
We will use gender, rather than sex, even when referring to those aspects of being
a woman (girl) or man (boy) that have traditionally been viewed as biological.
This will serve to emphasize [my] position that the element of social construction
is primary in all aspects of being female or male, particularly when the term we
used seems awkward (e.g., gender chromosomes). The word ‘sex’ will be used
only for references to reproductive and love-making activities and, at times, in
reference to purely physical characteristics when explicating the position of
someone else who uses this word. (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, p. 7)
Peripheral elements: Traits and roles
Bem (1981) explains that people develop a schema for categorizing their own genders
through a social process called sex-typing. She defines sex-typing as “the process by which
society transmutes male and female into masculine and feminine” (Bem, 1981, p. 354).
According to Bem, in a mutually constitutive process, people dichotomously link women and
men to traits and roles that are perceived as feminine or masculine, respectively. She developed
the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI) to measure sex-typing of traits according to this dichotomy,
but on a continuum in which androgyny would represent the mid-point of the scale. Spence
(1981) has criticized Bem's scale for placing femininity and masculinity as endpoints that make
it difficult to distinguish the midpoint as androgyny or as a refusal to type the target as masculine
or feminine. She also suggested that the scale, as well as the Personal Attributes Questionnaire
(PAQ; Spence & Helmreich, 1978), does not measure sex-typing or schematization, and instead
measures gender identity as multifactorial. She found that most people identify their genders
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according to traits that are gender-congruent while ignoring the fact that they do not have certain
gender-congruent traits and/or that they simultaneously possess gender-incongruent traits. But
how susceptible to change are people’s social representations of gender-related traits and roles
with regard to other people?
López-Sáez, Morales, and Lisbona (2008) measured schemas as stereotypes of others.
They looked at the stereotyping of traits and roles at two different time intervals in Spain: 1993
and 2001. Classical trait-based dimensions were used which dichotomize expressive-communal
traits (e.g., friendly) from instrumental-agentic traits (e.g., assertive). In 1993, these traits were
assigned to women and men respectively. In 2001, they found that the content of Spanish
people's schematic stereotyping were still dichotomous. However, they found that they seemed
to change their perceptions of traits that are typically assigned to men such that women were
assigned to instrumental-agentic traits just as often as men. López-Sáez, Morales, and Lisbona
(2008) argued that this adjustment in trait-stereotyping explains the changes in role stereotyping
that co-occurred in the general, worker population of Spain. During this period, gender-based
stereotyping significantly decreased with regard to roles related to paid work outside the home.
Thus, traits and roles were susceptible to changes over time just as peripheral elements are
depicted as mutable under social representations theory.
Similar to social representations, Bem (1981) acknowledged that the application of
gender schemas (sex-typing) as a universal process that has content that differentiates crossculturally in accordance with a culture’s enforced social roles. Furthermore, Bem (1981)
emphasized that gender schemas and their application to stimuli can evolve within a single
culture. According to Bem (1981), sex-typing contributes to an “evolving gender schema” used
“to evaluate and assimilate new information” as it is encountered throughout everyday life (p.
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355). The evolution of social representations of gender is depicted through the changing
attribution of traits and roles to certain genders in societies.
Like schema theory in general, Bem’s theory may benefit from a deliberate social
representations lens. Instead, she draws from social learning theory to explain that individuals
engage in sex-typing as a result of learning from adults and peers that there is a general social
agreement that sex determines certain roles and behaviors are meant either for females or for
males. Although social context is considered, this position neglects to account for how people
come to accept the woman-man and femininity-masculinity dichotomies in the first place.
Emphasizing this point is Bem’s (1981) persistence in using the term “sex-typing.” Spence's
(1993) emphasis on the multiple factors that contribute to gender identity was an improvement
on this. But Bem's (1981) use of the term “sex” rather than “gender” is an example of the
cisgenderist characterization of “female” and “male” biology as immutable. Use of the term
"sex" reproduces the social representation of a factual, essentialized, and binary gender
regardless of her separate perspective on the fluidity of gender traits and roles. Use of the term
sex while only questioning why people attach certain roles to sex suggests a personal acceptance
of a common sense biological dichotomy between women and men. A social representations lens
would question the assumption of this dichotomy as well as the ethnocentric assumption inherent
in her definition of sex-typing since not all cultures treat gender as binary. For example, at least
five gender categories are have been documented in Bugis society in Indonesia (Davies, 2007).
Next, I turn to research on gender attributions which takes into account the underlying
importance of physical and biological characteristics in people’s cognitive processing of other
people’s genders in the general population of Western/American society.
Central elements: Physical and biological characteristics
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There have been a limited number of empirical studies that consider the social
representations of gender involved in the attribution process. Gender attribution studies in social
psychology that follow a traditional causal attributions model have been in the majority (see
Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Galper & Luck, 1980; Koch, Muller,
& Sieverding, 2008; López-Sáez, Morales, and Lisbona, 2008). These studies helped reveal
additional role and trait-based gender biases in the perceptions of women and men similar to
Bem’s (1981) interpretation of “sex-typing.” Such studies challenge some of the peripheral,
flexible elements of social representations around gender, but neglect to address the social
representations that are central to forming people’s common sense notion of the woman-man
dichotomy. Researchers who developed studies from the perspective of ethnomethodology were
the first to ask questions that addressed the foundation upon which traits and roles are ultimately
built, i.e., "essential" features such as physical and biological characteristics (Garfinkel, 1967;
Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Medin & Ortony, 1989).
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodogical perspective 6 has much in common with social
representations theory. Social representations theory and ethnomethodology are extremely
similar in terms of how they describe the sharing of social knowledge. Both discuss
communication (in various forms) as the means through which social knowledge is shared in
societies (see Potter and Edwards, 1999). However, they differ in approach to doing research.
Ethnomethodologists seek to identify the methods through which people make sense of their
surroundings while social representations theorists seek to explain why those methods are there
in the first place. Moscovici (2001) actually criticized ethnomethodology for focusing too much
on identifying norms and explaining how they are used in communication practices without
6

Garfinkel developed his ethnomethodological perspective in critique of structuralist interpretations of people’s
relationship to society (for review of this critique, see Heritage, 1984).
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explaining their collective representation in social discourse. In turn, Potter and Edwards (1999)
have criticized social representations theory for its disinterest in analyzing micro-interactions
(e.g., through conversation analysis).
Regardless, researchers from both camps seem to similarly theorize that social knowledge
transforms into common sense understandings that are then applied (and are able to be studied)
at the individual level. In the opening to their gender attributions research, Kessler and McKenna
(1978) propose that ethnomethodologists question taken-for-granted understandings about our
world by seeking to identify the “objective facts” that people and societies create.
Ethnomethodologists seek to uncover how people individually (re)produce the existence of these
facts in their everyday lives in specified situations. Instead of calling them common sense
understandings or the central core elements of social representations, Garfinkel called them
“natural attitudes.” From this perspective, shared social knowledge about gender is viewed as a
belief system. Ethnomethodologists do not suggest a wrongness or rightness to these beliefs; they
are recognized as real to their believers. The motivation is to identify the methods used to
perpetuate social knowledge as real to those who believe them.
Garfinkel identified gender as an example of a concept imbued with common sense
notions. He mainly used case studies to derive several natural attitudes central to people’s
knowledge about and (re)production of gender in Western culture (see Garfinkel, 1967). Kessler
and McKenna (1978) paraphrased these into eight natural attitudes:
1. There are two, and only two, genders (female and male).
2. One’s gender is invariant. (If you are female/male, you always were female/male
and you always will be female/male.)
3. Genitals are the essential sign of gender. (A female is a person with a vagina; a
male is a person with a penis)
4. Any exceptions to two genders are not to be taken seriously. (They must be jokes,
pathology, etc.)
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5. There are no transfers from one gender to another except ceremonial ones
(masquerades).
6. Everyone must be classified as a member of one gender or another. (There are no
cases where gender is not attributed.)
7. The male/female dichotomy is a “natural” one. (Males and females exist
independently of scientists’ [or anyone else’s] criteria for male and female.)
8. Membership in one gender or another is “natural.” (Being female or male is not
dependent on anyone’s deciding what you are.) (pp. 113-114, all parentheses and
emphases are Kessler and McKenna's remarks)
In line with other ethnomethodologists, Kessler and McKenna (1978) temporarily suspend a
belief in the above “realities” in order to understand how those realities are constructed and
reconstituted in people’s everyday lives.
Kessler and McKenna (1978) identified the process of assigning a gender to another
person (“the gender attribution process”) as an everyday process that could answer the question:
How do people construct their “natural attitudes” toward gender? Resembling the
objectification of social representations, Kessler and McKenna suggest that social ideologies
become so widely accepted and engrained in our understanding of the world that we do not even
question them—they are common sense. They conceptualized the attribution process as a general
process in which information is inferred and interpreted through” implicit rules” that involve
“deep structure[s] of social interaction” (p. 18). In other words, attribution processes determine
the central elements that form people’s social representations, and these elements act implicitly
on cognitive processes to produce potentially prejudiced interpretations and judgments.
Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) studies sought to assess people’s attributions of the
categories “female” and “male.” Information in the form of different characteristics about a
hypothetical person was manipulated in ways that contradicted or aligned with stereotypical
notions of “female” and “male.” This manipulation helped reveal which of the hypothetical
person’s characteristics were relied on the most when people made a gender attribution. To
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accomplish this, Kessler and McKenna (1978) conducted two major studies: The first was their
“Ten Question Gender Game” and the second was their “Overlay study.”
For the Ten Question Gender Game, gender information was communicated through
questions generated by the participant, which might include questions about gender role
behaviors (e.g. having a 9-5 job), genitals (e.g. penis), “secondary” physical characteristics (e.g.
breasts), gender expression through clothing (e.g. wearing skirts) and more. Their questions were
then either confirmed or disconfirmed by the experimenter through randomized “yes” or “no”
responses. The participants had to make a gender attribution and explain their answers after each
time the experimenter gave a response. Based on participants' responses, Kessler and McKenna
concluded that: (1) the gender attribution process involves assessing and giving meaning to
information that is socially shared, and that information such as biological or physical
characteristics, in particular genitals, are more important than other information (gender roles) in
determining other people’s gender; (2) modifying Garfinkel’s (1967) claim that genitals are
equally essential to both genders, knowledge about the presence of a penis provides more insight
into a person’s gender than presence of a vagina; and (3) the first gender attribution made about
someone else acts as a filter for explaining the rest of that person’s behaviors/characteristics.
The first two of these conclusions are compelling and I elaborate on them below. The last
conclusion, regarding the finality in people’s decision when assigning a gender, may be the result
of a limitation with the ten questions game. First, people received gender information
sequentially. Second, participants were asked to make a dichotomous decision and commit to it
verbally to the researcher after every answer was given to their questions. This format may have
caused people to become defensive when they were then given subsequent and conflicting
information. In natural settings, people may receive several pieces of information upfront or at
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once. They may have the opportunity to assess several characteristics at once or pick and choose
which ones to consider that they deem relevant, even if some of those characteristics must be
imagined or assumed to exist (e.g., genitals beneath clothing). The next study they conducted
overcame this limitation.
For the Overlay study, participants were asked to attribute “female” or “male” to 96
variations of the same line-drawing image of an individual by using overlays to create different
combinations of hypothesized gender-related characteristics. Characteristics included: long/short
hair, wide/narrow hips, breasts/flat chest, no visible body hair/body hair, vagina/penis, and
"unisex" shirt/pants. When participants were expected to provide an even number of female
attributions as male attributions to certain figures (e.g. a figure with genitals covered), they
disproportionately used a male attribution. They applied a male attribution to figures more often
regardless of whether the genital regions were covered or uncovered. People tended to view
“female” characteristics as “male” more often than male characteristics were viewed as female.
People had a tendency to perceive different figures as male regardless of other available
information. For example, in figures with the genital region uncovered, the presence of a penis
almost always (96 percent of the time) resulted in a male gender attribution, while presence of a
vagina was not as definitive. The vagina needed the presence of two other characteristics (e.g.,
breasts and long hair) to come close to receiving a female attribution as often as the presence of a
penis received a male attribution. Kessler and McKenna (1978) concluded, “Penis equals male
but vagina does not equal female” (p. 151) in the attribution process.
Combined results from these studies revealed empirical support for Garfinkel’s (1967)
suggestion that our society holds several “natural attitudes” toward gender. The findings suggest
several important interpretations of the ways in which people think about, interpret, and make

35
judgments about other people’s genders. First, information is shared in the same sense that
Moscovici described about social representations. Their findings demonstrate a collective
agreement about genitals as the ultimate characteristics that constitute women and that constitute
men. Social representations explains that genitals have been communicated by authorities and
then perpetuated by members of society to establish them as common sense, irrefutable
characteristics that define women and men. Although children early on in their development
often believe that women and men have some essence that makes them women and men,
children do not usually identify genitals as the essential characteristic (see McConaghy, 1979).
Children eventually learn that genitals are significant through social communication over time
(Gelman, 2004). Often, this communication is derived from authoritative sources, e.g., parents
and doctors. When it comes to determining gender, the typical method used by authorities (e.g.
doctors, scientists) in U.S. society and other Western societies is to identify and measure
biological markers (e.g. genitals) to make a gender assignment in utero or at birth (see FaustoSterling, 2000). Therefore, a biologically deterministic schema for gender attribution that relies
on similar markers is likely to be a core social representation that gets communicated at a young
age and is easily accessed, supported, and perpetuated throughout people’s lives.
Kessler and McKenna (1978) concluded that gender attribution is genital attribution—
even when genitals cannot be physically seen. Garfinkel (1967) proposes the cultural genital as
the gender that people attribute to a person based on assumptions about their genitals because
they cannot actually see a person’s genitals. In Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) studies, the
corresponding genitals are assumed to be there even when a figure’s genital region is covered by
clothing. After all, people cannot see a person’s genitals when they are making a gender
attribution in everyday situations. People visualize or assume the genitals are there after
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assessing other characteristics. According to the research on categorization processes outlined
above, this visualization should be automatic (unless our judgments of a person's characteristics
are inconsistent with our interpretation of other characteristics).
Findings also specified that gender attribution is not only genital attribution—but penis
attribution, specifically. The male cultural genital (penis) was assigned more often than the
female cultural genital (vagina). For Kessler and McKenna (1978), these results emphasized
androcentrism in society. Androcentrism involves the tendency to view maleness as normative
and femaleness as representative of differences in gender. Males are often equated with humanity
and seen as the default gender (see Bem, 1981). Recent research has demonstrated that
androcentrism has not dissipated in nearly thirty-five years since Kessler and McKenna’s (1978)
studies (Braun & Kitzinger, 2001; Hegarty & Buechel, 2006). Thus, genitals appear to be a core
element of social representations of gender that result in misattributions of people's gender.
A recent study by Speer (2005) demonstrates further support that the cultural genital is a
persistent, core element of social representations of women and men in contemporary society.
Speer (2005) demonstrated people’s propensity to make binary gender attributions that reflect
Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) cultural genital finding. With its roots in ethnomethodology,
Speer’s (2005) study applied conversation analysis to transcripts of individuals in focus groups
who were asked to determine what was happening in different photographs held up by the
experimenter. Through this level of analysis, nearly thirty years after Kessler and McKenna’s
(1978) work, people still tended to take cues from the context of the photograph or the external
characteristics of the target person depicted in the photographs and then applied binary
(female/male) notions of gender to identify their genders (Speer, 2005). Furthermore, they did so
without the constraint of a split gender choice when making those attributions. Most of the time,
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participants implicitly attributed gender to the person or people in the picture by discussing the
scene with binary gender pronouns like “she” or “him.” Speer (2005) noted that participants had
difficulty identifying the gender of the pictured person and would attempt to come up with an
explanation for their gender; a reflection of past research findings that demonstrated people's
asymmetric explanatory focus on the unexpected or atypical group (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto,
2001). When trying to identify the gender of the pictured person, participants tended to
rationalize their way to assigning a female or male gender label by taking into account different
contextual and target cues. In other words, people had methods or ways of producing a dual
gender interpretation of the photographs, even if people perceived the photographs as depicting
gender in an ambiguous or atypical way. Findings such as these suggest that the cultural genital
norm is still a central component of social representations about gender today.
Methodological concerns and considerations
One observation of Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) studies is that—similar to the binary
gender anchors in Bem's sex-typing scale—their experimental design may have reinforced a
gender dichotomy through the instructions given to participants. For the Ten Questions Gender
Game, Kessler and McKenna (1978) told people to decide between the binary gender categories,
female and male. Similarly, in the Overlay study they asked people to determine if a female or
male was pictured. As a result, people could only assign people as one gender or the other. This
experimental constraint limits the study to pointing out binary miscalculations, rather than
miscalculations that derive from making an ambiguous calculation about other people’s genders.
After all, judging people as neither a woman nor a man or less of a woman or less of a man
because they are perceived to be inauthentic in their womanness or manness is equally as
cisgenderist as making a binary gender attribution that opposes a person’s gender identity. All of
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these gender judgments similarly delegitimize people’s self-designated genders (see Ansara,
2010).
The dichotomous choices that Kessler and McKenna (1978) implemented were, however,
appropriate to their intentions with the study, however. They intended for their approach to
demonstrate “…what transexualism can illuminate about the day-to-day social construction of
gender” (p. 112). Here, transsexualism refers to characteristics that contradict stereotypical
notions of “female” and “male.” Thus, Kessler and McKenna (1978) were interested in how
contradicting characteristics cause people to rely on certain characteristics over others to make a
determination that supports the gender dichotomy. They did not suggest that the contradicting
characteristics might cause people to deny others a position in that dichotomy altogether.
Furthermore, Speer's (2005) study suggested that people tend to rationalize their way to a
dichotomous gender attribution regardless.
Nevertheless, the experimenter reinforcement of a two-category choice may limit the
ability to identify when perceivers' social knowledge about gender has developed to challenge
this dichotomy. Participants in the Ten Questions Gender Game broke the “rules” twice by
spontaneously suggesting the gender labels “hermaphrodite” and “transsexual.” This suggests
that at least some people at the time of their studies (the 1970s) had knowledge of gendered
groups that may be depicted as “outside” the woman-man dichotomy. When people have the
opportunity to assign non-binary categories, they may essentialize the target person as distinct
from the traditional binary similar to how they distinguish between groups in research on
subgrouping (see Richards & Hewstone, 2001). While being essentialized as a non-binary gender
is unproblematic for people who identify with that category, this form of misgendering can be
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problematic for people who do identify as either a woman or a man. In the next section, I
consider the impact of this differentiation.
The special case of gender identity in attributions
Gender identity is a special Western concept and characteristic that, like the cultural
genital, is difficult to perceive from the outside. Gender identity has to do with the feelings that
people have about their own gender—information that is difficult for a perceiver to know for
certain without asking the individual (Kessler & McKenna, 1978). The concept of gender
identity is sometimes defined in such a way that it re-essentializes gender as a biological, innate,
and immutable characteristic that is “between the ears” rather than “between the legs” (see
Laqueur, 1990). This definition is commonly used among psychologists and other authoritative
individuals who are invested in distinguishing between “sex” and “gender” (e.g., Diamond,
2002; Unger, 1979), potentially making it into a new kind of social representation about gender
particularly in the discourse of American/Western society. 7 Many individuals experience their
gender identity as distinct from their physical sex and want to be perceived only as the gender
that corresponds with their identity (see Prosser, 1998). For example, Sandy Stone (1991)
examined the autobiographies of women with a self-designated gender that was independent
from the male gender assigned to them at birth and found that they persisted in their belief in the
existence of two, distinct, biological genders. 8
However, as discussed earlier in this introduction, not all people are perceived as their
gender identity to others. Recall Kaur’s experience as a self-identified woman: she
acknowledged that the presence of her beard was perceived as inconsistent with normative

7

Gender itself, including gender identity, has been argued to be an ethnocentric concept that does not translate to
other cultures. See Oyěwùmí (1997) for a discussion about inapplicability of gender to some African societies.
8
For an example of an “intersex” person’s position reflecting this same perspective, see Garfinkel’s (1967) case of
“Agnes.”
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expectations of women, a perception that caused confusion about her gender. Misattributions
having to do with a discrepancy between a perceiver’s gender attribution and a target person’s
gender identity can arise when people make assumptions about a person’s gender based on their
perceptions of external information. Since gender identity is an internal characteristic, people
must be told or they must ask in order to know it. Even the very idea that gender identity
qualifies gender suggests that gender identity and a person's gender are purportedly two separate
concepts with two potentially different values. For instance, people rely on social representations
about gender that do not include asking someone their own perceptions of their gender as the
foremost method for making a gender attribution. People attempt to identify other people’s
genders using other characteristics, e.g., their voices, their body hair, their genitals, etc. As I have
described, reliance on these other characteristics can result in misgendering. Therefore,
cisgenderism includes instances of all judgments or positions that deny the legitimacy of a
person’s own gender self-designation, such as denying their gender self-designation if they were
not born with the gender identity they designate for themselves, if they did not present “crosssex” behaviors in childhood, or if they do not have brain or genetic characteristics that
stereotypically align with their designated gender. Although some individuals may personally
interpret their gender identity or gender experience as innate, moving beyond cisgenderism
involves granting people the right to designate their gender for themselves regardless of its cause
or origin (see Ansara, 2010). Again, cisgenderism is the delegitmization of people’s designations
of their own genders by relying on social representations to make that designation for them.
According to the socio-genesis of social representations, social practices and norms may
eventually change as micro-genetic interactions such as those with Kaur continue to challenge
normative expectations of gender. Increases in attention to individuals like Kaur may contribute

41
to more people adopting social practices that lead to a full cultural shift, e.g., a shift toward a
common practice of asking people their gender identities before authoritatively assigning a
gender to them. Information about the amount that the media has covered stories that include
people with self-designated genders is limited. However, one magazine article claims that from
2006 to 2007 news coverage of people with self-designated genders (e.g., “transgender people”)
and their experiences nearly doubled (Hollar, 2007). Recently, Barney's began a campaign
featuring transgender models with an over 30-minute documentary-style video about their stories
affirming their genders socially, medically and administratively. Barney's collaborated with the
National Center for Transgender Equality to produce the campaign "... with hopes to help break
stereotypes and build social acceptance of the transgender community" (Brothers, Sisters, Sons
& Daughters, 2014). With such coverage about people with self-designated genders in the media,
gender identity may be starting to be a characteristic that people want to know about and may
factor into their judgments before they take people’s appearance, the sound of their voice, or
other characteristics at face value and jump to conclusions about their genders.
Similarly, increasing media coverage and emphasis on the importance of genetics and
chromosomes in health and science may suggest that characteristics such as chromosomes are
also becoming an important consideration in the profile of determining people's gender (Hansen,
2006). Future studies may consider including gender identity and chromosomes as elements that
inform the gender attribution process. Pairing these elements with greater flexibility in the
gender choices that perceivers can attribute would provide insight into the socio-genesis of social
representations about gender and their correlation with gender misattributions. With information
about personal identity, genitals, and chromosomes provided, categorizing people as anything
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other than people’s personal gender identities would suggest a cognitive bias stemming from
their social representations.
Individual differences in attribution processes and social representations
Challenges to normative expectations related to gender (Kessler & McKenna, 1978;
Speer, 2005) may result in individual differences in the attributions that people make—especially
when one of those challenges has to do with information that is provided about a person’s gender
identity. Recall Gilbert’s (1989) description of the sequential attribution process. People first
automatically make dispositional attributions of other’s behavior because these come from
American social representations regarding individualism. Then, some people correct for these
misattributions by considering the situational attributions of other’s behavior. I predict that
gender attributions will be made in a similar step-by-step process. But what are the individual
differences that predict people’s propensity to engage in the second, “correcting” step of this
process?
Moscovici (1963) initially used the construct of individual attitudes to account for the
structure of social representations. He posited that representations of objects simultaneously
constitute people’s attitudes toward those objects. Attitudes, while seen by many social
psychologists as individualized, mental constructs (e.g., Allport, 1935; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993),
are depicted here as social because they are linked to social values (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984). In
other words, an assessment of attitudes toward an object provides a window to understanding the
social representation of that object. Subsequently, Doise (1989) once explained that attitudes
depend on people’s individual exposure to particular social knowledge. Thus, the two
overarching individual measures that may predict differences in people’s gender attribution
outcomes are: (1) exposure to social information that challenges common sense understandings
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of gender, i.e., when the reliability of individuals’ genital attribution practices are challenged;
and (2) attitude measures that, in the past, have been found to correlate with less prejudice
toward persons with self-designated genders and the groups with which some of these persons
identify, e.g., transgender persons. Below, I outline the research that suggests why these two
overarching individual measures may relate to differences in the outcome of misgendering.
Quantity and quality of contact with perceived out-groups
Contact with particular groups with which people do not share membership ("outgroups")
and certain personality traits that facilitate the frequency and quality of such contact may predict
some of the variance related to gender misattribution. This relationship was first examined by
sociologist Robin Williams, Jr. (1947), who published a review of ingroup relations research that
primarily focused on racial and ethnic prejudice. His findings confirmed researchers’ and
practitioners’ early speculations that contact between groups has a positive effect on people’s
attitudes toward each other. Williams’ findings provided the needed support for Gordon Allport
(1954/1979) to introduce the intergroup contact theory to the field of social psychology. He
proposed that prejudice between groups is reduced when several contextual factors are met: (1)
equal status between groups; (2) common goals between groups; (3) intergroup cooperation; and
(4) cultural or authoritative support.
Many studies were subsequently conducted to examine the intergroup contact theory.
Reviews of this literature have shown conflicting results. Some reviewers concluded that
increases in prejudice among study participants may not extrapolate to entire outgroups (Forbes,
1997; McClendon, 1974) , that increases in prejudice rely on the nature of the relationship
between individuals (e.g., friends v. acquaintances) from each group (Riordan, 1978), and that
many other contextual factors must be present for contact to reduce prejudice (Stephan, 1987).
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As a result, some social psychologists have concluded that “the initial hopes of contact theorists
have failed to materialize” (Hopkins, Reicher, and Levine, 1997, p. 306).
Nevertheless, these past reviews have been criticized for missing the inclusion of
important publications in their analyses, for lacking strict rules for inclusion of certain
publications over others, and for the inclusion of research that was not quantitative (see
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) suggested that simple exposure to other
groups increases people’s overall liking of them. They hypothesized that the other factors cited
by Allport, such as having equal status or common goals, simply help facilitate the effect already
set in motion by exposure alone. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis that
strictly focused on studies that examined intergroup contact as the independent variable and
prejudice as the dependent variable, studies that looked at contact between specific social groups
rather than interpersonal groups, and studies that measured direct intergroup interaction that took
place rather than the proximity of two groups. The results of their rigorous meta-analysis clearly
suggested that intergroup contact reduces prejudice between groups.
Some social psychologists debate that contact theory overlooks actual experiences of
contact in favor of ideal experiences of contact (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Thus, a
reorientation in the design of research on the contact hypothesis has been suggested. For
example, focusing on individuals' own interpretations of the contact they have with outgroups
may be important to isolating contact with outgroups that is interpreted as positive rather than
negative. A focus on people's own interpretations—e.g., whether or not those contacts are
perceived as friends—may accomplish the goal of assessing people's actual experiences with
outgroups. Recent research also suggests the importance of flipping the coin to examine the
impact of contact on the historically disadvantaged group. In some social contexts, contact may
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reduce disadvantaged groups motivation to fight for equality because of the positive relationships
they develop with advantaged groups (see Durrheim, Jacobs, Dixon, 2013).
Some researchers have become interested in studying the impact of personality traits on
the contact-prejudice effect. Who is more likely to have contact with outgroups in the first place?
Who is more likely to have contact that results in positive experiences that strengthen the
contact-prejudice effect? Jackson and Poulsen (2005) proposed a mediation model where the Big
Five Personality traits were hypothesized to influence the contact-prejudice effect. For instance,
the authors drew on research showing that people higher on the openness to experience trait are
more likely to seek out and enjoy new experiences (see McCrae & Costa, 1997). Thus, people
who are more open to experience are more likely to initiate contact with outgroups and come
away from that contact with positive feelings about the outgroups. The authors also drew on past
research showing that people higher on the agreeableness trait tend to have more positive
interpersonal relations with people from friends to strangers suggesting that agreeableness also
facilitates positive outcomes of contact with outgroups (see Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Indeed
their model was supported in a study measuring the mediation of personality traits between
contact and prejudice toward Asian and African Americans. Results suggested that openness and
agreeableness mediate the contact-prejudice effect such that greater openness increases
frequency of contact and both openness and agreeableness raise the quality of the contact,
resulting in an overall reduction in negative attitudes toward Asian and African Americans.
Although a peer-reviewed analysis has not yet published clear evidence, increases in
media coverage (Hollar, 2007) and advertising campaigns like Barney's recent one (Brothers,
Sisters, Sons & Daughters, 2014) suggest people may be becoming more aware of concepts like
gender identity as an important characteristic to defining people’s genders. One hypothesis
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derived from this is that individuals, who might refer to themselves as "allies," may be becoming
more supportive of certain groups, e.g., transgender people, who experience disproportionate
amounts of gender-related prejudice in society (Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). In primarily
qualitative studies, ally status was found to be commensurate with positive attitudes and less
prejudice toward the group to which they are allied. In alignment with contact theory, ally status
has also been found to be a product of prior exposure to individuals within the allied group
(Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). Therefore, ally status to groups, e.g., transgender people, may
contribute to fewer gender misattributions. Examining ally status may be a promising area to
explore in light of recent concerns among researchers about the reduction in motivations to fight
for inequality among disadvantaged groups as a result of contact with advantaged groups (see
Durrheim, Jacobs, & Dixon, 2013). In contrast, the title "ally" is often given because of causerelated support and resources that allies provide to fighting equality (see Stone, 2009).
The above research on prejudice demonstrates that contact and ally status with
transgender people as well as the personality traits that facilitate the frequency and quality of
such contact may be related to gender misattributions. People’s exposure to transgender people
may inform them about concepts, such as gender identity, that may impact the ways in which
people view other people’s genders. Thus, contact with transgender people may contribute to less
gender misattributions.
The impact of attitudes and beliefs about gender on cisgenderist responses
Cisgenderism defines institutionalized assumptions that cause gender misattributions and
delegitimizations that affect a large number of individuals and social groups. There are no
existing attitude scales or measures of prejudice that represent cisgenderist attitudes in the same
way that concepts such as sexism, heterosexism, or transphobia have previously been measured.
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Therefore, I turn to existing measures that may invoke some of the underlying assumptions that
promote cisgenderist outcomes. Recall that the core of cisgenderism is denying others the right
to determine their own gender. Instead of allowing people the authority to define their genders
however they see fit, people tend to impose gender on others based on their own preconceived,
social representations of what gender is supposed to look like.
Drawing on what Kessler and McKenna (1978) found, the cultural genital is a biologybased social representation of gender that seems to be the core element used to inform people’s
perceptions of a target person’s gender. In their study conducted in the United Kingdom, Tee and
Hegarty (2006) created a Biological Gender Beliefs scale, a measure developed out of a scale
measuring "beliefs about trans people," which found that higher endorsement in the belief that
gender is determined by biology predicted more negative attitudes toward trans people’s rights.
They also measured people’s Beliefs about Gender, a scale that was originally developed to
assess for attitudes that correspond with Garfinkel’s (1967) natural attitudes about gender.
Although this measure was not found to significantly correlate with attitudes toward trans
people’s rights, the scale is new and has not been tested widely enough to conclude whether or
not higher endorsement of these beliefs increase people's tendency to misgender. Furthermore,
no study to date has determined the extent to which the endorsement of either the Biological
Gender Beliefs scale or the Beliefs about Gender scale impact the relationship between
stereotype-inconsistencies in a target person’s gender characteristics and a perceiver’s rejection
of the target person’s gender identity.
Biology-based social representations may be measured by the concept of essentialism as
well. Allport (1954/1979) proposed that prejudice results from the perception that others—who
often form certain out-groups—share dispositional or essential characteristics. Essentialism
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involves the tendency to explain outward appearances or behaviors as indicative of underlying,
stable characteristics (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Heyman & Dweck, 1998). Some
psychologists have pointed out the significance of essentialist beliefs about gender in social
perception by identifying its endorsement by children as young as pre-school age (Gelman,
Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004). In an effort to define essentialism, Gelman (2004) explained that
essentialism describes "human constructions" rather than natural realities (p. 405). In other
words, humans construct sex as reality rather than identify its existence in reality. Haslam and
Levy (2006) found that essentialism includes the endorsement that the characteristics and
behaviors of certain groups (e.g., women and men) are biologically immutable, have defining
features, and are universally consistent across time and space. People who have essentialist
beliefs tend to have a cognitive preference for stereotype-consistency over stereotypeinconsistency when making judgments about others (Bastian & Haslam, 2007). Therefore,
essentialist beliefs should similarly affect the gender attribution process such that essentialist
beliefs moderate the relationship between gender characteristics that are stereotype-inconsistent
and gender misattribution.
Measures such as gender essentialism and biological gender beliefs may incorporate the
social representations involved in cisgenderism that other measures, e.g., trans-related prejudice,
do not include. For example, essentialism gets at the root of people making gender
misattributions and includes the delegitimization of multiple existing and not-yet-realized
gendered groups by exposing the assumptions that underlie gender in the first place. A major
criticism inherent in the essentialism and cisgenderism concepts is that measuring negative
attitudes toward specific groups reifies the existence of those groups by neglecting to call into
question the assumptions that establish those groups from the start. For example, measures of
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trans-prejudice are important to identifying who discriminates against “trans people” and
measures of transphobia are important to identifying who fears or is disgusted by “trans people.”
These measures accomplish the task of exposing that the prejudice exists, that certain people are
more likely to be prejudiced in this way, and that the prejudice has a negative impact on the
specific group of trans people (Ansara & Friedman, in press).
However, this focus on attitudes toward “trans people” does not identify what it is about
people’s perceptions of trans people that causes such prejudice in the first place. Measures of
trans-prejudice and transphobia also neglect to assess for assumptions that are made about trans
people that are harmful, but may, in fact, be involuntary or come from a place of goodwill.
People can hold opinions about a particular group that are positive while simultaneously holding
assumptions that they are not fully aware of that impact their judgments when interacting with a
member of that group (Hoffman, Hawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, et al., 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998). Thus, people who are
motivated to be less prejudiced tend to still be prejudiced at an implicit level (Ajzen, 2005;
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance,
2002). For example, research on implicit racism has clearly demonstrated this effect. The
implicit association test (which measures race-related stereotyping) captures significantly more
variance than self-report measures of racial attitudes by showing that most people tend to
asymmetrically favor “White” people over “Black” people (Nosek, et al. 2007). Implicit
measures reveal asymmetries that exist behind people's otherwise egalitarian beliefs toward
certain groups in modern culture, e.g. that black people should be treated equally to white people
(see Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Thus, measures of attitudes toward transgender people (e.g.,
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Genderism and Transphobia scale, Hill and Willoughby 2006) are not necessary to accomplish
the goals of the present research.
Additionally, the focus on trans people as the subjects of trans-prejudice and transphobia
has been criticized for its intracultural and intercultural exclusion of groups and individuals who
may not fall into the very Western category of “trans,” but who experience discrimination for
similar, underlying reasons, e.g., the experiences of Sikh-American Balpreet Kaur, Thailand’s
Kathoey people, or Indonesia’s Bissu people (Ansara & Hegarty, 2013). Although the present
study is constrained to an American population, cisgenderism offers more flexibility in the
measurement of these similar experiences of discrimination (Ansara & Hegarty, 2012).
Essentialism and biological gender beliefs may define two ways of measuring the underlying
assumptions that contribute to cisgenderist responses experienced by many different groups.
Authoritarianism & Conservatism
In their examination of anti-trans rights in the United Kingdom, Tee and Hegarty (2006)
examined authoritarianism as a construct that relates to prejudice against transgender people.
They found that part of the variance predicting opposition to trans people’s civil rights was
explained by authoritarianism, an expected outcome given the correlation between sexual
prejudice and authoritarianism in previous studies (see Herek, 2000; Whitley, 1999).
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) explained that people who score high on authoritarianism are
inclined to be prejudiced toward all groups perceived as out-groups. They explained that the
correlation has to do with a greater propensity to comply with norms, rather than just having the
personality construct of authoritarianism. However, endorsement of authoritarian beliefs can be
used to identify individuals’ willingness to comply with social norms. Zakrisson’s (2005) RightWing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale accomplishes this at least in part. The RWA is a
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psychometrically sound measure based in social-learning theory that defines three components or
factors: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression.
Conventionalism, in particular, has to do with strict conformity to social norms. Since the
underlying components of this measure have to do with norms and gender characteristics are
often stereotyped according to those norms, I suspect that endorsement of authoritarianism
would impact the gender attribution process.
Sexual prejudice has traditionally been correlated with conservatism and right-wing
politics in the United States (see Brewer, 2003). Brewer’s Conservativism scale measures two
components: moral traditionalism and egalitarianism. Moral traditionalism is defined by beliefs
about the threat of changing moral standards in society. Egalitarianism is defined by beliefs
about all people’s right to equal treatment in society. This measure was originally developed to
examine shifting public opinion in response to the gay rights movement. While there has been
much correlation between measures of sexuality-related attitudes measures and measures of
gender-related attitudes measures in past research (e.g., Tee & Hegarty, 2006), this measure’s
items are general enough to explain other outcomes. Thus, conservative beliefs may be measured
in relation to its impact on the gender attribution process.
Conclusion
In summary, social representations theory provides a theoretical framework for
examining the impact of institutionalized cisgenderism on the schemas people use to make
gender attributions at the cognitive level. Individual differences in gender attributions that lead to
affirming other people’s own gender self-designations may reveal the beginnings of a cultural
shift in social representations about gender. Looking to a person’s own gender self-designation
(e.g., their personal gender identity) may eventually replace biology as the model for determining
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a target person’s gender. However, previous research findings and scholarship on gender
attributions, stereotyping, schemas, attitudes and prejudice, and cognitive busyness have
highlighted several human tendencies that affect people's attributions about others. These
tendencies reveal some of the central elements involved in social representations about gender
that may be responsible for the persistence of cisgenderism over time. The tendencies are:
(a) people rely on characteristics perceived as essential (e.g., biological characteristics)
when categorizing other people;
(b) people demonstrate an implicit, asymmetric preference for people perceived to have
stereotype-consistent rather than stereotype-inconsistent characteristics;
(c) people categorize stimuli faster the more features of those stimuli are perceived as
categorically similar;
(d) people enact cognitive control to correct for or adjust their misperceptions or
misattributions if they are aware of and motivated to adjust them, but they will default to
these perceptions or attributions if their cognitive resources become depleted (e.g.,
through the presentation of a distraction task);
(e) people differ in their level of prejudice toward particular groups depending on certain
individual differences, e.g., having an open and agreeable personality, less contact with
outgroups, being an ally to outgroups, essentialist beliefs, authoritarian beliefs, and
conservatism relate to greater prejudice.
These tendencies inform the theoretical model, study aims, and methods that were used in the
research outlined henceforth.
The theoretical model
Based on the above analysis of the literature, I have developed a theoretical model to
explain the relationships among the gender attribution process, individual differences, and
cisgenderist outcomes (Figure 1). According to the model, people automatically process some
aspects of gender at the cognitive level through gender visualization (A) and application of a
default schema (B) to help interpret the visualization and make a final gender attribution (D).
Gender visualization is proposed as an important part of the process since Kessler & McKenna
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(1978) emphasized how people assume a person's genitals—even when they are not physically
shown—based on other characteristics of the individual. Congruent with past research on
stereotypes and automaticity (Bargh, 1999), this model suggests that this process is automatic, or
little time is spent visualizing, when characteristics are described as stereotype-consistent with
other characteristics. Similarly, application of the default schema is quick when characteristics
are expected. Gilbert (1989) discussed how some people attempt to correct their biased
attributions. Thus, the model posits that some people may engage in an explicit process in which
the default schema that was automatically applied is adjusted by applying a different schema (C)
before making the final gender attribution. Different outcomes for gender attribution depend on
the schema that the perceiver uses to interpret the target person’s biological characteristics
relative to the target person’s gender identity. When target persons’ characteristics are
interpreted as stereotype-inconsistent, some people may use a default schema (B) while others
may adjust (C) for the default schema before making a final gender attribution (D). Schema
adjustment is operationally defined as less rejection of a target person’s self-designed gender
identity (D) specifically when the target person’s characteristics are perceived to be stereotypeinconsistent.
For example, if perceivers are told to determine the gender of "G" who identifies as a
woman and has a penis, they would begin by processing their perceptions of G through gender
visualization (A). If G identified as a man and had a penis, perceivers would easily and quickly
visualize a penis and possibly imagine other biological features that are stereotypically
associated with having a penis (e.g., having a beard). However, the stereotype-inconsistency
between G identifying as a woman and G having a penis would slow down the visualization and
schema application process in comparison to if G's characteristics were stereotype-consistent. At
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first, all people will automatically apply a default schema (B) in which they rely on G's actual or
imagined biological characteristics to help them arrive at a final gender attribution. Using this
default schema, many perceivers will arrive at the conclusion that G is a man, which is a
rejection of G's gender identity as a woman, because G has a penis. However, some people will
adjust their schema (C). They will use the gender identity of G, rather than G's genitals, to make
a final gender attribution (D).
The model further suggests that individual differences (X) in cognitive processing,
derived from measures of experience, personality, attitudes, and beliefs, directly moderate the
relationship between engaging in schema adjustment in the first place (C) and making a gender
attribution (D). The model additionally posits two moderating factors on schema adjustment
processes. First, the presence of a distraction (Y) during visualization may weaken the likelihood
that people will engage in schema adjustment (C) similar to the increase in sexist language
caused by cognitive busyness in Cralley and Ruscher's (2005) study. Second, based on the notion
that circumstance can alter judgments (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995), the interpretation of
consistency or inconsistency between a target person’s gender identity and an additional gender
characteristic (Z) may also weaken the likelihood that adjusters will engage in schema
adjustment (C).
To return to the example of G, perceivers will be more likely to engage in schema
adjustment if they have the following individual differences (X): more contact with transgender
people, fewer essentialist beliefs, fewer beliefs that biology determines gender, less
authoritarianism, and less conservatism. In other words, they will be more likely to determine
that G is a woman, which demonstrates acceptance of G's gender identity (D). However, if
perceivers who typically engage in schema adjustment (C) are distracted (Y) during gender
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visualization of G (A), then they will be less likely to engage in schema adjustment (C).
Similarly, if an additional characteristic is described that is stereotypically-inconsistent with G's
gender identity as a woman (Z), such as that G enjoys wearing tuxedos to formal events, then
perceivers will also be less likely to engage in adjustment (C). Both of these factors—distraction
(Y) and an additional stereotype-inconsistent characteristic (Z)—will lead perceivers who
typically engage in schema adjustment to apply the default schema (B) and determine that G is a
man (D).
Research aims and Study Overview
Drawing on the logic of this model and the literature outlined above, I conducted a
program of research addressing several aims that correspond with the questions raised at the
beginning this dissertation. In this research, I follow the suggestions of Moscovici (2001) by
examining collective representations as they exist in the social discourse. I do so by defining
these representations as the independent variables—manipulations of target gender
characteristics (stereotype-inconsistent/consistent) that are then judged by perceivers. This
experimental design is one methodological approach, among many, to studying social
representations theory (see Wagner, et al., 1999). Each aim to these studies is outlined below:
Aim 1:

Determine how perceived stereotype (in)consistencies between a target person’s
gender identity and biological characteristics impact the extent to which
perceivers (a) reject a target person’s gender (rejection scores); and (b) take time
to judge the target person’s gender (response time).

Aim 2:

Describe the individual difference factors that impact the relationship between
perceptions of the stereotype (in)consistencies in target peoples gender
characteristics and perceivers’ (a) rejection scores; and (b) response time.

Aim 3:

Determine the impact of cognitive busyness/presence of a distraction on adjusters’
(i.e., according to the model these are people who engage in schema adjustment)
rejection scores for target people’s perceived to have stereotype-inconsistent
characteristics.
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Aim 4:

Determine the impact of an additional gender-related target characteristic (e.g.,
clothing) on adjusters’ rejection scores for target people perceived to have
stereotype-inconsistent characteristics.
Five studies were conducted to address the above aims. Study 1 tested Aims 1 and 2.

Study 1 examined the relationship between perceived stereotype-inconsistencies of a target
person's gender characteristics and the perceiver's rejection of the target person's gender identity
by rating the extent to which the target person is a woman or a man. The relationship between
the time perceivers' took to judge target people’s characteristics (e.g., gender identity, genitals,
and chromosomes) and stereotype-(in)consistencies of the target person was also determined.
Lastly, the study explored the role of individual differences in these relationships.
Study 2 extended Study 1 by specifically addressing Aim 3. The study tested the impact
of cognitive distraction on the gender ratings given to target people by perceivers who engage in
schema adjustment ("adjusters"). This study expanded on Study 1 by allowing participants more
flexibility on the rating scale used to determine target people’s gender, and by examining
additional individual differences. Study 2 also restricted the gender characteristics describing the
target to gender identity and genitals.
Similar to Study 2, Study 3 addressed Aim 3. However, Study 3 used a revised study
design aimed at strengthening the distraction task and reducing the potential confound effect of
rehearsal time between rating target people without a distraction present and rating them with a
distraction present.
Study 4 piloted new target gender characteristics in order to test the extent to which
certain gender-related characteristics (e.g., clothing) are socially represented as exclusively for
women or exclusively for men and the extent to which these characteristics are socially
desirable. The characteristics with the strongest ratings were used in the vignettes that described
new target people in Study 5.
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Study 5 used findings from Study 4 to test Aim 4. This study examined the effect of
manipulating a normative gender characteristic (e.g., clothing preference) that is perceived as
stereotype-inconsistent with the target person's gender identity on adjusters' gender judgments.
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Chapter 3:
Study 1 – Secondary Data Analysis
Kessler and McKenna (1978) concluded from their studies that certain biological
characteristics of the target—particularly the genitals—are central to the gender attribution
process. Study 1 aimed to experimentally test factors such as genitals and others that may
contribute to the gender attribution process within US society today. As a part of this process, the
current study attempts to link knowledge from research demonstrating asymmetry in people’s
judgments of others marked as surprising and who become the “effect to be explained" to the
tendency to misgender certain people over others (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Factors that
may contribute to the asymmetrical misgendering of others were investigated to determine which
ones were most strongly linked to misgendering. Since misgendering has to do with assigning a
person to a gender to which they do not personally identify, the gender identity of the target was
the primary factor used to determine when misgendering occurred. Thus, Study 1 investigated
how perceived stereotype-(in)consistencies between a target person’s gender identity and
biological characteristics affect the extent to which perceivers reject a target person’s gender.
The research on asymmetrical judgments suggests that perceivers pay more attention to
targets stereotypically perceived as surprising (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Research on
schematic categorization has also found that the more dissimilar the features of a category are,
the more time people take to categorize it (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, &
Knippenberg, 2003). Study 1 assessed response time to help determine which combinations of
stereotyped features of targets are processed more quickly than others. Based on research on the
contact hypothesis (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and research that links personality traits to
more positive experiences with outgroups (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1997), I also hypothesized that
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factors of the perceiver may attenuate the extent to which misgendering occurs. For example,
exposure to people who are more likely to have gender-related characteristics that are perceived
as atypical (e.g., some transgender people), may lead to less misgendering and less time spent
judging the target. The gender attributions people make, the amount of time they spend making
those attributions, and individual factors related to the perceiver may shed light on the extent to
which knowledge about gender is collectively represented and individually perpetuated.
To test the above, Study 1 involved a secondary data analysis conducted on Dr. Sarit
Golub’s research study on gender perception. Dr. Golub developed the design of the experiment
and collected the data in her lab with a team of research assistants. I then conducted an analysis
of the data based on post-hoc inquiry stemming from the model I proposed in Figure 1. I
examined the relationship between stereotype-inconsistent gender-related target characteristics
and perceiver “rejection” of the target’s gender identity. I also examined whether there were
differences in response time when rating targets with stereotype-inconsistencies compared to
those with stereotype-consistent characteristics. Furthermore, I tested contact with transgender
people and specific Big 5 personality traits (e.g., openness and agreeableness) as covariates that
might influence rejection or acceptance of a target's gender identity.
Participants
Study 1 participants were 151 students from Hunter College in New York City (NYC)
who received course credit for their participation in the study. Of these 151 students, 24 (15.3%)
students did not pass the manipulation check, which was used to determine people’s basic
knowledge about the stereotyped association between XX chromosomes and women as well as
XY chromosomes and men. Therefore, the final sample used in Study 1 analyses was 127
participants.
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Table 1 shows full demographic data on the 127 participants. Of 125 participants who
responded to the question asking about their age, the sample ranged from 18 to 53 years old (M =
21.10, SD = 4.61). The 127 participants were mostly female-identified, mostly straightidentified, had diverse racial group representation, mostly grew up in NYC, had a diverse
representation of household incomes, and the majority were Atheist, Catholic, or
Protestant/Christian.
Method
Study 1 was conducted in the research lab. Participants completed the study on the
computer using MediaLab/Direct RT. Participants were presented with vignettes that they were
asked to rate, filled out some additional measures, and then answered background information
about themselves.
Vignettes. First, participants were asked to read a series of fictional vignettes and make an
attribution about the gender of the target person described in each vignette. A total of 16
vignettes included a description of four dichotomous gender-related characteristics (2x2x2x2)
representing a single target individual: (a) chromosomes (XX or XY); (b) external genitals
(vagina and labia or penis and scrotum); (c) gender identity (strong personal identity as a woman
and wears skirts and heels to work at a law office or strong personal identity as a man and wears
suits and ties to work at a law office); (d) sexual attraction (attracted to women and is currently
in a relationship with a woman or attracted to men and is currently in a relationship with a man).
The following is an example of one of these vignettes:
L. H. has XX chromosomes, and a vagina and labia. L. H. has a strong personal
identity as a man, and wears suits and ties to work at a law office. L.H. is attracted
to women, and is currently in a romantic relationship with a woman.
The initials used to describe each target were different for all 16 vignettes. Initials were used to
avoid the possibility of communicating gender through the use of names with different gender
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meanings. MediaLab/Direct RT software recorded participants’ responses and counterbalanced
the order of presentation of vignettes and gender characteristics within each vignette.
Rejection scores. For each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate whether they
thought the person described was a woman or a man on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 =
definitely a man, 7 = definitely a woman). In this within-subjects design, all participants were
asked to evaluate all 16 vignettes using this rating system. Predictions for this study focused on
determining the extent to which perceivers were misgendering of targets. Thus, a rejection of
self-designated gender ("rejection") variable was operationalized as the degree of discrepancy
between the target’s self-designated gender identity (e.g., L.H. has a strong personal identity as a
man) and the participant’s rating of the target’s gender (e.g., the distance between the
participant’s rating and a “1” on the scale). For all vignettes, rejection scores were coded such
that higher scores reflect greater rejection of target’s self-designated gender identity. The four
within-subjects factors (gender identity, genitals, chromosomes, and sexual attraction) yielded 16
distinct rejection scores.
Response time. As participants read and rated the vignettes, MediaLab/Direct RT
software recorded the time it took them to respond and move on to the next question (response
time). Response times were recorded in milliseconds (ms) and were converted to seconds (s) for
the final results.
Contact factor. Participants were asked the amount of contact they had with particular
groups of people who are most likely to experience cisgenderism. They were asked the number
of transgender people they know. They were also asked the number of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people they know. These questions were coded as dichotomous variables in which participants
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either knew transgender people (1”) or not (“0”) and either knew lesbian, gay, and bisexual
people (“1”) or not (“0”).
Personality factors. The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, &
Swann, 2008) was used as a brief measure of personality factors. This measure uses a Likert
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) in which participants are given a set of 10
different personality traits. This scale averages together 2 items out of the 10 to create the
“agreeableness” variable and averages together 2 different items out of the 10 to create the
“openness” variable. Participants’ scores for “openness” (M = 5.48, SD = 1.01) and
“agreeableness” (M = 4.77, SD = 0.96) were used in analyses for Study 1 in which higher scores
indicated more openness and agreeableness.
Hypotheses and Analyses
Three hypotheses were tested in Study 1:
Hypothesis 1:

Rejection will be greater and response time will be slower when the target
person’s characteristics are perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as
opposed to stereotype-consistent.

Hypothesis 2:

Stereotype inconsistency perceived between genitals and gender identity
will have a stronger impact than stereotype-inconsistency perceived
between chromosomes and gender identity on perceiver’s level of
rejection and response time.

Hypothesis 3:

Contact and personality factors such as no contact with transgender people
and less openness and agreeableness will strengthen the relationships
found in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.

Since the study seeks to understand the factors that contribute to the rejection of a person's selfdesignated gender, target gender characteristics were considered stereotype-inconsistent or
consistent depending on the target's gender identity. Based on U.S. society's social
representations of gender, chromosomes were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender
identity when XX chromosomes were paired with identifying as a man or when XY
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chromosomes were paired with identifying as a woman in the vignettes. Genitals were
considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when having a penis was paired with
identifying as a woman and having a vagina was paired with identifying as a man in the
vignettes. Sexual attraction was considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when
attraction to women was paired with identifying as a woman and attraction to men was paired
with identifying as a man. Additionally, genitals and chromosomes were considered stereotypeinconsistent with each other when having a vagina was paired with XY chromosomes or having
a penis was paired with having XX chromosomes. Henceforth, references to stereotypeinconsistencies or stereotype-consistencies between gender-related characteristics describe
participants' perceptions that those characteristics are either stereotype-inconsistent or –
consistent; not that they in reality are stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent.
Framework for testing hypotheses. The first hypothesis was tested to determine how
perceived stereotype (in)consistencies between target’s gender identity and biological
characteristics impact rejection and response time. A 2 (gender identity:woman/man) x 2
(genitals: vagina/penis) x 2 (chromosomes: XX/XY) x 2 (sexual attraction: to women/to men)
repeated measures (within-subjects) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
conducted on rejection scores and response time. MANOVA is appropriate when independent
variables are predicted to impact the pattern of responses on multiple dependent variables
(Carey, 1998). Thus, this technique was applied since I predicted that rejection and response time
would depend on the stereotype-(in)consistency of the targets' gender characteristics in each
vignette. ANOVA is more preferable in cases where the dependent variables are highly
correlated, but that was not the case for rejection and response time in this study. Another
advantage to using MANOVA over ANOVA is that it diminishes the possibility of Type I error
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(Stevens, 2009; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In order to interpret the individual impact of both
rejection and response time in this study, univariate (ANOVA) statistics were reported where
multivariate significance was found, as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001).
Interaction effects specifically between gender identity and the other target
characteristics—genitals, chromosomes, and sexual attraction—on rejection and response time
were examined through the repeated measures MANOVA. No predictions were made for sexual
attraction, but since it was a manipulated variable it was included in the analysis. The means of
the two-way interaction effects between gender identity and genitals as well as gender identity
and chromosomes were examined to interpret the predictions of Hypothesis 1. An examination of
the means of these interactions would suggest the extent to which stereotype-consistency or
stereotype-inconsistency between gender identity and the biological characteristics were
responsible for significant changes in rejection and response time. The effect sizes of each of
these interactions were examined to determine the extent of their influence and to interpret
predictions of Hypothesis 2. Partial eta-squared effect sizes were calculated to analyze any
differences between genitals and chromosomes on the outcomes. These effect sizes are
operationalized as small (.01), medium (.06), and large (.14) effects (Richardson, 2011; Stevens,
2009). For a comprehensive understanding of the full model, additional two-way interactions as
well as three-way and four-way interactions were reported.
Finally, a repeated measures multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was
conducted on rejection and response time to address Hypothesis 3. Contact and personality
factors were entered as between-subjects covariates. In order to determine the interaction effect
of these covariates and the relationship between the relevant factors and the outcomes, only
significant factors producing large effect sizes from the first analysis were included in the
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MANCOVA. Three-way interaction effects between each covariate, gender identity, and each of
the other factors were examined. An examination of the means would suggest the direction of the
impact of knowing a transgender person and/or having an open and agreeable personality on the
relationship between stereotype-(in)consistency of the target's characteristics and rejection and
response time.
Assumptions of MANOVA. The assumption of sphericity does not typically need to be met
for MANOVA (O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985). Regardless, sphericity is trivial in the present study
since the within-subjects factors only measured two levels (see Lewis, 1993). This means that
different criteria for correcting violations of sphericity (e.g., Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt)
produced the same univariate statistics, so I report univariate statistics regardless of correction.
An examination of skew and kurtosis demonstrated moderate to heavy-tailed distributions on
some of the factors—especially for the response times—in response to each vignette. There is
consensus in the literature that the repeated measures MANOVA technique is robust to
violations of normality (Bock, 1975, Cohen, 2008; Obrien and Kaiser, 1985, Stevens, 2009).
Light-tailed distributions that are non-normal are typically robust in small to moderate sample
sizes (Field, 2009). When there are heavy-tailed distributions, such as in the present study,
sample size must be large (above 50 cases) in order to be robust to violations of normality
(Stevens, 2009; Wilcox, 2005). Thus, assumptions of normality were not of concern even with
extreme non-normality since all analyses in Study 1 involved a large sample size (N = 127).
Nevertheless, to be certain that the non-normality of the data did not affect the results,
attempts were made to normalize the data and compare the outcomes. Removal of outliers—e.g.,
people who took longer than 50 seconds to make a gender attribution (n = 7)—prior to
conducting the RM MANOVA did not change the significant outcomes found without their
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removal. A log transformation of the data prior to conducting the repeated measures MANOVA
also did not change the significant outcomes found without transformation. These adjustments
actually strengthened some of the outcomes found prior to outlier removal or transformation. But
inclusion of outliers may be theoretically important to the hypotheses (Kruskal, 1960; Orr,
Sackett, & DuBois, 1991). For example, outlier responses on response time may reflect the
extent to which people find it difficult to process and interpret target gender characteristics
especially when they are stereotype-inconsistent. Thus, outliers were included in the final
analyses reported below. Also, since repeated measures MANOVA is robust to violations of
normality and transformed data produced the same significant outcomes, non-transformed data
were entered into the final analyses.
Results
Main effects. The repeated measures MANOVA produced no main effects for gender
identity, genitals, chromosomes, or sexual attraction on rejection and response time.
Two-way interaction effects. To test Hypothesis 1 and 2, the repeated measures
MANOVA on rejection and response time produced several significant two-way interaction
effects. Means and standard errors for significant results from this analysis are outlined in Table
2. A significant two-way interaction effect was found between gender identity and genitals on
both rejection and response time, F (2, 125) = 159.69, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.72. Univariate tests
(ANOVA) demonstrated rejection was significantly higher when genitals were stereotypeinconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina) compared to stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina,
man/penis) with target gender identity, F (1, 126) = 306.87, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.71. Univariate tests
demonstrated response time was significantly slower when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent
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compared to stereotype-consistent with target gender identity, F (1, 126) = 19.29, p <.001, ƞp2 =
0.13.
A significant two-way interaction effect was also found between gender identity and
chromosomes, F (2, 125) = 85.26, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.58. This effect was driven by rejection scores,
such that univariate tests demonstrated rejection was higher when chromosomes were stereotypeinconsistent (woman/XY, man/XX) compared to stereotype-consistent (woman/XX, man/XY)
with target gender identity, F (1, 126) = 171.67, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.58. Univariate tests
demonstrated no significant interaction between gender identity and chromosomes on response
time.
A significant two-way interaction effect was found between gender identity and sexual
attraction, F (2, 125) = 3.68, p <.05, ƞp2 = 0.06. This effect was driven by rejection scores, such
that univariate tests demonstrated rejection was higher when sexual attraction was stereotypeinconsistent, but only for targets who identify as men, F (1, 126) = 5.10, p <.05, ƞp2 = 0.04. In
other words, rejection was higher for targets who identify as men and are attracted to men than
for targets who identify as women and are attracted to women. Rejection was also higher for
targets who identify as men and are attracted to men than for targets whose attractions are
stereotype-consistent regardless of gender identity (i.e., women attracted to men, men attracted to
women). Univariate tests demonstrated no significant interaction between gender identity and
sexual attraction on response time.
A significant two-way interaction effect was found between genitals and chromosomes, F
(2, 125) = 5.15, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.08. This effect was driven by response time such that univariate
tests demonstrated response time was slower when targets had a vagina and XY chromosomes
compared to any other combination of characteristic regardless of gender identity (vagina/XX,
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penis/XX, penis/XY), F (1, 126) = 9.42, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.07. Univariate tests demonstrated no
significant interaction between genitals and chromosomes on rejection.
There were no significant two-way interaction effects found between genitals and sexual
attraction or chromosomes and sexual attraction.
Three-way interaction effects. A significant three-way interaction effect was also found
between gender identity, genitals, and chromosomes on rejection and response time, F (2, 125) =
4.10, p <.05, ƞp2 = 0.06. Means and standard errors for this interaction are outlined in Table
3.This effect was driven by a marginally significant effect of rejection and a significant effect of
response time. As depicted in Figure 2, univariate tests revealed that rejection increased as the
number of target biological characteristics that were stereotype-inconsistent with target gender
identity increased, F (1, 126) = 3.71, p = .06, ƞp2 = 0.03. In other words, rejection was higher
when just chromosomes or just genitals were stereotype-inconsistent (woman/XY/vagina,
woman/XX/penis, man/XY/vagina, or man/XX/penis) compared to when both chromosomes and
genitals were stereotype-consistent with target gender identity (man/XY/penis,
woman/XX/vagina). Rejection was highest when both chromosomes and genitals were
stereotype-inconsistent (man/XX/vagina or woman/XY/penis). Also depicted in Figure 2,
univariate tests demonstrated that response time slowed differently across conditions depending
on target identity as a woman or a man, F (1, 126) = 4.13, p < .05, ƞp2 = 0.03. When targets
identified as women, response time was slower when either one or both biological characteristics
(genitals and/or chromosomes) were stereotype-inconsistent (woman/penis, woman/XY)
compared to stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina, woman/XX) with target gender identity. In
contrast, when targets identified as men, response time was slower when genitals were
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stereotype-inconsistent (man/vagina) compared to stereotype-consistent (man/pens) with target
gender identity, regardless of chromosomes.
There were no three-way interaction effects between gender identity, chromosomes, and
sexual attraction, between gender identity, genitals, and sexual attraction, or between
chromosomes, genitals, and sexual attraction.
There was no four-way interaction found between gender identity, genitals,
chromosomes, and sexual attraction (data not shown).
Moderation effects. Since sexual attraction had only a small to moderate effect size in the
original analyses and since it was not a variable of interest to the original hypotheses, sexual
attraction was dropped in the moderation analyses depicted by Hypothesis 3. Means for the
remaining three factors were collapsed across the sexual attraction factor. Thus, a three-way
(gender identity, genitals, chromosomes) repeated measures MANCOVA was conducted on
rejection scores and response times with transgender contact, openness, and agreeableness
entered as covariates. The only significant interaction found was between gender identity,
chromosomes, and transgender contact on rejection and response time, F (2, 122) = 5.97, p <.01,
ƞp2 = 0.09. This effect was driven by a significant effect of rejection and a marginally significant
effect of response time. As depicted in Figure 3, univariate tests revealed that rejection was
higher overall when chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity, but
rejection was highest among people who had no transgender contact compared to people who
did, F (1, 122) = 8.50, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.07. In other words, rejection was higher for people who do
not know at least one transgender person compared to people who do know at least one
transgender person when chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity
(woman/XY, man/XX), regardless of genitals. As depicted in Figure 3, the marginally significant
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result from the univariate tests suggested that response time was slower among people who had
no transgender contact compared to people who did, but this effect was strongest when
chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with targets who identified as women, F (1, 122) =
3.71, p = .06, ƞp2 = 0.03.
No significant interactions were found on rejection or response time for gender identity,
genitals, and transgender contact, gender identity, genitals, and openness, gender identity,
chromosomes and openness, gender identity, genitals, and agreeableness, gender identity,
chromosomes, and agreeableness (data not shown).
Summary
Results supported the predictions of Hypothesis 1. Both genitals and chromosomes were
found to individually affect people's gender judgments. In reflection of past research on
asymmetry in the judgments of others (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), people were more rejecting
when genitals and chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent rather than stereotype-consistent
with gender identity. Both the interactions between genitals and gender identity as well as
chromosomes and gender identity on rejection had very large effect sizes. The finding regarding
chromosomes expands on the work of Kessler and McKenna (1978) who did not assess internal
biological characteristics stereotyped to gender in their studies. People were also slower to make
a gender judgment, but only when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity.
The interaction between genitals and gender identity on response time had a large effect size.
Although previous research correlates dissimilar features of stimuli with increases in time spent
categorizing (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003), the present research
suggests that this process is context-dependent. The time it takes to categorize gender in the face
of dissimilar features is increased primarily by stereotype-inconsistent genitals and not by other
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stereotype-inconsistent characteristics (e.g., chromosomes). Cognitive processing of genitals
differ from other characteristic types because they may be more strongly socially represented.
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported by the results. Effect sizes for the interactions
between genitals and gender identity and chromosomes and gender identity on rejection were
both very large, although genitals and gender identity had a slightly larger effect size. The larger
effect size on rejection and the only significant interaction on response time for genitals suggests
some support for the prediction that genitals had a stronger impact on the gender attribution
process than chromosomes. This confirmed the findings in Kessler and McKenna’s (1978)
studies such that genitals were found to be a primary factor that people relied on when making
gender attributions. However, this did not support their finding that beyond just genitals, gender
attribution is penis attribution. Having a vagina and having a penis were similarly rated
regardless of the gender identity of the target. Results from the three-way interaction between
gender identity, genitals, and chromosomes also did not provide further support for Hypothesis 2
since the effect sizes were so small. The small effect of the differences between the gender
identity of the target in this three-way interaction may suggest that the penis is less central to
social representations of gender than it was when Kessler and McKenna (1978) conducted their
studies.
Study 1 findings partially supported the predictions of Hypothesis 3. Amount of contact
with transgender people was the only significant moderating covariate found. Thus, personality
traits do not attenuate the processes that result in misgendering in the same way that they have
been found to attenuate the processes that lead to prejudice (see Jackson and Poulsen, 2005). In
support of previous research on the contact hypothesis, when chromosomes (regardless of
genitals) were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity, knowing a transgender person made
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people less rejecting of targets overall. A marginally significant effect suggested that these same
conditions made people slower at making a gender attribution specifically when the targets
identified as women. There were medium effect sizes for the interaction between gender identity,
chromosomes, and knowing a transgender person on rejection and on response time.
Although no predictions were made about sexual attraction, the present study also found
that people were more rejecting of target gender identity when the target identified as a man and
was attracted to men compared to any other target type. But the effect size for this interaction
between gender identity and sexual attraction on rejection was only small to medium.
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Chapter 4:
Study 2 – Replicating and Expanding on Study 1
Study 2 replicated Study 1, but expanded on its methods and measures. Participants were
given more flexibility on the rating scale used to determine target people’s gender, such that
participants used separate scales to rate the degree to which the person was a woman and the
degree to which the person was a man rather than rating them on one continuous scale from
“definitely a woman” to “definitely a man.” The rating scale was split so as not to reinforce a
binary view of gender (see a longer explanation in the section on Rejection Scores below). Since
Study 1 found that the interaction between genitals and gender identity had the strongest impact
on the gender attribution process, genitals and gender identity were isolated for examination of
these factors in Study 2. Additionally, I revised and retested the contact with transgender people
variable. According to previous research which linked ally status to less prejudice toward the
allied groups (Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009), I tested the impact of perceiver’s identification as an
ally to transgender people on the outcomes. Finally, Moscovici (1963) suggested that individual
attitudes are linked to social values. Thus, attitudes/beliefs were measured (e.g., gender
essentialism, biological gender beliefs, natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, authoritarianism,
and conservatism) based on research suggesting their correlation with prejudice toward certain
outgroups (Bastian & Haslam, 2007; Herek, 2000; Tee & Hegarty, 2006; Whitley, 1999). All
tests related to the experiences and attitudes of the perceiver were measured for their moderating
impact on stereotype (in)consistencies of target people’s characteristics and rejection and
response time.
Participants
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Study 2 participants were 202 individuals recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 9
(MTurk) who completed the study online and received $0.50 each for their participation. MTurk
parameters were set to exclude non-U.S. residents and non-English speakers because study aims
and methods were developed based on assumptions about the ways in which social
representations are communicated within Western, U.S.-based society with no cross-cultural or
cross-lingual predictions. Furthermore, people under 18 years of age were excluded because
study aims rely on the establishment of social representation at the cognitive level and no
predictions are made with regard to the developmental processing of such social representations
in childhood and adolescence. Additionally, people who have a low Human Intelligence Task
(HIT) rating (below 90%) and have completed less than 50 HITs on MTurk were excluded
because this ensured the data were of high quality (see Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). Of
the 202 individuals recruited, 12 (6.0%) of the participants did not pass the quality checks which
were embedded in the study to determine whether or not people were paying careful attention to
each study item (see description in the Method section below). Therefore, the final sample used
in Study 2 analyses was 190 participants.
Table 5 shows full demographic data on the 190 participants in Study 2. Participants
ranged in age from 19 to 76 years old (M = 38.77, SD = 35.50). Participants were politically
oriented slightly liberal or left of neutral/moderate (M = 3.32, SD = 3.00). Altogether, responses
average around the midpoint of the scale (neither agree nor disagree) on the following
attitudes/beliefs measures: gender essentialism (M = 4.55, SD = 1.31); biological gender beliefs

9

MTurk is an internet-based crowdsourcing service for recruiting participants that is increasingly being used by
psychologists and other social scientists (Burmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis,
2013; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participation from MTurk users has been found to produce reliable,
high-quality data at a rapid and inexpensive rate through the recruitment of more demographically diverse samples
than regular internet samples or college student convenience samples (for a review see Burmeister, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011).
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(M = 4.25, SD = 1.28); and natural attitudes/beliefs about gender (M = 4.05, SD = 1.34).
Participants' authoritarian beliefs (M = 3.05, SD = 1.31) and morally traditional beliefs (M =
3.21, SD = 1.56) averaged a bit below the midpoint of the scale, indicating slight to moderate
disagreement with these scales. Participants egalitarian beliefs (M = 5.21, SD = 1.40) averaged a
bit above the midpoint of the scale, indicating slight to moderate agreement with the scale.
Participants reported having an average of 4.00 (SD = 2.50) bisexual, lesbian, or gay friends. The
percentage of participants who reported having at least one transgender friend was 12.6% (n =
24). Most participants did not have a gender identity independent from the gender assigned to
them at birth, were assigned as female at birth, thought other people correctly perceive their
gender, and had a constant and clear attraction to people who are the binary opposite of the
gender assigned to them at birth. Participants described the area surrounding their current
residence as suburban, they did not identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, they
identified as White or Caucasian, and they had less than a 4-year college degree. On ally status,
most participants did not consider themselves to be allies to transgender people while most did
consider themselves to be allies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people.
Method
Study 2 was conducted completely on the internet using MTurk which directed
participants to a Qualtrics survey. Participants were presented with vignettes that they were
asked to rate, filled out a series of Likert-scale measures, and then answered background
information about themselves.
Vignettes. Similar to Study 1, participants were asked to read a series of fictional
vignettes and make an attribution about the gender of the target person described in each
vignette. Vignettes included two gender-related characteristics and three other characteristics that
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were used as filler information unrelated to gender. Filler information was meant to distract
participants from determining that the only variables under examination were gender identity and
genitals (2x2). Vignettes included the following information: (a) gender: identity (thinks of
themself as a woman or man); (b) gender: genitals (has a vagina or penis); (c) filler: age (is an
old or a young adult); (d) filler: transportation to work (takes the subway to work in a big city or
takes the bus to work in the suburbs) (e) filler: food (likes to eat chicken or turkey). The
following is an example of a vignette used in the study:
J. S. is a young adult who enjoys eating chicken, has a penis, thinks of
themself as a woman, and takes the bus to work in the suburbs.
The initials used to describe each target were different for all vignettes. There was a 2 (thinks of
themself as a woman/man) x 2 (has a vagina/penis) design yielding 4 vignettes used for analyses.
Since the rest of the characteristics were used as filler information, these characteristics were
deliberately paired such that target persons who identified as a woman were always described as
a young adult, who enjoys eating chicken, and takes the bus to work in the suburbs and target
persons who identified as a man were always described as an older adult who enjoys eating
turkey, and takes the subway to work in a big city. These pairings were applied regardless of
whether or not target persons had a vagina or a penis. Each participant received all 4 vignettes.
Qualtrics randomized the presentation of these vignettes across participants.
Rejection scores. For each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate the target
person’s gender on two separate scales: (1) the degree to which they thought the person
described was a woman (Woman Attribution scale; 1 = definitely a woman, 7 = definitely not a
woman); and (2) the degree to which they thought the person described was a man (Man
Attribution scale; 1 = definitely a man, 7 = definitely not a man). Rejection of the target person’s
self-designated gender was operationalized as the degree to which a participant evaluated the
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target person’s gender as different from the description of the target person’s gender identity
(e.g. definitely a man when the target person identifies as a woman). Rejection of a person’s selfdesignated gender as a woman was the average score between the Woman Attribution scale and
the Man Attribution scale, in which the Man Attribution scale was reverse coded. Similarly,
rejection of a person’s self-designated gender as a man was the average score between both
scales in which the Woman Attribution scale was reverse coded. The measures were separated in
the study to capture nuance in the gender judgments people make and so as not to reinforce the
binary assumption that the more we perceive a target as a man, the less we perceive that target as
a woman. With separate dimensions, participants did not have to identify the target, for example,
as a woman by denying a concurrent perception of the target as a man. Higher scores meant
greater rejection.
Response time. As participants read and rated the vignettes, Qualtrics recorded the time it
took them to respond and move on to the next question (response time). Record of response time
started when the page loaded and ended when the participant clicked to continue to the next
survey page. Response times were recorded in seconds.
Measures: Contact and Attitudes/beliefs. Study 2 tested the impact of seven potential
moderators having to do with perceivers' contact with transgender people or perceivers'
attitudes/beliefs that may predict the relationship between target gender characteristics and
rejection scores or response time. Full measures, where applicable, can be viewed in the
Appendix.
Transgender friendships. The transgender friendships variable indicated participants' total
number of friends who are transgender. This number was transformed into a binary variable of
people who indicated having zero friends who are transgender (“0”) and people who indicated
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having at least one friend who is transgender (“1”). For analyses involving participants'
transgender friendships, there were 188 participants because two participants did not respond to
this question.
Transgender ally status. The dichotomous transgender ally status variable was based off
of a binary question in which participants indicated that they either do not consider themselves to
be an ally to transgender people (“0”) or they do consider themselves to be an ally to transgender
people (“1”). For analyses involving participants' status as an ally to transgender people, there
were 188 participants because two participants did not respond to this question.
Gender Essentialism. The Essentialist Beliefs scale (Haslam & Levy, 2006) is a 15-item
measure that was modified and factor analyzed to create a 9-item Gender Essentialism scale used
in Study 2. The scale was originally developed to measure people’s essentialist beliefs about
sexual orientation, i.e., beliefs about gay and straight people as distinct groups. However,
modifications focused on essentialist beliefs about women and men as distinct groups. The scale
was restricted to the original discreteness factor items and most of the original immutability
factor items because the content of these items translated accurately from being about sexuality
to being about gender.
Participants rated Gender Essentialism items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly
disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item from the scale is "Women and men
each have necessary or defining characteristics, without which they would not be women or
men." Qualtrics randomized the presentation of all items within the scale across all participants.
The Gender Essentialism scale was factor analyzed with oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-MeyerOlkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was acceptable at .88 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou,
1999) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, X2 (36) = 866.36, p < .001. Based on these
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test results, the Gender Essentialism scale was considered appropriate to assess further. The
factor analysis revealed one gender essentialism factor with an Eigenvalue of 4.86 which
explained 54.02% of the variance. Principal components analysis with oblim rotation produced
all item loadings above λ = .50. The resulting Gender Essentialism scale was statistically reliable
(α = .89). Relevant items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated greater endorsement
of gender essentialism.
Biological Gender Beliefs. The full Trans Persons Belief scale (Tee & Hegarty, 2006)
was used and then modified after reliability checks were made to its subscales. In Tee and
Hegarty (2006), this scale originally produced two separate factors: biological gender beliefs and
social gender beliefs. The biological gender beliefs factor was the only factor found to be
statistically reliable. Participants rated Biological Gender Beliefs on a 7-point Likert scale (1 =
very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item from the scale is
"Gender is determined by biological factors, such as genes and hormones, before birth."
Qualtrics randomized the presentation of all items within the scale across all participants.
Reliability checks for Study 2 results on this measure found that when the items were split
according to these two factors, the Biological Gender Beliefs subscale had good reliability (α =
.85) while the social gender beliefs subscale did not (α = .25). Therefore, only the Biological
Gender Beliefs subscale was used in Study 2 analyses (see Appendix A for the items). Higher
scores indicated greater endorsement of biological gender beliefs.
Natural Attitudes/Beliefs About Gender. For Study 2 data, this 9-item scale had good
reliability (α = .87). This scale was originally developed to assess for beliefs that correspond with
Garfinkel’s (1967) natural attitudes about gender, e.g., that women and men are the only genders,
that there is a clear distinction between women and men, and that the traits that make people
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women and men are immutable. Participants rated natural attitudes/beliefs about gender on a 7point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item
from the scale is "There are only two genders, women and men." Qualtrics randomized the
presentation of all items within the scale across all participants. Higher scores indicated greater
endorsement of natural attitudes/beliefs about gender.
Authoritarianism. A modified, short version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale
(RWA; Zakrisson, 2005) was used in Study 2. The original short version has 15 items, but item
number 6 ("The society needs to show openness towards people thinking differently, rather than
a strong leader, the world is not particularly evil or dangerous.") was removed due to confusion
over this item voiced by research assistants who pre-tested Study 2. Therefore, a 14-item, short
version of the RWA was used in Study 2 and had good reliability (α = .94). Participants rated
authoritarianism on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree).
An example of an item from the scale is "Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to
destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today." Qualtrics randomized the
presentation of all items within the scale across all participants. Relevant items were reverse
coded so that higher scores indicated more authoritarianism.
Conservatism. The Conservatism scale (Brewer, 2003) was also used in Study 2. Its
moral traditionalism subscale had good reliability (α = .90). Its egalitarianism subscale also had
good reliability (α = .92). Participants rated both moral traditionalism and egalitarianism on a 7point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item
from the moral traditionalism subscale is "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown
of society." An example of an item from the egalitarianism subscale is "We have gone too far in
pushing equal rights in this country." Qualtrics randomized the presentation of all items within
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the subscales across all participants. Relevant items were reverse coded so that higher scores
indicated more conservatism.
Quality checks. Because this study was conducted online with little control over the
quality of the data that participants provide, several questions were inserted into the above
described measures to ensure that participants were paying attention to each item and the
responses they made. Qualtrics set these items so they were not included in the randomization of
measure items. They were set to always appear embedded within the list of items so they would
not be randomized to appear first or last. The first quality check was an item appearing among
the items for the Gender Essentialism scale (the first scale presented to participants after the
vignette ratings). This item was: “People can get tired while filling out surveys, but if you're
paying attention choose 'somewhat agree' for this question.” The second quality check was an
item inserted into the Authoritarianism scale which was the penultimate scale completed by
participants. This item was: “If you're paying attention, choose 'neither agree nor disagree' for
this question.” Responding incorrectly resulted in removal of all of that participants’ data (n =
12) in the final analyses. No differences were found between participants who passed and who
did not pass these quality checks.
Hypotheses and Analyses
Two hypotheses were tested in Study 2. The first hypothesis is a repetition of the
hypothesis from Study 1. The new hypothesis tested the moderating effects of previously
untested individual difference factors on the relationships found in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1:

Rejection will be greater and response time will be slower when the target
person’s characteristics are perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as
opposed to stereotype-consistent.

Hypothesis 2:

Individual difference factors such as no friendships with transgender
people, not identifying as an ally to transgender people, essentialist beliefs
about gender, biological beliefs about gender, natural attitudes/beliefs
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about gender, authoritarianism, and conservatism will strengthen the
relationships found in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
As in Study 1, this study sought to understand the factors that contribute to the rejection of a
person's self-designated gender. Thus, target genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent or
consistent depending on the target's gender identity. Based on U.S. society's social
representations of gender, genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity
when having a penis was paired with identifying as a woman and having a vagina was paired
with identifying as a man in the vignettes. Again, references to stereotype-inconsistencies or
stereotype-consistencies between gender characteristics describe participants' perceptions that
those characteristics are either stereotype-inconsistent or –consistent; not that they in reality are
stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent.
Framework for testing hypotheses. The first hypothesis was tested to replicate Study 1
findings by specifically examining how perceived stereotype (in)consistencies between target’s
gender identity and genitals impact rejection and response time. A 2 (gender identity:
woman/man) x 2 (genitals: vagina/penis) repeated measures (within-subjects) multivariate
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on rejection scores and response times. The
interaction between gender identity and genitals was examined using this technique. The means
of the two-way interaction effects between gender identity and genitals as well as gender identity
and chromosomes were examined to interpret the predictions of Hypotheses 1. Examination of
the means from these interactions would suggest the extent to which stereotype-consistency or
stereotype-inconsistency between gender identity and genitals were responsible for significant
changes in rejection and response time. The effect size of this interaction was examined to
interpret its strength.
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To address Hypothesis 2, a repeated measures MANCOVA on rejection and response
time included several factors of the perceiver (transgender friendship, transgender ally status,
gender essentialism, biological gender beliefs, natural attitudes/beliefs about gender,
authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and egalitarianism) entered as between-subjects
covariates. Main effects and interactions were examined. In particular, three-way interaction
effects between each covariate, gender identity, and genitals were examined to test the factors in
Hypothesis 2. An examination of the means of the interactions would suggest the direction of the
impact of the covariates on the relationship between stereotype-(in)consistency of the target's
characteristics and rejection and response time. Median splits were created for any significant
continuous variables and then they were assessed within the model to help interpret the direction
of the variables' effect on the outcomes. By reporting on the effects of the continuous variable
first, the strength of the variable could be assessed without a loss of power (see Fitzsimons,
2008). The median-split then allowed for an interpretation of the direction of its effect.
Assumptions of MANOVA/MANCOVA. For the same reasons depicted in Study 1
analyses, assumptions of sphericty were determined to be trivial and the large sample size (N =
190) in Study 2 made analyses robust to even extreme violations of normality. To be certain that
the non-normality of the data did not affect the results, outliers were removed (n = 19) and log
transformations were conducted and outcomes were compared. As in Study 1, adjustments did
not change the outcomes that would have been derived prior to outlier removal or
transformation. Outliers were included and non-transformed data were used in the final analyses.
Testing for order effects. Analyses were also conducted to explore the impact of order
effect for the gender identity of the target on rejection scores and response times. Dummy
variables were created for vignettes presented first that described targets who identify as women
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and vignettes presented first that described targets who identify as men (1 = first, 0 = not first).
Independent samples t-tests examined differences between presentation of vignettes first or not
first stratified by target gender identity on rejection and response time. Since response times
were positively skewed and t-tests operate on the assumption of normality, log transformations
were conducted and entered into the analyses. The order of presentation of vignettes was
randomized in Study 2, so any significant results were not of concern to the outcomes of this
study. Instead, results from these tests were considered in the design of the follow-up studies (see
Study 3 and Study 5).
Results
Main effects. The two-way repeated measures MANOVA produced no main effects for
gender identity or genitals on rejection and response time.
Two-way interaction effects. To test Hypothesis 1, the two-way repeated measures
MANOVA was examined for an interaction between genitals and gender identity on rejection
and response time. Means and standard errors for this analysis are outlined in Table 6. A
significant interaction effect was found between gender identity and genitals on rejection and
response time, F (2, 188) = 403.34, p <.001, ƞp2 = .81. As depicted in Figure 4, univariate tests
(ANOVA) demonstrated rejection scores were higher when gender identity and genitals were
stereotype-inconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina) compared to when gender identity and
genitals were stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina, man/penis), F (1, 189) = 805.42, p <.001, ƞp2
= 0.81. Univariate tests demonstrated response time was slower when gender identity and
genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to when gender identity and genitals were
stereotype-consistent, F (1, 189) = 18.85, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.09.
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Initial moderation analyses. To test Hypothesis 2, a two-way repeated measures
MANCOVA was conducted to identify certain covariates as moderators of the relationship
between genitals and gender identity on rejection and response time. To accomplish this,
transgender friendship, transgender ally status, gender essentialism, biological gender beliefs,
natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, authoritarianism, and the moral traditionalism and
egalitarianism subscales were entered as covariates. The repeated measures MANCOVA
revealed a significant main effect of gender essentialism on rejection and response time, F (2,
184) = 60.38, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.40. This analysis also revealed a significant main effect of
transgender ally status on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 7.19, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.07, such
that rejection scores were higher for participants who did not identify as an ally to transgender
people regardless of target genitals and gender identity. There were also significant three-way
interactions between gender identity, genitals and gender essentialism, F (2, 184) = 35.34, p
<.001, ƞp2 = 0.28, and gender identity, genitals, and transgender ally status, F (2, 184) = 6.96, p
<.01, ƞp2 = 0.07. These interactions are described below after running analyses again excluding
the following measures which all had no significant interactions with genitals and gender
identity: natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, biological gender beliefs, authoritarianism,
egalitarianism, or moral traditionalism.
Moderation of gender essentialism. After initial analyses were conducted including all
contact and attitudes/beliefs measures, another model was created in order to isolate the effect of
the significant factors. Gender essentialism and transgender ally status were entered as the sole
covariates in a two-way repeated measures MANOVA. There was a significant main effect of
gender essentialism on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 60.38, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.40. There
was also a significant interaction effect between gender identity, genitals, and gender
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essentialism on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 35.34, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.28. Univariate
tests (ANOVA) for the final model revealed that the three-way interaction between gender
identity, genitals, and gender essentialism was driven by rejection, F (1, 185) = 71.07, p <.001,
ƞp2 = 0.28. Contrast effects in the MANOVA indicated a linear relationship for both rejection (p
< .001) and response time (p < .01) in this three-way interaction. In order to interpret the
significant three-way interaction effect, a dichotomous variable was created from a median split
of gender essentialism. Means and standard errors for significant effects of this dichotomoized
variable are outlined in Table 7. As depicted in Figure 5, the univariate tests on the interaction
between gender identity, genitals, and the dichotomized gender essentialism variable revealed
that when gender identity is stereotype-consistent with genitals (woman/vagina, man/penis),
rejection is low and there is no effect of essentialist beliefs. However, when gender identity and
genitals are stereotype-inconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina), rejection is significantly higher
among individuals with high essentialist beliefs, F (1, 185) = 16.59, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.08 (see
Figure 5). Univariate tests demonstrated no significant three-way interaction between gender
identity, genitals, and essentialism on response time.
Moderation of transgender ally status. Means and standard errors for significant effects
of transgender ally status are outlined in Table 8. The same repeated-measures ANOVA that
included the continuous essentialism variable revealed a significant main effect of transgender
ally status on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 60.38, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.07. There was also
a significant interaction effect between gender identity, genitals, and transgender ally status on
rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 6.96, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.07. As depicted in Figure 6,
univariate tests revealed that when gender identity is stereotype-consistent with genitals,
rejection is low and there is no effect of transgender ally status. However, when gender identity
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and genitals are stereotype-inconsistent with genitals, rejection is significantly higher among
individuals who did not identify as an ally to transgender people, F (1, 185) = 11.49, p <.01, ƞp2 =
0.06 (see Figure 6). A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated no significant three-way
interaction between gender identity, genitals, and transgender ally status on response time.
Order effects. Independent samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between
order of vignette presented on rejection scores (data not shown). There were significant order
effects on response time (see Table 9). Response times were faster on vignettes that described
targets who identify as men when vignettes that described targets who identify as women were
presented first. Response time was also faster on the vignette that described targets who identify
as women and had a vagina when vignettes that described targets who identify as men were
presented first. No order effect was found for vignettes that described targets who identify as
women and had a penis when vignettes that described targets who identify as men were
presented first.
Summary
First, Study 2 demonstrated a repetition of Study 1 results, but with isolated
characteristics. Study 2 examined how perceived (in)consistencies between a target person’s
genitals and gender identity affect perceivers’ rejection and response time. Results supported the
prediction of Hypothesis 1. Rejection was greater when genitals and gender identity were
perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as opposed to stereotype-consistent. The effect size of the
interaction between genitals and gender identity on rejection was very large. Response time was
slower when genitals and gender identity were perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as opposed to
stereotype-consistent. There was a medium effect size for this interaction. Based on the findings
from Study 1, these results from Study 2 were expected.
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Study 2 also expanded on the results of Study 1 by examining factors predicted to
moderate the relationships found between target gender characteristics and the outcomes of
rejection and response time. Some of the predicted factors described in Hypothesis 2 were found
to affect the relationship between perceived stereotype-inconsistencies of the target
characteristics and rejection, but not response time. First, stereotype-inconsistency between
genitals and gender identity resulted in greater rejection among participants who scored high on
gender essentialism. When testing essentialism as a continuous variable, its interaction with
genitals and gender identity resulted in a very large effect size. This finding supports the research
by Bastian and Haslam (2007) who identified that endorsement of essentialist attitudes is related
to a preference for stereotype-consistency over stereotype-inconsistency when judging others.
Second, stereotype-inconsistency between genitals and gender identity resulted in greater
rejection among participants who did not identify as allies to transgender people. There was a
medium effect size describing this three-way interaction. This finding may suggest that
identifying as an ally to transgender people has similar benefits to reductions in misgendering as
ally identification with other groups has on lower prejudiced attitudes toward those groups (see
Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). All other measures—biological gender beliefs, natural
attitudes/beliefs about gender, authoritarianism, and conservatism—were not found to be
significant moderators of the relationship between genitals and gender identity on rejection and
response time. This may suggest that while these measures correspond to prejudiced outcomes
toward certain groups, they may not similarly correspond to the processes involved in
misgendering.
Analyses were also conducted to test the order effect of target gender identity on rejection
scores and response times. There were no order effects having to do with the target gender
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identity on rejection scores. There were order effects on response times such that people were
typically faster at responding the second time regardless of the gender identity of the target
presented first. There was only one condition for which response time was not affected by order.
Response time did not significantly change for targets who identify as women and have a penis
when presented with targets who identify as men first. The key piece of this data that was applied
to later studies is that rejection scores were not affected by presentation of targets who identify as
one gender before another.
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Chapter 5:
Study 3 – Distraction During Schema Adjustment
Study 3 extended Study 2 by examining individuals who accept rather than reject target
people's self-designated gender, even when it conflicts with information about targets’ biological
characteristics. The hypothesized model (Figure 1) predicts that all individuals automatically
recognize stereotype-inconsistent target characteristics, but not all people necessarily respond
with the same judgments (Ajzen, 2005; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant,
Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). Gilbert (1989) has suggested that some individuals
may "correct," or adjust, their initial automatic judgments (also see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
Adjustments during the gender attribution process may lead to endorsement of gender labels that
affirm a target’s self-designated gender. Researchers have claimed that this process of adjusting
is unstable because it requires more cognitive resources than merely applying stereotypes and
moving on (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000; Devine, 1989). The
stability of adjusting during the gender attribution process was assessed in Study 3 to better
understand the extent to which stereotyped ways of thinking about gender are automatic and are
only overcome by explicit cognitive attention applied to adjust such thinking. Therefore, Study 3
examined whether or not those who adjust their attributions toward gender affirmation become
more rejecting of a target’s gender identity when under cognitive load.
The design for this experiment was influenced by the impact of cognitive load on sexist
language use among people who scored low on sexism in Cralley and Ruscher’s (2005) studies.
Other studies have demonstrated similar effects of cognitive load on the tendency to engage in
stereotyping (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Harris & Perkins, 1995; Sherman, Macrae,
Bodenhausen, 2011). Study 3 was designed to categorize people as adjusters through the gender
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attributions they made on a first set of vignettes and then test the impact of a distraction task on
their rejection scores and response times as they rated a second set of vignettes. This procedure
for categorizing adjusters over other methods of categorization allowed for a strict test of the
instability of adjustment processes when distracted. Changes in rejection scores while under
cognitive load were assessed to find out if misgendering occurs—even among those least likely
to misgender—as a result of the automaticity of gender stereotyping. Adjusters who fail to adjust
when under cognitive load would demonstrate a cognitive reliance on stereotypes as the default
method for making a gender attribution. Such stereotypes may be interpreted as central to our
current social representations of gender if they represent the default to which all people turn (see
Abric, 2001). Simultaneously, differences between adjusters and those who do not adjust were
explored to help identify possible other methods for identifying adjusters in future research.
Participants
Study 3 participants were 201 individuals from MTurk who received $0.50 each for their
participation in the study. As in Study 2, the same parameters on MTurk were set to recruit
participants. Of the 201 individuals recruited, 25 (12.44%) did not pass quality checks, similar to
those used in Study 2, and were excluded. Also, one participant indicated being from "CA"
which may have indicated that the participant was from either Canada or California. Without
knowing for certain, and since this study was deliberate in its focus on United States participants,
this one participant was excluded from analyses. Therefore, the final sample in Study 3 included
175 participants.
Table 10 shows full demographic data on the 175 participants in Study 3. Participants
ranged from 18 to 74 years old (M = 35.26, SD = 32.00). Participants were politically oriented
slightly liberal or left of neutral/moderate (M = 3.08, SD = 3.00). Most participants did not have
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a gender identity independent from the gender assigned to them at birth, they were assigned as
female at birth, they thought other people correctly perceive their gender, and they had a constant
and clear attraction to people who are the binary opposite of the gender assigned to them at birth.
On demographics, participants described the area surrounding their current residence as
suburban, they did not identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, they identified as White
or Caucasian, and they had less than a 4-year college degree. Most participants considered
themselves to be allies to transgender people and allies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)
people. However, most participants did not personally know a transgender or genderqueer
person. Of the participants who did personally know a transgender person, most knew at least
one person who identified as a woman
Method
Study 3 was conducted completely on the internet using MTurk, which directed
participants to a Qualtrics survey. Participants received two sets of vignettes that they were asked
to rate and then answered background information about themselves.
Vignettes. In Study 3, participants were presented with two sets of vignettes each
describing target people with gender-related characteristics and filler characteristics. Filler
characteristics were meant to distract participants from determining that the only variables under
examination were gender identity and genitals. The first set and second set of vignettes were
identical to each other except the second set was presented with a distraction task. Study 3
employed a different design for the vignettes and ratings than Study 2 in an attempt to reduce the
possibility of rehearsal between each set of vignettes. If the vignettes were the same each time,
participants may rehearse a particular rating method during the first set of vignettes and then
apply this method to the second set of vignettes, despite the presence of the distraction.
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Therefore, the design of the vignettes and vignette ratings described in Study 2 were altered in an
attempt to reduce the potential impact of rehearsing responses to familiar gender characteristic
combinations.
First, descriptions of the target people included information about the age and personality
of the target person in addition to information about the target person's gender in each vignette.
Participants were asked to rate these filler characteristics on age and personality scales that were
randomly presented in addition to the Woman Attribution and Man Attribution scales described
in Study 2. Filler characteristics were asked to be rated in an attempt to remove participants
primary focus away from the gender content of the study. The gender scales were the only ones
used for analyses.
Second, participants read the vignettes and made their ratings on separate screen pages.
Participants were instructed to “form an impression” of the target person in each vignette
because they were then asked questions about that target on the next page. Participants did not
know what they would be asked on the next page; just that they may be asked about the
participants' gender, age, or personality. They had to rely on the impression they formed about
the target person on the page prior rather than have the description available to use as a reference
when rating the target person’s gender.
Third, results from Study 2 found that people tend to reject target people who identify as
women and target people who identify as men in similar ways—e.g., they score higher on
rejection when gender identity and genitals are stereotype-inconsistent than stereotypeconsistent. Furthermore, Study 2 found that there were no order effects related to rejection of
targets gender identity. Thus, participants were presented with information about target people
who identify as men in the first set and then about target people who identify as women in the
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second set to further minimize rehearsal of responses between each set. This helped create
parallel sets of ratings to test the effect of the presence of a distraction versus absence of a
distraction on gender attributions.
Vignettes included the following information: (a) gender identity: personally thinks of
themself as a woman/as a man; (b) genitals: has a vagina/ penis; (c) personality: likes attending
big parties/spending time with one friend at a time on the weekend; and (d) age: enjoys reading
the news on the internet/in the local newspaper for leisure. Gender identity was split between the
first set (men) and the second set (women). Genitals were manipulated in both sets
(vagina/penis). The rest of the characteristics, personality and age, were filler characteristics. The
following is an example of a vignette that appeared in the first set:
K. S. thinks of themself as a man and has a vagina.
K. S. likes to hang out with one friend at a time on the weekends.
For leisure, K. S. enjoys reading the news on the internet.
A total of 6 vignettes were rated in the first set and 6 in the second set, but only 2
vignettes each were relevant to analyses. The 2 vignettes in each set that were paired with the
gender rating scales were used in analyses. For these vignettes, filler characteristics were held
constant. The characteristics used for vignettes paired with gender ratings were always: (1) likes
to attend big parties with friends on the weekends; and (2) enjoys reading the news on the
internet for leisure. The remaining 4 vignettes were filler meant to make gender less salient for
participants. Two vignettes were paired with age ratings and two with personality ratings, but
these ratings were not used in the analyses. Filler characteristics for these vignettes were
randomly distributed since age and personality ratings did not pertain to the research question.
Distraction task. Before rating the second set of vignettes, participants were told that they
were going to complete a similar task in which they simultaneously had to pay attention to a
randomly blinking blue dot on the screen. Participants previewed the dot and indicated that they
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did, in fact, see the dot blinking on the screen before continuing on. If participants indicated not
seeing the dot blinking on the screen, they skipped the second vignette rating task and completed
the rest of the study. If they did see the blinking dot, they were told they would have to count the
number of times the dot blinked on the screen during their time spent on the page reading the
vignette. They were informed that after they finished reading the vignette, the next screen would
ask them to recall the number of times the dot blinked and then answer questions about the target
person from the vignette on the previous page. They were told that their accuracy counted, but
this was not actually calculated for this study since the dot was only meant to distract participants
while they completed the vignette ratings.
The blue dot was designed as a 64x64 pixel GIF animation image (color: #00a3e8) using
Adobe Photoshop CS6 software. The blinking of the dot was designed to be challenging, but not
impossible to count in periphery on the screen while participants’ centralized attention was on
reading the vignettes. With over 100 looped frames, the dot was designed to appear for 200
milliseconds at a time and, using a random number generator, disappear for intervals varying
from 200 to 1500 milliseconds. Each of the 6 vignettes had a separate dot assigned to it that
blinked at different intervals. Each dot was placed left-aligned just above the rating scales and
below the vignette descriptions so that participants could see the blinking dot even if scrolling
down the page to click to continue on. The page after reading the vignettes asked participants to
report the number of times the dot blinked and then make their ratings of target people on
gender, age, or personality.
Response time. Qualtrics was programmed to record two response times for participants
that were averaged together to create one overall response time. These two times were: (1) the
time it took perceivers to initially read the vignettes; and (2) the time it took perceivers to rate the
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vignettes (response time). Record of time started when the pages loaded and ended when the
participant clicked to continue to the next survey page. Response times were recorded in
seconds.
Rejection scores. For each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate the target person's
gender on two separate scales: (1) the degree to which they thought the person described was a
woman (Woman Attribution scale; 1 = definitely a woman, 7 = definitely not a woman); and (2)
the degree to which they thought the person described was a man (Man Attribution scale; 1 =
definitely a man, 7 = definitely not a man). Rejection of the target person’s self-designated
gender was operationalized as the degree to which a participant evaluated the target person’s
gender as different from the description of the target person’s gender identity (e.g. definitely a
man when the target person identifies as a woman). Rejection of a person’s self-designated
gender as a woman was the average score between the Woman Attribution scale and the Man
Attribution scale, in which the Man Attribution scale was reverse coded. Similarly, rejection of a
person’s self-designated gender as a man was the average score between both scales in which the
Woman Attribution scale is reverse coded. The measures were separated in the study to allow
participants the option to distinguish between judging a target person as neither a woman nor or
man or as both a woman and a man. Higher scores meant greater rejection.
Adjusters and Defaulters. The first set of vignettes produced rejection scores in which
participants received no distraction task. Rejection scores from this first set were used to create a
“schema group” of individuals called adjusters. Adjusters were considered to be people who
engaged in schema adjustment or used an identity schema to make a gender attribution about
target people who were perceived to have stereotype inconsistencies between their gender
identity and genitals (e.g., a target person who identifies as a man and has a vagina). Participants
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were categorized as adjusters when they scored low on rejection of target people's gender
identity (1.00 to 1.99). In contrast, participants were categorized as defaulters when they scored
high on rejection of target people's gender identity (2.00 to 7.00). Based on this criteria, a
dummy-coded (binary) variable (“1” = adjusters, “0” = defaulters) was created indicating 25
participants in the sample were adjusters and 151 were defaulters.
Hypotheses and Analyses
Study 3 sought to test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1:

Rejection will be greater when adjusters are distracted as opposed to when
they are not distracted when genitals are perceived as stereotypeinconsistent with gender identity.

Hypothesis 2:

Rejection will be greater when defaulters judge stereotype-inconsistent as
opposed to stereotype-consistent genitals and gender identity regardless of
the presence or absence of a distraction task.

The presence or absence of a distraction task represents the moderating cognitive factor
described in the proposed model (Figure 1). The presence of the distraction task was predicted to
make adjusters behave more like defaulters in the gender attributions they make. In other words,
adjusters’ rejection scores were predicted to increase as a function of the distraction task being
present as compared to the distraction task being absent. This outcome was expected to occur
when adjusters were specifically judging target people who have stereotype-inconsistent genitals
and gender identities as opposed to stereotype-consistent genitals and gender identities. As
previously, genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when having a
penis was paired with identifying as a woman and having a vagina was paired with identifying as
a man in the vignettes. Again, references to stereotype-inconsistencies or stereotypeconsistencies between gender characteristics describe participants' perceptions that those
characteristics are either stereotype-inconsistent or –consistent; not that they in reality are
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stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent. No predictions were made about response time
for this study. But since response time was relevant to processes of gender attribution in previous
studies, response time was explored in the analyses.
Framework for testing hypothesis. The hypothesis was tested with a 2 (genitals:
stereotype-inconsistent/consistent) x 2 (distraction task: absent/present) repeated measures
MANOVA on rejection and response time. This technique was first conducted among adjusters
to test Hypothesis 1, then among defaulters to test Hypothesis 2. Since rejection scores from
Task 1 (distraction task absent) were used to divide adjusters and defaulters into separate groups
in the first place, they would logically have different rejection scores at that level. Thus, the
groups were examined through separate analyses and the means and plots of their data were
compared and contrasted. Main effects and two-way interaction effects were examined for each
analysis. In particular, the two-way interaction between distraction task and target characteristics
was examined to determine if adjusters’ rejection scores significantly increased during the
distraction task when judging stereotype-inconsistent target characteristics. The effect size of this
interaction was examined to interpret its strength. The separate repeated measures MANOVA for
defaulters tested Hypothesis 2. The two-way interaction between distraction task and target
characteristics was examined to determine if defaulters rejection scores did not significantly
change during the distraction task as a function of stereotype-(in)consistent target characteristics.
Non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney U) were conducted to explore differences between
adjusters and defaulters on the outcome variables. In particular, differences in response time
were explored when distraction was absent and differences in both response time and rejection
were explored when distraction was present. Differences in rejection when distraction was absent
were not reported since this measure was used to distinguish the two group in the first place. T-
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tests were also conducted to explore differences between adjusters and defaulters on various
demographic variables and on other measures in the study (e.g., essentialism).
Assumptions of MANCOVA. For the same reasons depicted in Study 1 and 2 analyses,
assumptions of sphericty were determined to be trivial since there were 2 levels in each factor.
The analyses were split into two groups with different sample sizes for this study. The group of
defaulters had a large sample size (n = 150) making it robust to even heavy-tailed distributions
(Wilcox, 2005). To be certain that the non-normality of the data did not affect the results,
analyses were conducted both with outliers included and with outliers removed (n = 9). This
helped outcome variables that were previously non-normal reach normality. As in Study 1 and 2,
removal of outliers did not change the results in this study other than slightly strengthening the
effect sizes of the significant outcomes that had been found. For the same reasons as in the
previous studies (see Orr, Sackett, & DuBois, 1991), outliers were included in the final analyses.
The adjusters group in the present study had a smaller sample size (n = 25). For this group,
outcomes were only slightly non-normal and demonstrated light-tailed distributions. According
to Fields (2009), regardless of the smaller sample size, the slight non-normality was not a
concern for the robust MANOVA test. Thus, the MANOVA for adjusters was also conducted
without removing outliers and without data transformation. Non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney
U) were used when examining differences between adjusters and defaulters on rejection and
response time.
Results
Adjusters and Defaulters. Table 8 depicts values that describe differences between
adjusters and defaulters on categorical variables. Adjusters ranged from 18 to 63 years old and
were younger (M = 29.64, SD = 9.22) than defaulters (M = 36.10, SD = 12.41), t (1, 39.95) = -
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3.07, p < .01. Adjusters were politically oriented slightly more liberal (M = 2.33, SD = 2.00) than
defaulters (M = 3.08, SD = 3.00), t (1, 174) = -2.73, p < .01. Adjusters were less gender
essentialist (M = 3.34, SD = 1.74) than defaulters (M = 4.50, SD = 1.21), t (1, 27.94) = -3.22, p <
.01. Adjusters were also less authoritarian (M = 2.48, SD = 1.52) than defaulters (M = 3.10, SD =
1.24), t (1, 174) = -2.24, p < .001. Of the 25 adjusters, a significantly greater percentage than
defaulters had a gender identity that was independent from the one assigned to them at birth,
were assigned as female at birth, and had sexual attractions that were fluid, flexible, and genderirrelevant or included same-gender attractions (sometimes exclusively). Adjusters and defaulters
did not differ significantly on how they think others perceive their gender. On demographic
variables, adjusters and defaulters did not differ in the area surrounding their current residence,
their ethnicity, race, or education. They also did not differ significantly by status as an ally, or
personally knowing a transgender or genderqueer person. A greater percentage of adjusters than
defaulters indicated personally knowing a transgender person who identifies as a man and
personally knowing an individual who identifies as genderqueer. A greater, marginally
significant percentage of adjusters than defaulters indicated personally knowing a transgender
person who identifies in some other way not listed. Adjusters did not differ from defaulters on
knowing transgender people who self-designate their gender as women.
Main effects among adjusters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for main
effects of schema group, target characteristics, and distraction task. Means and standard errors
for these main effects are outlined in Table 11. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of target
characteristics on rejection and response time, F (2, 23) = 6.95, p <.01, ƞp2 = .38. Univariate tests
revealed rejection was greater when target characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent compared
to stereotype-consistent, F (1, 24) = 11.56, p <.05, ƞp2 = .21. Univariate tests also revealed
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response time was slower when target characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent compared to
stereotype-consistent, F (1, 24) = 519.20, p <.01, ƞp2 = .25.
The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of distraction task on
rejection and response time, F (2, 23) = 3.99, p < .05, ƞp2 = .23. This effect was driven by
rejection such that univariate tests revealed rejection was greater when the distraction task was
present compared to when it was absent, F (1, 24) = 12.96, p <.05, ƞp2 = .25. There was no
significant main effect of distraction task on response time.
Two-way interaction effects among adjusters. The repeated measures MANOVA was
examined for two-way interactions between target characteristics and distraction task on
rejection and response time. Means and standard errors for these interactions are outlined in
Table 11. A significant interaction effect was found between target characteristics and distraction
task on rejection and response time, F (2, 172) = 6.63, p <.01, ƞp2 = .37. As depicted in Figure 7,
this effect was driven by a significant effect on rejection scores. Univariate tests revealed
rejection was greater among adjusters when target characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent
compared to stereotype-consistent, but only when the distraction task was present, F (1, 24) =
13.80, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.37. There was no significant interaction effect between target
characteristics and distraction task on response time.
Main effects among defaulters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for
main effects of target characteristics and distraction task. Means and standard errors for these
main effects are outlined in Table 12. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of target
characteristics on rejection and response time, F (2, 148) = 243.98 p <.001, ƞp2 = .77. This effect
was driven by rejection such that univariate tests revealed rejection was greater when target
characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent, F (1, 149) =

102
478.48, p <.001, ƞp2 = .76. There was no significant main effect of schema group on response
time.
The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of distraction task on
rejection and response time, F (2, 148) = 3.25, p < .05, ƞp2 = .04. This effect was driven by a
marginally significant effect on response time such that univariate tests revealed response time
was faster when the distraction task was present (Task 2) compared to when it was absent, F (1,
148) = 3.68, p = .06, ƞp2 = .02. There was no significant main effect of distraction task on
rejection.
Two-way interaction effects among defaulters. The repeated measures MANOVA was
examined for two-way interactions between target characteristics and distraction task on
rejection and response time. There were no significant interaction effects between target
characteristics and distraction task on rejection or response time. Means and standard errors for
interaction effects are outlined in Table 12. Figure 7 shows the non-significant interaction among
defaulters alongside the significant interaction found for the same effect among adjusters.
Comparing adjusters and defaulters. Non-parametric tests were conducted to explore
differences between adjusters and defaulters in the absence of distraction on response time and in
the presence of distraction on rejection and response time. There was a marginally significant
difference between adjusters and defaulters on response time in the absence of distraction such
that adjusters were faster than defaulters at making a gender attribution when the target had
stereotype-inconsistent characteristics (U = 1448.00, p = .06). Adjusters were less rejecting than
defaulters when targets had stereotype-inconsistent characteristics when distraction was present
(U = 869.50, p < .001). There were no differences between adjusters and defaulters on response
time when the distraction was present.
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Summary
Study 3 examined whether adjusters' rejection scores would increase when they were
distracted compared to when they were not distracted while rating target people with stereotypeinconsistent genitals and gender identity. Results supported the prediction of Hypothesis 1.
Adjusters became more rejecting under cognitive load when judging targets with stereotypeinconsistent characteristics. The effect size for this effect was very large suggesting that the
process of adjusting is unstable due to the cognitive attention required to adjust from otherwise
automatic stereotypical thinking about gender (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Boenke, 2003;
Cooper, 2000; Devine, 1989). In support of the prediction in Hypothesis 2, defaulters remained
just as rejecting under cognitive load as when no distraction was present. Defaulters were more
rejecting when targets characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent regardless of the distraction
task. This finding was expected considering the findings from the pervious studies and that
defaulters made up such a large portion of the sample.
Interestingly, a marginally significant finding suggests that defaulters became faster at
making a gender judgment in the presence of a distraction task compared to its absence. This
outcome may be confounded by defaulters rehearsing the schema they applied during the first
task making them more efficient at making gender attributions even in the presence of a
distraction. But this effect was only marginally significant and had a small effect size.
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Chapter 6:
Study 4 – Pilot Testing Gender Expression (Clothing) Items
Study 4 piloted new target gender characteristics having to do with clothing preferences.
Study 5 used results from this study to test clothing as the moderating target factor described in
the proposed model (Figure 1). To ensure that the clothing preferences manipulated in the
vignettes of Study 5 paralleled each other, I assessed the extent to which different articles of
clothing and accessories are perceived to be exclusively worn by women or exclusively worn by
men.
Articles of clothing may be considered peripheral elements of social representations
about gender since trends in clothing for each gender change over time. While a strong
association may be made between clothing items and particular genders, these associations may
be confounded by the social desirability of what is considered appropriate for each gender in
American society at a given point in time. To ensure that social trends of certain clothing items
would not confound people’s perceptions when making gender attributions, I also assessed the
extent to which wearing an item of clothing is socially desirable for women or for men. Thus, I
was able to control for both gender exclusivity and social desirability in current judgments about
target clothing preferences in Study 5 by identifying clothing items that were strong on both
measures through this pilot study. The characteristics with the strongest ratings were used in
vignettes describing clothing preferences of target persons in Study 5. Since the pilot was
exploratory and sought to identify variables used in the follow-up study, no hypotheses were
proposed. Below is an explanation of the study design, results, and brief interpretation of the
results for their application in Study 5.
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Participants
Study 4 participants were 84 individuals from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) who
received $0.25 each for their participation in the study. As in Study 2 and Study 3, the same
parameters on MTurk were set to recruit participants. Of the 84 individuals recruited, 16 (19.1%)
of the participants did not pass the quality checks. Therefore, the final sample used in Study 2
was 68 participants.
Table 13 shows full demographic data on the 68 participants in Study 4. Participants
ranged in age from 19 to 62 years old (M = 36.06, SD = 34.00). Participants indicated a political
orientation that was slightly liberal leaning or left of moderate (M = 3.38, SD = 1.68). Most
participants did not have a gender identity independent from the gender assigned to them at birth,
were assigned as female at birth, thought other people correctly perceive their gender, had a
constant and clear attraction to people who are the binary opposite of the gender assigned to
them at birth, did not identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, identified as White or
Caucasian, described the area surrounding their current residence as suburban, and had a 4-year
college degree or higher.
Method
For Study 4, participants were directed from MTurk to a Qualtrics survey where they
were asked to determine the gender exclusivity and social desirability of various articles of
clothing and accessories. These items are listed in Table 10. Items with the strongest ratings were
considered for use in the vignettes describing target people' clothing preferences in Study 5.
Gender Exclusivity. The gender exclusivity measure asked participants to determine the
extent to which each item was only worn by women (Exclusively for Women; 1 = Never, 7 =
Always) and the extent to which each item was only worn by men (Exclusively for Men; 1 =
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Never, 7 = Always). The strength of an article of clothing or accessory on its gender exclusivity
was defined by the mean difference between these two scores. Exclusively for Men scores were
subtracted from Exclusively for Women scores to produce mean difference scores that were
either positive or negative. Items with positive scores that were the farthest away from 0 were
considered to have the strongest gender exclusivity for women. Items with negative scores that
were the farthest away from 0 were considered to have the strongest gender exclusivity for men.
Social Desirability. The social desirability measure asked participants to determine the
extent to which each item is desirable for women to wear (Desirable for Women; 1 = Never, 7 =
Always) and the extent to which each item is desirable for men to wear (Desirable for Men; 1 =
Never, 7 = Always). The strength of an article of clothing or accessory on its social desirability
was defined by the mean difference between these two scores. Desirable for Men scores were
subtracted from Desirable for Women scores to produce mean difference scores that were either
positive or negative. Items with positive scores that were the farthest away from 0 were
considered to have the strongest social desirability for women. Items with negative scores that
were the farthest away from 0 were considered to have the strongest social desirability for men.
Results
Mean difference scores on Gender Exclusivity suggested that bras and tuxedos had the
highest gender exclusivity ratings for women and men, respectively (see Table 14). Mean
difference scores on Social Desirability suggested that dresses and cologne had the highest social
desirability ratings for women and men, respectively (see Table 14). Correlations between
gender exclusivity and social desirability for dresses, tuxedos, bras, and cologne are expressed in
Table 15. Dresses for women and tuxedos for men are more highly correlated than any of the
following: bras for women and tuxedos for men, dresses for women and cologne for men.
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Summary
Study 4 explored and attempted to identify two opposing characteristics that would be
viewed as similarly socially desirable for women and men to be used in vignettes for Study 5. To
identify these clothing characteristics the mean difference scores for items' gender exclusivity
and social desirability ratings, the correlations between the most exclusive and socially desirable
items, and some contextual features of the items as they are worn in American society were all
considered. Dresses and tuxedos were chosen to include in the vignettes for Study 5 for several
reasons. First, both received high ratings on gender exclusivity and social desirability. On gender
exclusivity, dresses ranked sixth for women and tuxedos ranked first for men. On social
desirability, dresses ranked first for women and tuxedos ranked second for men. Although bras
for women had a higher correlation between gender exclusivity and social desirability than
dresses, dresses for women were still highly correlated on both these measures as were tuxedos
for men. In the end, either bras or dresses could have been chosen based on statistics alone, but
dresses were preferred since they are complementary to tuxedos in several ways. They could
easily be adapted into a parallel narrative in the vignettes because they both are articles of
clothing rather than accessories, they are worn on the majority of the body rather than a part of
the body, and they are visibly worn on the outside of the body rather than as a scent or
undergarment. Thus, dresses and tuxedos were selected as the strongest fit for inclusion in the
vignettes in Study 5.
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Chapter 7:
Study 5 – Gender Expression on Schema Adjustment
One way to understand the current state of social representations of gender in U.S.
society is to assess the stability of adjusters’ gender schema under different conditions set by the
characteristics of the target. The manipulation of cognitive load in Study 3 demonstrated that
adjusters’ method for affirming target gender identity was destabilized by a cognitive
manipulation. But does their method hold up when normative expectations of the target are
manipulated? Kahneman and Miller (1986) suggested that social norms associated with a
particular group can inform people’s visualizations of those groups. Adjusters supposedly use an
identity-based schema when making gender attributions in the face of stereotype-inconsistencies
between genitals and gender identity. New expectations based on their schema developed around
the gender identity of the target have yet to be assessed. Research has suggested that expectations
related to group norms often result in asymmetrical judgments between groups (e.g., Hegarty &
Pratto 2001). If gender identity is a strong social representation of gender for adjusters, then
adjusters should not become more rejecting when characteristics of the target (other than just
genitals) are stereotype-inconsistent. If they do, then one interpretation is that adjustment using
an identity-based schema results in the development of or strengthening of norms newly
associated with gender identity.
As defined in the proposed model (Figure 1), gender exclusive and socially desirable
clothing items from Study 4 were used to test clothing preferences as an additional feature of the
target that adjusters may associate with the targets’ gender identity (Figure 1). There were three
reasons for examining the impact of clothing. First, Study 1 did not distinguish between gender
identity and clothing. Clothing was described and stereotypically-paired with descriptions of the
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target’s gender identity. But for a multiplicity of reasons people do not always prefer to dress
stereotypically in accordance with their gender, so they may be misgendered as a result. Second,
Kessler and McKenna (1978) described clothing as the "cultural genital" because the association
of certain types of clothing with certain genders led people to expect certain genitals to be there
even when unseen. I was interested in determining the simultaneous impact of "seeing" (reading
about) both genitals and information about clothing on people's gender judgments. Third,
clothing preferences, unlike genitals, have to do with social norms. As such, clothing was a
reasonable choice for manipulating norms to test its effects on adjusters’ rejection. Study 5 tested
what would happen if these clothing-based expectations did not stereotypically match up with
the person's gender identity and, instead, matched up with the targets’ genitals.
The added effect of clothing on rejection and response time was assessed in the context
of targets who had stereotype-inconsistent genitals and gender identity. Study 5 specifically
tested the extent to which adjusters' rejection scores and response times changed in this context
when information about stereotype-inconsistent clothing was included. Originally, adjusters were
grouped as such based on the fact that they had low rejection scores for targets with stereotypeinconsistent gender identity and genitals. In this context, stereotype-inconsistency between
gender identity and clothing was predicted to result in higher rejection scores among adjusters. In
other words, the conclusion could be made that gender identity is not a central social
representation of gender for adjusters if a social norm (clothing) is prioritized in their judgments.
If gender identity is truly central for adjusters, they should not become more rejecting in the face
of target clothing preferences that are stereotype-inconsistent with target gender identity.
Participants
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Study 5 participants were 236 individuals from MTurk who received $0.50 each for their
participation in the study. As in Study 2 through Study 4, the same parameters on MTurk were
set to recruit participants. Of the 236 individuals recruited, 24 (10.17%) did not pass the quality
checks, similar to those used in Study 2 and 3, and were excluded. Two participants also did not
complete all of the conditions in the study. Therefore, the final sample used in Study 5 was 210
participants.
See Table 16 for the full demographic data on participants in Study 5. Participants ranged
from 18 to 74 years old (M = 38.05, SD = 35.00). Participants were politically oriented slightly
liberal or left of neutral/moderate (M = 3.34, SD = 3.00). Most participants did not have a gender
identity independent from the gender assigned to them at birth, were assigned as female at birth,
thought other people correctly perceive their gender, and had a constant and clear attraction to
people who are the binary opposite of the gender assigned to them at birth. On demographics,
most participants described the area surrounding their current residence as suburban, did not
identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, identified as White or Caucasian, and had less
than a 4-year college degree. Most participants did not consider themselves to be allies to
transgender people, but considered themselves to be allies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)
people. Most did not personally know a transgender or genderqueer person. Of the participants
who did know a transgender person, most knew at least one person who identifies as a woman.
Method
Study 5 was conducted completely on the internet using MTurk which directed
participants to a Qualtrics survey. Participants were presented with two sets of vignettes that they
were asked to rate and then answered background information about themselves.
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Vignettes. Study 5 employed the same design as Study 3 for the vignettes and ratings
which attempted to reduce the possibility of rehearsal between each set of vignettes. Similar to
Study 3, the design made gender less salient and rehearsal of a gender schema between sets was
reduced in several ways: (a) participants rated targets on their personality and age, not just on
their gender; (b) participants made ratings on a second screen page after forming an impression
of the target person on the previous screen page; and (c) participants received two sets of
vignettes describing target people with who identified as men in the first set and as women in the
second set with genitals manipulated within each set (vagina/penis). The manipulation of genitals
in each set resulted in genitals being stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity (woman/penis,
man/vagina) or stereotype-consistent with gender identity (woman/vagina, man/penis).
The first set of vignettes included the following information: (a) genitals: stereotypeconsistent/stereotype-inconsistent; (b) personality: likes attending big parties/spending time with
one friend at a time on the weekend; and (c) age: enjoys reading the news on the internet/in the
local newspaper for leisure. The second set of vignettes included the same characteristics plus
another target characteristic: (d) clothing preference: prefers to wear a dress/prefers to wear a
tuxedo. The following is an example of a vignette that appeared in the first set:
K. S. thinks of themself as a man and has a vagina.
K. S. likes to hang out with one friend at a time on the weekends.
For leisure, K. S. enjoys reading the news on the internet.
The following is an example of a vignette that appeared in the second set:
J. P. thinks of themself as a woman and has a vagina.
When attending formal engagements, J. P. prefers to wear a dress.
J. P. likes to hang out with one friend at a time on the weekends.
For leisure, J. P. enjoys reading the news on the internet.
A total of 6 vignettes were rated in the first set, but only 2 vignettes were relevant to
analyses. As in Study 3, the 2 vignettes in each set that were paired with the gender rating scales
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were used in analyses. For these vignettes, filler characteristics were held constant. The
characteristics used for vignettes paired with gender ratings were also the same as in Study 3: (1)
likes to attend big parties with friends on the weekends; and (2) enjoys reading the news on the
internet for leisure. The remaining 4 filler vignettes were paired with two age ratings and two
personality ratings. Filler characteristics for these vignettes were randomly distributed since age
and personality ratings did not pertain to the research question.
A total of 12 vignettes were rated in the second set, more than the first set because of the
inclusion of the additional clothing characteristic with two levels for each. Thus, 4 vignettes were
relevant to these analyses. These 4 vignettes were paired with the gender rating scales. Filler
characteristics were held constant—the same characteristics held constant in the first set. The
remaining 8 vignettes were paired with 4 age ratings and 4 personality ratings. Filler
characteristics for these vignettes were randomly assigned.
Response time. Similar to Study 3, Qualtrics was programmed to record two response
times for participants that were averaged together to create one overall response time. These two
times were: (1) the time it took perceivers to first read the vignettes; and (2) the time it took
perceivers to rate the vignettes. Record of time started when the pages loaded and ended when
the participant clicked to continue to the next survey page. Response times were recorded in
seconds.
Rejection scores. Rejection scores were calculated in the same way as Study 3. Higher
scores indicated greater rejection.
Adjusters and Defaulters. The first set of vignettes produced rejection scores in which
participants were not given the clothing preference of the target person. Rejection scores from
this first set were analyzed to create the schema group called adjusters. Participants were
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categorized as adjusters when they scored low on rejection of target people's gender identity
(1.00 to 1.99). In contrast, participants were categorized as defaulters when they scored high on
rejection of target people's gender identity (2.00 to 7.00). Based on this criteria, a dummy-coded
(binary) variable (“1” = adjusters, “0” = defaulters) was created indicating 15 participants in the
Study 5 sample were adjusters and 195 were defaulters.
Hypothesis and Analysis
Study 5 sought to test the prediction that adjusters’ rejection scores will increase in the
context of additional stereotype-inconsistent information, e.g., clothing, specifically about a
target with stereotype-inconsistent genitals and gender identity. Clothing represents the
moderating target factor described in the proposed model (Figure 1). The addition of stereotypeinconsistent clothing was predicted to result in greater rejection scores among adjusters in the
context of targets whose genitals are stereotype-inconsistent and information about clothing is
withheld or is stereotype-consistent. If this is the case, the interpretation can be made that
clothing altered people's tendency to use an identity-based schema rather than a biology-based
schema during the gender attribution process.
As in previous studies, genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender
identity when having a penis was paired with identifying as a woman and having a vagina was
paired with identifying as a man in the vignettes. Based on U.S. society's social representations
of gender, clothing was considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when preference
for wearing a dress was paired with identifying as a man or when preference for wearing a
tuxedo was paired with identifying as a woman in the vignettes. Clothing was also manipulated
to either be absent or present in the vignettes. Clothing was absent when clothing preference for
wearing either a dress or wearing a tuxedo was not included as a characteristic in the vignette.

114
Clothing was present when clothing preference for wearing either a dress or a tuxedo was
included as a characteristic in the vignette.
Framework for testing the hypothesis. The hypothesis was tested on Study 5 data to
determine the impact of information about clothing preference on adjusters' rejection scores. A 2
(genitals: stereotype-consistent/stereotype-inconsistent) x 3 (clothing: absent/present and
stereotype-consistent/present and stereotype-inconsistent) repeated measures MANOVA was
conducted on rejection and response time. This technique was first conducted among adjusters to
test the hypothesis, then among defaulters to explore other outcomes. Main effects of genitals
and clothing and the two-way interaction effect between these terms were examined and
reported. No predictions were made about response time for this study. But since response time
was relevant to gender attribution processes in previous studies, response time was explored in
the analyses. Particular to the hypothesis were the main effect of clothing and the two-way
interaction effect on rejection scores. Post hoc comparisons of rejection and response time were
performed by Bonferroni t-tests (2-tailed) to adjust for the multiple comparisons (see Field,
2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). These comparisons on the main effect of clothing were
examined to determine if rejection was greater for the presence of clothing that was stereotypeinconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with target gender identity. The interaction effect
was also examined to determine if adjusters’ rejection scores significantly increased in the
presence of information about clothing specifically when judging stereotype-inconsistent
genitals. The effect size of this interaction was examined to interpret its strength.
The same 2 x 3 repeated measures MANOVA on rejection and response time was then
conducted among defaulters. Main effects of genitals and clothing and the two-way interaction
effect between these terms were examined and reported. No predictions were made about
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defaulters in this study. But their rejection scores and response times across factors were
interpreted in light of the outcomes for adjusters. To further examine differences between
adjusters and defaulters, non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney U) were conducted. Specifically
differences in response time were explored when clothing was absent and differences in both
response time and rejection were explored when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent
or consistent. Differences in rejection when clothing was absent were not reported since this
measure was used to distinguish the two group in the first place. Regular t-tests were also
conducted to explore differences between adjusters and defaulters on various demographic
variables and on other measures in the study (e.g., essentialism).
Assumptions of MANOVA. In contrast to the previous studies, the present study examined
a factor with more than 2 levels and the assumption of sphericity was not met. The assumption of
sphericity does not need to be met for a repeated measures MANOVA (O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985),
but univariate test statistics were reported and do require that the assumption of sphericity is met.
Thus, I reference the Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for all univariate statistics in the analyses
(see Field, 2009; Stevens, 2009). Adjusters had a small sample size (n = 15), but factors were
only slightly non-normal on the outcomes and demonstrated light-tailed distributions. For the
same reasons as described in Study 3, the MANOVA for adjusters was conducted without
removing outliers and without data transformation. However, non-parametric tests were used
when examining differences between adjusters and defaulters on rejection and response time.
Results
Adjusters and defaulters. See Table 16 for values describing differences between
adjusters and defaulters on the above variables. Adjusters ranged from 18 to 58 years old and
were not significantly different in age (M = 34.87, SD = 12.52) in comparison to defaulters (M =
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38.30, SD = 13.57), t (1, 208) = -0.95, ns. Adjusters were politically oriented slightly more
liberal (M = 2.33, SD = 1.23) than defaulters (M = 3.43, SD = 1.75), t (1, 208) = -2.37, p < .05.
Adjusters were less gender essentialist (M = 3.41, SD = 1.55) than defaulters (M = 4.63, SD =
1.13), t (1, 208) = -3.92, p < .001. There were no significant differences on authoritarianism
between adjusters (M = 2.64, SD = 1.20) and defaulters (M = 3.16, SD = 1.32), t (1, 208) = -.52,
ns. Of the 15 adjusters, a greater, marginally significant percentage of adjusters than defaulters
had sexual attractions that were fluid, flexible, and gender-irrelevant or included same-gender
attractions (sometimes exclusively). A significantly greater percentage of adjusters than
defaulters described the area surrounding their current residence as urban and a marginally
significant greater percentage of adjusters than defaulters identified their race as Black or
African American. Adjusters and defaulters were not significantly different on gender identity
independence from birth-assignment, gender assigned at birth, how they think others perceive
their gender, ethnicity, education, status as an ally, or personally knowing a transgender or
genderqueer person.
Since contact with transgender people affected rejection scores in Study 1, the gender
identities of the people whom participants personally know may be important to understanding
any differences on rejection between target person's who identify as women and target person's
who identify as men. Thus, adjusters and defaulters were compared on differences in the gender
identities of the transgender or genderqueer people they know. Of the participants who indicated
personally knowing a transgender or genderqueer person, a greater percentage of defaulters than
adjusters indicated personally knowing a transgender person who identifies as a woman. A
greater percentage of adjusters than defaulters indicated personally knowing a transgender
person who identifies as a man and a transgender person who identifies as genderqueer.
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Adjusters did not differ from defaulters on knowing transgender people who identify in some
other way.
Main effects among adjusters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for main
effects of genitals and clothing. Means and standard errors for these main effects are outlined in
Table 17. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of genitals on rejection and response time, F
(2, 13) = 4.27, p < .05, ƞp2 = .40. Univariate tests revealed rejection was higher when genitals
were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with gender identity, F (1, 14) =
8.66, p <.05, ƞp2 = .38. A marginally significant effect of response time was found such that
univariate tests revealed response time was slower when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent
compared to stereotype-consistent with gender identity, F (1, 14) = 4.12, p = .06, ƞp2 = .23.
The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of clothing on rejection
and response time, F (2, 11) = 6.23, p < .01, ƞp2 = .69. Univariate tests revealed rejection was
higher when clothing was present compared to when clothing was absent, F (1, 28) = 8.19, p <
.01, ƞp2 = .37. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that rejection was not significantly different
when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when clothing was present
and stereotype-consistent. There was marginal significance suggesting that rejection was higher
when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent (p = .06).
Additionally, rejection was significantly higher when clothing was present and stereotypeinconsistent compared to when clothing was absent (p < .05). Univariate tests also revealed
response time was slower when clothing was absent compared to when clothing was present, F
(1, 28) = 4.79, p < .05, ƞp2 = .26. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that response time was not
significantly different when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when
clothing was present and stereotype-consistent. Response time was faster when clothing was
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present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent (p < .05). Response time was
not significantly different when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to
when clothing was absent.
Interaction effects among adjusters. The repeated measures MANOVA was examined for
interactions between genitals and clothing on rejection and response time. Means and standard
errors for these interactions are outlined in Table 17. A significant interaction effect was found
between schema group and genitals on rejection and response time, F (2, 11) = 6.94, p < .01, ƞp2
= .72. As depicted in Figure 8, this effect was driven by a significant effect on rejection scores
such that univariate tests revealed rejection was higher when genitals were stereotypeinconsistent and clothing was present compared to stereotype-consistent and absent regardless of
the stereotype-(in)consistency of clothing, F (1, 28) = 13.54, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.49. There was no
significant interaction effect between genitals and clothing on response time.
Main effects among defaulters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for
main effects of genitals and clothing. Means and standard errors for these main effects are
outlined in Table 18, The analysis demonstrated a main effect of genitals on rejection and
response time, F (2, 193) = 388.81, p < .001, ƞp2 = .80. Univariate tests revealed rejection was
higher when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with gender
identity, F (1, 194) = 763.73, p < .001, ƞp2 = .80. Univariate tests revealed response time was
slower when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with
gender identity, F (1, 194) = 9.34, p < .01, ƞp2 = .05.
The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of clothing on rejection
and response time, F (2, 191) = 11.92, p < .001, ƞp2 = .20. Univariate tests revealed rejection was
lower when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent, F (1,

119
388) = 9.91, p < .001, ƞp2 = .05. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that rejection was greater
when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when clothing was present
and stereotype-consistent (p < .001). There was marginal significance suggesting that rejection
was higher when clothing was absent than when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent
(p = .06). Additionally, rejection was not significantly different when clothing was present and
stereotype-inconsistent compared to when clothing was absent. Univariate tests also revealed
response time was slower when clothing was absent compared to when clothing was present, F
(1, 388) = 12.47, p < .001, ƞp2 = .06. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that response time was
not significantly different when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to
when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent. Response time was faster when clothing
was present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent (p < .001). Response time
was also faster when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when
clothing was absent (p < .01).
Interaction effects among defaulters. The repeated measures MANOVA was examined
for two-way interactions between genitals and clothing on rejection and response time. There
were no significant interaction effects between genitals and clothing on rejection or response
time. Means and standard errors for interaction effects are outlined in Table 18. Figure 8 shows
the non-significant interaction among defaulters alongside the significant interaction found for
the same effect among adjusters.
Comparing adjusters and defaulters. Non-parametric tests were conducted to explore
differences between adjusters and defaulters in the absence of clothing on response time and in
the presence of clothing on rejection and response time. Adjusters were less rejecting than
defaulters when targets genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity (U = 820.00, p
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< .01). Adjusters were less rejecting than defaulters when targets genitals were stereotypeinconsistent and clothing was stereotype-consistent with gender identity (U = 928.00, p < .05).
There was a marginally significant difference between adjusters and defaulters on rejection when
just clothing was stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity such that adjusters were less
rejecting than defaulters (U = 1120.00, p = .08). There were no significant differences between
adjusters and defaulters on response time in the presence or absence of information about
clothing.
Summary
Study 5 examined the effect of presence or absence of clothing preference on rejection
and response time among adjusters. The addition of information about stereotype-inconsistent
clothing preference was predicted to increase the degree of rejection only in the context in which
genitals were also stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity. Interestingly, results suggest that
when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent adjusters' rejection scores were higher as a function
of the mere presence of information about clothing. Rejection scores were higher regardless of
whether the information about clothing was stereotype-consistent or inconsistent, just as long as
clothing information was included in the targets’ description. Comparisons reflected this finding
such that no differences in adjusters' rejection scores were found between clothing that was
stereotype-consistent and clothing that was stereotype-inconsistent. This suggests that the impact
of clothing went beyond what was hypothesized to occur. The presence of clothing, regardless of
stereotype-(in)consistency, resulted in higher rejection rather than the prediction that just
clothing that was stereotype-inconsistent would result in higher rejection. No predictions were
made about the impact of genitals on rejection for adjusters, but genitals that were stereotypeinconsistent were found to result in higher rejection among adjusters regardless of clothing.
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Together, these findings suggest that information about genitals was favored in the context of
information about clothing for adjusters. Adjusters ended up expecting consistency between
clothing and genitals similar to Kessler and McKenna's (1978) concept of the "cultural genital."
When comparing and contrasting adjusters and defaulters on rejection, defaulters were
more rejecting when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent
with target gender identity. The magnitude of the effect size of genitals on rejection was much
greater for defaulters than for adjusters. This suggests that genitals had a larger effect on the
gender attribution process for defaulters than for adjusters. This makes sense considering
adjusters were less rejecting than defaulters when targets’ genitals were stereotype-inconsistent
in the first place before information about clothing was included. According to a marginally
significant finding, defaulters, like adjusters, were more rejecting when clothing was stereotypeinconsistent compared to when it was stereotype-consistent with gender identity regardless of
the stereotype-(in)consistency of target genitals. Stereotype-inconsistent clothing made
defaulters somewhat more rejecting compared to when information about clothing was absent,
but this finding was marginally significant. In other words, just stereotype-inconsistent clothing
preferences made defaulters more likely to reject even when all else was stereotype-consistent.
The magnitude of this effect of clothing on rejection was much smaller for defaulters than
adjusters. In sum, adjusters’ rejection scores were more affected by clothing than genitals while
the reverse was true for defaulters. Effect sizes suggested that defaulters’ rejection scores, in
contrast, were more affected by genitals than by clothing.
No predictions were made about response times for adjusters or defaulters and findings
were generally unsurprising. Findings for adjusters on response time had large effect sizes, while
the findings for defaulters had small to medium effect sizes. Adjusters' response times were
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slower and (marginal) defaulters' response times were slower (significantly) when genitals were
stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent. Additional information about
stereotype-consistent clothing made adjusters faster at making a gender attribution compared to
when this information was absent, but not when it was stereotype-inconsistent. Since adjusters
rely on gender identity to make their decision, they made a gender attribution more quickly when
a greater number of stereotype-consistent characteristics were provided. In contrast, defaulters
were faster at making a gender attribution when clothing was present rather than absent
regardless of stereotype-(in)consistency. Since defaulters rely on genitals to make their decision,
they rehearsed this default schema in the first set of vignettes so they were able to apply it more
quickly to the second set of vignettes regardless of the clothing information.
To explore the data further, differences between adjusters and defaulters on
demographics and other measures were examined. Adjusters and defaulters were different in
political orientation, gender essentialist beliefs, sexual attractions, geographic location, and the
transgender or genderqueer people they know. Adjusters were more liberal and less gender
essentialist. Adjusters were more likely to have sexual attractions that were fluid, flexible, and
gender-irrelevant or included same-gender attractions (sometimes exclusively). Adjusters were
more likely to live in an urban area. Finally, adjusters were more likely to know transgender
people who identified as men or as genderqueer, while defaulters were more likely to know
transgender people who identified as women.
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Chapter 8:
Discussion
This program of research examined how social representations, cognitive processes, and
individual attitudes and experiences predict cisgenderist outcomes in the gender attribution
process. To examine the links between these factors, I proposed a model (Figure 1) that describes
the role of gender visualization and schema application in perceiving and determining a target
person's gender. Specifically, this model hypothesized that gender is initially processed at the
cognitive level through visualizing a target's characteristics which automatically activates a
default, biology-based schema. People then decide whether or not to apply this schema and
arrive at a final gender attribution. Individual contact with outgroups, certain personality traits,
gender-related beliefs, and general beliefs about society were predicted to act as moderators to
this process. The model predicted that some people may attempt to control their automatic
judgment of the target by consciously engaging in schema adjustment before arriving at a final
gender attribution (called "adjusters"). To examine the centrality of social representations in
gender attributions at the cognitive level, adjusters were predicted to revert to using a default,
biology-based schema when under conditions of cognitive load (a distraction) or when
considering an additional, stereotype-inconsistent target characteristic (clothing preference).
There were five different research studies conducted and analyzed to test the different
pieces of this model. The results from these studies are described below in the context of the four
research aims outlined in Chapter 2. In this section, I discuss study results as they relate to each
of the study aims. Next, I discuss the limitations and future direction for research on this topic. I
also discuss the implications of this research to the study of social representations and social
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cognition. Last, I make some final conclusions with regard to experiences of cisgenderism in
gender attributions.
Findings and Implications by Aim
Aim 1 – Determine the relationships between target gender characteristics,
rejection, and response time. One aim of this dissertation was to determine the effect of social
representations about gender on people's tendency to misgender others. In these studies, social
representations about gender were described by stereotype-(in)consistencies in target persons'
gender characteristics. The tendency to misgender was operationalized as the extent to which a
target's gender identity was rejected, i.e., saying that a target person is a man when she selfidentifies as a woman. Previously, Kessler and McKenna's (1978) studies found that people tend
to rely on gender stereotypes associated with biological characteristics, particularly genitals and
especially the penis, when making gender attributions about others (Kessler & McKenna, 1978).
The current study found further support for what they found nearly 35 years ago. Genitals
impacted the degree to which people rejected target people's self-designated gender. The current
research also expanded on Kessler and McKenna's (1978) studies by examining the effects of
chromosomes as a social representation affecting the tendency to misgender others. Perceivers'
gender judgments were similarly affected by information about chromosomes as they were about
genitals.
Results across multiple studies suggest that perceivers misgender others when biological
characteristics (e.g., genitals and/or chromosomes) do not stereotypically match a target's gender
identity. Speer (2005) found that when gender is perceived as ambiguous, people interpret
contextual information about the target's gender to make an attribution. Similarly, the model
proposed for the current research described how people use schemas to interpret gender
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according to biology-based social representations of women and men. For example, the social
representation that women have a vagina and XX chromosomes lead people to determine that a
target who identifies as a woman and has a penis and/or XY chromosomes is "actually" a man.
The effect sizes for both genitals and chromosomes on rejection of target gender identity were
similarly large. The large effect sizes can be interpreted to mean that genitals and chromosomes
define two core elements in Americans' social representations of gender. People consistently
demonstrated a common sense understanding that women and men have distinct chromosomes
and genitals and that they may view variations from these distinctions as not "real" (see
Garfinkel, 1967). If people had instead thought that gender could only be determined by people's
personal gender identities at any given point in time, then people would have been much less
likely to misgender others.
Another aim of this dissertation was to expand on past research to learn more about the
level of automaticity in people's cognitive processing of other people's gender. One of the ways
the current research examined automaticity was through perceivers' response times as they
judged different targets' genders. Past research on norm theory found that certain social groups
are asymmetrically attended to because their characteristics and/or behaviors are seen as
surprising or unexpected (Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele , 2012; Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty &
Buechel,2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Hegarty & Pratto, 2004; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991;
Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmairos, 2007). Research on schemas has also found that stereotypeinconsistencies tend to increase the amount of time people spend categorizing stimuli (Rosch,
1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003).
In contrast, biological characteristics that were stereotype-inconsistent with expectations
of women and men in the current research were not always attended to for longer. For example,
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Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, and Knippenberg (2003) found that dissimilar features of stimuli
increase the time people spend making categorizations of that stimuli. But, as Augoustinos and
Walker (1995) suggested, the present research found that this cognitive process may be contextdependent. There was an increase in the time it took people to categorize gender when target’s
genitals were stereotype-inconsistent, but not when other characteristics were stereotypeinconsistent. For example, Study 1 found that people were more rejecting of stereotypeinconsistent chromosomes and gender identity, but they did not need more time to make this
judgment. One interpretation is that chromosomes may not need to go through processes of
gender visualization as the model proposes (Figure 1). Chromosomes are internal and nonphysical perceivers, so they may have received little to no visualization time. In contrast, genitals
are external, physical characteristics, so they received more visualization time. Differences in
externality may explain why response time was not a factor for chromosomes when perceivers
made a gender attribution, while response time was a factor for genitals. In partial contradiction
to the proposed model, gender visualization may not always be a necessary procedure in the
gender attribution process. Considering the very large effect sizes found for rejection; the effect
sizes found for response time were negligible by comparison. This pattern was found across all
studies. In general, people seemed to be quick to make a gender attribution, even when their
expectations were not met.
Overall, results from the current research suggest a social-cognitive asymmetry in which
people are more likely to misgender others when characteristics do not match up with
stereotyped expectations. Response times suggest that gender attribution is generally a fairly
quick process regardless of whether people's expectations are met. The quick speed at which
people make judgments about other people's gender may suggest that gender attribution—
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particularly rejecting people's gender identity—has become so habituated and automatic that we
do not even notice we are doing it.
Aim 2 – Determine the moderating effect of personality, transgender contact,
transgender ally status, gender-related beliefs and general beliefs about society on the
relationship between target gender characteristics, rejection, and response time. Another
aim of the current research was to examine the impact of various perceiver characteristics on
their tendency to misgender others. Study 1 examined personality traits such as openness to
experience and agreeableness to find out if they make people less rejecting of other people's
gender. Openness and agreeableness had no effect on rejection. This finding was surprising
because openness and agreeableness have previously been found to mediate the relationship
between contact with outgroups and prejudice (e.g., Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Study 1 also
examined whether or not knowing a transgender person would make people less rejecting. There
was a medium effect size suggesting that participants who knew at least one transgender person
were less rejecting when targets had stereotype-inconsistent chromosomes. They were also faster
at making these judgments particularly for targets who identified as women, but the effect size
for response time was small.
This finding is congruent with previous research linking contact with outgroups to lower
prejudice (Allport, 1954/1979; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Knowing transgender people made
people less rejecting when chromosomes were inconsistent with identity, but this effect was not
found when genitals were inconsistent with gender identity. Perhaps interactions with
transgender people caused them to view chromosomes as less changeable than genitals. Research
has linked lower prejudice with perceiving group characteristics as immutable (see Haslam &
Levy, 2006). Thus, participants who knew transgender people were less rejecting when
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unchangeable characteristics conflicted with gender identity (e.g. chromosomes), but they were
no different from people who did not know a transgender person when changeable
characteristics conflicted (e.g., genitals). Considering the sample size for participants who knew
a transgender person was small, the effect sizes for both rejection and response time suggest a
trend worth further analysis in future studies. More contact with a diversity of individuals who
self-designate their genders may increase understanding about the many different ways in which
people express their genders regardless of the mutability of their characteristics.
In Study 2, knowing a transgender person was not found to be a significant moderator
since chromosomes were not an assessed characteristic of the targets. But this study also
assessed the extent to which identifying as a transgender ally makes participants less rejecting
and judge faster. Participants who identified as an ally to transgender people were less rejecting
in the context of targets whose genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with their gender identity.
There were no differences with regard to response time. The finding for rejection was expected
since past research has found that people are less prejudiced toward the groups to which they are
allied (Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). The effect size was medium for rejection, but there were no
differences on response time. This finding suggests that decreases in rejection among allies were
not due to differences in cognitive processing speed. Transgender allies were similar to nonallies in the time they spent processing gender (in)consistencies when making judgments, but
their final decisions were less rejecting of target's self-designated gender regardless. The
differences in rejection scores despite similar response times may suggest that allies and nonallies spend similar amounts of time processing gender, but at different stages of the gender
attribution process. While non-allies may be trying to visualize the unexpected, stereotypeinconsistent information, allies may be focusing on trying to adjust and apply a schema to be less

129
rejecting. This hypothesis is congruent with research suggesting that stereotype-inconsistent
information is attended to for longer than stereotype-consistent information in inferential and
categorization processing (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). Allies
may be less likely to be slowed down by the stereotype-inconsistencies than non-allies
considering their motivation to be gender-affirming. Their cognitive energy may, instead, be
expended on applying a schema that will help them arrive at a less rejecting decision. If they
were not motivated to put forth the cognitive effort to be less rejecting, they may end up rejecting
in the same way that non-allies do. Efforts to reduce cisgenderism may try to focus on
motivating people to be transgender allies so that they pay more attention to the schemas that
they use that have a direct impact on misgendered groups.
Study 2 also measured the extent to which lower endorsement of gender essentialism
makes participants less rejecting and judge gender faster. Participants with low endorsement of
gender essentialism were less rejecting, but there were no differences with regard to response
time. The effect on rejection is congruent with past studies which found that people who have
essentialist beliefs tend to have a cognitive preference for stereotype-consistency over
stereotype-inconsistency when making judgments about others (Bastian & Haslam, 2007).
Similarly, participants with low gender essentialism were less rejecting in the context of targets
whose genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with their gender identity. The effect size for the
continuous variable of essentialism on rejection was very large, but response time was
unaffected. The effect on response time has similar implications for those low in gender
essentialism as it did for allies to transgender people. Decreases in rejection among people who
endorse gender essentialism less were not due to differences in cognitive processing speed.
Similar to allies, people low in gender essentialism may not respond the same way to stereotype-
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inconsistencies because of their motivation to be less gender essentialist. They may expend their
cognitive efforts adjusting to and applying a schema that will be less rejecting. If they were not
motivated to put forth this cognitive effort to be less rejecting, they may end up being more
rejecting. Efforts to reduce cisgenderism may try to focus on motivating people to endorse less
gender essentialism in the schemas that they apply during the gender attribution process
Study 2 also measured the extent to which biological gender beliefs and natural
attitudes/beliefs about gender increased rejection and slowed down judgments. These were not
found to be significant. Previously, biological gender beliefs were a predictor of support for
transgender people's rights, and not natural attitudes/beliefs about gender (see Tee and Hegarty,
2006). But these had never been tested on attribution processes that can lead to misgendering.
Also, Study 2 measured the extent to which authoritarianism and conservatism increased
rejection and slowed down judgments. These were not found to be significant either. Previously,
these measures had been found to predict sexual prejudice or anti-trans prejudice (Herek, 2000;
Tee & Hegarty, 2006; Whitley, 1999). Therefore, these measures do not relate to processes that
result in misgendering.
Overall, knowledge derived from knowing a transgender person plays an important role
in the extent to which people reject other's gender identities and how quickly their decision is
made. The diversification of knowledge through exposure to individuals and groups with many
ways of expressing gender may help reduce people's tendency to misgender. Also, the effects of
identifying as a transgender ally or being low in gender essentialism on response time gave
insight into the stages at which people focus their attention during the attribution process. If
people are motivated to focus on the schemas used to make a gender judgment rather than on
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visualizing the stereotype-inconsistencies of the target, they may become less rejecting in their
gender judgments.
Aim 3 – Determine the effect of cognitive distraction on adjusters’ rejection among
target with stereotype-inconsistent gender characteristics. Building on the predictions and
findings of the previous studies, another aim of this dissertation was twofold: The first was to
identify individuals who engage in schema adjustment. Schema adjustment was considered to
occur when people, called "adjusters," applied a schema that was based on affirming a target's
gender identity (an "identity-based schema"). The second aim was to determine if adjusters
would become more rejecting when distracted while making a gender judgment. Findings for this
aim would lend credence to the idea proposed in Chapter 2 that people who are less prejudice
will still demonstrate prejudice on an implicit level (see Gilbert, 1989). Study 3 found that, under
conditions in which adjusters were cognitively distracted, their rejection scores increased. This
finding was expected since past research on prejudice found that people who are otherwise less
prejudiced become more prejudiced when under cognitive load (Cralley & Ruscher, 2005). In
general, people who report less prejudice on self-report measures tend to demonstrate prejudice
on implicit cognitive measures (Hoffman, Hawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005;
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, et al., 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998).
people who are motivated to be less prejudiced tend to still be prejudiced at an implicit level
(Ajzen, 2005; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones,
& Vance, 2002). Similarly, adjusters were less rejecting of targets with stereotype-inconsistent
genitals and gender identity, but they became more rejecting when they judged target gender
while being distracted.
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Interestingly, a marginally significant finding suggested that adjusters were faster than
defaulters at making a gender attribution when they weren't distracted. Thus, adjusters may not
be "adjusting" from a default schema to an identity-based schema as previously thought. If they
were adjusting, they would have been the same speed or slower to apply an identity-based
schema because they may have needed more time for the extra step of adjusting. Such a result
would lend credence to the idea proposed in Chapter 2 that some people "correct" or adjust their
attributions in a step-by-step process (see Gilbert, 1989). Gilbert (1989) described “correcting”
as a sequential process in which people make an attribution first and then revise that attribution
with a new one. Through the model depicted in Figure 1, I posited a similar process for gender
attributions among adjusters. The faster response time among adjusters, although a marginally
significant result, suggests that adjusters processed targets much more quickly than this
sequential process would suggest. One interpretation of their faster response time is that adjusters
were blocking information about genitals in order to more efficiently apply an affirming,
identity-based schema to each target. Thus, adjusters may be more accurately called "blockers"
than adjusters.
This process of blocking contrasts with the findings for transgender allies and people low
in gender essentialism. Transgender allies and people low in gender essentialism in Study 2 took
a similar amount of time to process stereotype-inconsistencies as those who were not transgender
allies and were high in gender essentialism. An interpretation of their similar response times
suggests that these groups may have been engaging in sequential adjustment as I had originally
proposed might be the case for adjusters. In short, these studies described two methods that
different people may apply to make a gender attribution that is less likely to be misgendering: (1)
people who adjust their initial default, biology-based schema toward an identity-based one that is
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more gender-affirming; and (2) people who block information about biology to apply an identitybased schema that is gender-affirming.
Blocking in Study 3 may have some similar characteristics to blocking as it is described
in the literature on attention in learning (Kruschke, 2003). Kruschke (2003) posited that people
learn methods that perfectly predict outcomes such that they tend not to associate new cues with
that outcome; they block those cues out. In comparison, the process of blocking in Study 3 may
suggest that some people have learned to associate gender identity as the perfect predictor of a
person's gender. The difference between blocking in the literature on attention in learning and
blocking in gender attributions is that, instead of blocking new cues, people block old and
familiar cues that were presumably learned first (e.g., biological characteristics). Therefore,
blocking may use up cognitive resources to a greater degree when making a gender attribution
than when engaging in simple cognitive learning tasks. This may be why blocking was generally
ineffective for people when the distraction task was present. The cognitive effort to block the
default schema and apply an identity-based schema did not hold up when under cognitive load—
adjusters became more rejecting.
Adjusters higher rejection scores while under cognitive load revealed that, on an implicit
level, adjusters may still be impacted by knowledge about biology-based social representations
of gender. Blocking out the default schema in order to apply an identity-based schema seems to
be an explicit, controlled process that depletes cognitive resources and makes people susceptible
to the effects of cognitive load. Thus, psychologists' and activists' attempts to establish gender
identity as a biological, immutable characteristic (e.g., Diamond, 2002; Ungar, 1979) may not
have successfully established itself as a central element in people's social representations. If it
had, Moscovici (1984) would suggest that gender identity would be able to stand the test of any
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situation. But adjusters' identity-based model for gender attribution did not hold up under
cognitive load. Future research on adjusters should explore the direct impact of habitually asking
unfamiliar people their gender identity on their tendency to misgender others thereafter. Perhaps
automating this practice would reduce the cognitive effort needed to block out the current
biological premise upon which social representations of gender are based.
Aim 4 – Determine the effect of an additional stereotype-inconsistent gender
characteristic on adjusters' rejection. The final aim of this dissertation explored adjusters
(suggested to be "blockers" in the conclusions for Study 3) further by adding a socially-normed
gender characteristic that they would additionally have to be de-prioritized in order to apply an
identity-based schema. While the previous study uncovered the instability of schema adjustment
because of a cognitive distraction, Study 5 sought to expose the instability of schema adjustment
because of a social norm. Kahneman and Miller (1986) suggest that social norms get associated
with particular groups. Research has found that these associations often result in asymmetrical
judgments about groups (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto 2001). Adjusters typically categorize people
according to their gender identity. Such categorizations may still lead people to make normative
or stereotyped associations based on those categorizations. Since Kessler and McKenna (1978)
described clothing as the "cultural genital," clothing preferences were manipulated in Study 5 to
determine their impact on adjusters’ judgment of targets who they otherwise categorize
according to their gender identity.
I predicted that adjusters would be more rejecting when clothing was stereotypeinconsistent with gender identity in the context of stereotype-inconsistent genitals. I assumed that
they would not be more rejecting when clothing was stereotype-consistent with gender identity
in the context of stereotype-inconsistent genitals. Results from the study only supported this first
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prediction. In the context of stereotype-inconsistent genitals, adjusters were more rejecting of
target gender identity regardless of whether clothing was stereotype-inconsistent or stereotypeconsistent. The presence of clothing caused adjusters’ stereotyped expectations about genitals to
emerge. This may suggest an expansion on past research into the impact of norms on the
judgments people make. At least for some people (in this case, adjusters), the mere presence or
absence of certain stimuli may change the parameters upon which other stimuli get associated
with stereotypes and then categorized.
Caution should be exercised when deriving conclusions from the above results. Recall
that gender identity of the target was split between the first set of vignettes (clothing absent) and
second set of vignettes (clothing present) in order to distinguish adjusters from the sample.
Although somewhat post hoc, results may have been confounded by the fact that the gender
identity of the target was not counterbalanced between presence or absence of clothing
preference. Attempts were made to ensure that the clothing characteristics were both rated highly
on gender exclusivity and social desirability. Attempts were also made to reduce the salience of
these gender ratings in the design of the study. But the effect of order could not be discerned for
certain and was not controlled for in this study. While order effects were not significant when
testing vignettes that described target gender identity and genitals (see Study 2), order effects
were not specifically tested on vignettes that included information about clothing.
Further exploration of the data revealed that adjusters were still less rejecting than
defaulters in the presence of information about clothing. Both adjusters' and defaulters' gender
judgments were influenced by information about genitals in the presence of information about
clothing, but adjusters were influenced by genitals to a lesser degree than defaulters. The effect
sizes for the impact of genitals on rejection for adjusters and defaulters were both very large, but
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much larger among defaulters. These results may be explained by differences between adjusters'
and defaulters' in the gender identities of the transgender people they know. The sample sizes
were too small to test the effects of knowing transgender people on the outcomes, but adjusters
tended to know more transgender people who self-designate their gender as genderqueer than
defaulters did. Genderqueer is a category sometimes used to define one's gender as independent
from a binary identification as a woman or a man (see Nestle, Howell, & Wilchins, 2002).
People who identify as genderqueer may express their genders (e.g., through clothing) in ways
that are not easily categorized according to binary social representations of gender and that may
change in their gender stereotyped-consistency over time and across contexts. Thus, adjusters
may have interpreted certain targets as examples of people who are genderqueer—not distinctly
a woman or distinctly a man—when they learned that their clothing preferences were
inconsistent.
People have many reasons for self-identifying within the gender binary while expressing
their gender in contrast to it (Ansara, 2010; Wilchins, 1997; Serano, 2007; Stone, 1991). Some
people who, for example, identify as women and have a penis, may express their gender in
masculine ways to protect themselves from violence because they do not easily "pass" as a
woman or they cannot afford gender affirming hormones or surgeries to help them pass.
Alternatively, violence may not be a factor—they may simply just like to express themselves as a
masculine woman. If adjusters had greater exposure to the multiplicity of reasons people have
for self-identifying their genders within the binary and continuing to express their genders in
contrasting ways, they might not have become more rejecting in the presence of information
about clothing.
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Overall, adjusters’ identity-based schema did not hold up in the presence of information
about clothing. Underlying stereotypes based on the biological determination of gender emerged
in the presence of this socially-normed characteristic regardless of its stereotype-consistency or
inconsistency. Knowledge about genderqueer identities may have influenced adjusters becoming
more rejecting, but still not as rejecting, as defaulters. In the end, both groups were rejecting of
targets who had characteristics that were stereotype-inconsistent. Both adjusters and defaulters
may benefit from exposure to more diverse knowledge about the various ways in which people
express their gender—including those who self-identify within the gender binary—and the
reasons why they do. Such knowledge could help broaden people's understanding about others to
whom they have less exposure, which may also reduce the effects of cisgenderism in all people's
gender attributions.
Implications for research on social representations and social cognition
Rateau, Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric (2012) wagered that future research combining social
representations and sociocognitive processes would "...be crucial to the development of our
knowledge about the psychosocial functioning of individuals and groups" (p. 494). The above
studies combined these two fields of thought by empirically manipulating different social
representations of gender and testing their impact on cognitive processes. Social representations
theory provided the framework for testing collective assumptions and expectations about gender
through different combinations of stereotyped characteristics that described various target
persons. Social cognition provided the focus on the attributions that perceivers made and the
length of time it took them to make an attribution. This design allowed for a deeper
understanding of the processes associated with both theories.
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Cognitive manipulations and interpretation of their effects helped explain the current
state of social representations of gender. Moscovici (1969; 1984) explained that social
representations are generally stable over time, but have the ability to evolve through challenges
made by individuals. Cognitive manipulations in the present studies were useful for
understanding the extent to which gender identity is becoming integrated into people's collective
social representations of gender. For a subgroup of the samples, gender identity predicted
people's gender attributions regardless of stereotype-inconsistency with genitals, but only under
conditions in which they were easily in control of the judgments they were making. Cognitive
load was manipulated to determine the automaticity of making a gender judgment that affirmed
target gender identity in this subgroup. Cognitive load caused this group to be more likely to
misgender the target when genitals and gender identity were stereotype-inconsistent. In other
words, this subgroup became much like the rest of the sample who relied on biological
characteristics to make their gender judgments. This research suggested that biological
characteristics are central to shared knowledge about gender, even among those who may be
beginning to challenge these assumptions.
Social representations of gender via the manipulation of target characteristics helped
emphasize the impact of context on the cognitive processing of gender. Research on norms found
that people can be asymmetric in their judgments of others when they are marked as unexpected
or surprising (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto). Asymmetries were similarly found in the current research,
but the strength of these asymmetries depended on which features of the target were more
strongly associated with social representations. There was a larger effect of genitals than
chromosomes such that people were more likely to misgender when genitals were stereotypeinconsistent. Additionally, research on schema categorization has found that the more dissimilar
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the features of a category are, the more time people take to categorize it (Rosch, 1978;
Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). Meta-analyses have found inconsistencies in
the findings regarding response time in categorization (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992). The current research found that response time was relevant only to certain
manipulations of certain types of target gender characteristics. Genitals rather than chromosomes
made people slower at forming their judgments. Overall, genitals were processed differently than
chromosomes at the cognitive level. This may have to do with the effort that goes into
cognitively visualizing genitals especially when they are stereotype-inconsistent. This extra
visualization process may be unnecessary for chromosomes since they are internal biological
characteristics associated with gender while genitals are external. Chromosomes may be less
strongly relevant and more quickly processed as a result.
Taken together, social representations theory and social cognitive processes
complemented each other through both design and interpretation of the findings. Future research
into complex sociological phenomenon (e.g., gender) may wish to integrate these two
approaches in similar ways or using improved methods such as the suggestions described in the
next section.
Limitations and future directions
This program of research involved several overarching as well as study-specific
limitations. First, all studies involved issues of external validity since they had participants make
judgments about fictional target people described in vignettes rather than make judgments about
real people observed in everyday settings. However, being among the first of their kind, these
studies attempted to isolate and manipulate variables previously found to be relevant to the
gender attribution process (e.g. genitals; Kessler & McKenna, 2005) and test new variables (e.g.,
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chromosomes) so that their specific impact in relation to gender identity could be examined. In
this way, these studies married the methods of social cognitive research while contextualizing the
findings within social expectations and assumptions about gender.
A few limitations to the studies have to do with the methods of analysis. For one, the
rejection scores derived from the two Attribution rating scales in Studies 2, 3, and 5 limited
analyses to understanding the extent to which people rejected, but not the reasoning behind their
judgments. A benefit of the two separate scales that perceivers could attribute targets to being a
woman and/or a man separately. They had the option to judge the target to be a woman and a
man or neither a woman nor a man if they wanted. I took the average of these two rating scales
together since any rejection of a target’s self-designated gender would be an instance of
misgendering. This includes the suggestion through these rating scales that a target who
identifies as a single gender (as a woman or as a man) is either both these gender simultaneously
or neither of these genders. Nevertheless, I was unable to distinguish between judging the target
as both or as neither by averaging the two scales together. Future studies may seek to examine
differences in nuance between the judgments that people make by interpreting differences in the
reasoning behind their judgments and subsequent ratings.
Research is needed to further understand who “adjusters” are, what causes adjusters to be
more rejecting, and how schema adjustment and/or "blocking" operates across different
information provided about the target person’s gender. Since the identity schema did not hold up
when under cognitive load and when additionally learning about a target person’s clothing
preference, this calls into question the distinctiveness of adjusters from defaulters across
contexts. Although this finding implies that schema adjustment and/or blocking may be even
rarer and more unstable than previously thought, continuing to identify and explore the instances
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in which certain people do engage in schema adjustment or blocking will help build an
understanding of the social representations that act implicitly to perpetuate or reduce cisgenderist
outcomes in our gender attributions.
Future studies should counterbalance gender identity of the target in order to accurately
determine the effect of clothing preference on adjusters' rejection of the target's gender identity.
Alternatively, future studies could identify a group of likely adjusters/blockers prior to testing
and then test the effects of clothing and genitals on rejection for both targets who identify as men
and targets who identify as women. Circular reasoning was at risk when I chose to distinguish
adjusters as such strict “accepters” of target gender identity using the same measure that was
used in the main analyses. Distinguishing adjusters in this way, however, ensured that the group I
was assessing truly represented the group that was the least rejecting in the sample. Future
studies may attempt to avoid the risk of circular reasoning by recruiting a larger sample and/or
focusing recruitment efforts on populations who are more likely to be adjusters/blockers. The
demographic differences between adjusters/blockers and defaulters found in Study 3 and 5 may
help with recruitment strategizing to this end.
Findings from this research also provide a foundation upon which to test additional target
characteristics' impact on gender attributions. Future studies can test the extent to which gender
attributions are affected by differences in the tone of people's voices, in presence/absence or
coarseness of hair on peoples bodies, in the structure of people's faces, and other external
attributes associated with gender. These studies were also limited by their focus on targets who
think of themselves on the gender binary as either a woman or a man. A more diverse spectrum
of gender identities may be used. Open-ended questions may ask people to indicate the target's
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gender allowing for more flexibility in their responses by way of removing the possible priming
effect of anchoring target gender along a continuum of being a woman or being a man.
Future studies may retest characteristics of the target used in the current studies in order
to determine their centrality to social representations across time and across cultures. Mosocivici
(1981) emphasized that social representations are mutable and transformative across time as
objectification processes incorporate new information that push assumptions and common sense
realities in novel directions. Chromosomes may be an example of this in U.S. society today since
people responded to chromosomes differently than genitals on rejection and response time. Also,
social representations are central to the communications and knowledges of cultures. Therefore,
taking these same or similar studies and applying them cross-culturally may reveal
characteristics other than biological ones (e.g., "spirit gender" in indigenous North American
cultures; Jacobs, Thomas, Lang, 1997) that influence people's gender judgments.
The current research also provided a foundation upon which to test additional
characteristics of the perceiver and their impact on the gender attribution process. For one, the
design of these studies did not include direct measures of participants' emotional response, e.g.,
anger and disgust, in reaction to the targets gender characteristics. The reason for excluding
measures of affect were described in Chapter 2, but future research should propose and test a
model that includes affect as a potential moderator to the gender attribution process.
Cisgenderism has been differentiated from measures of emotion-laden forms of prejudice such as
transphobia (see Ansara & Hegarty, 2012). Social representations that lead to cisgenderist
responses are said to operate implicitly on the gender attribution process, regardless of emotional
response. Therefore, this study predicted cisgenderist responses to be found both among people
more likely to have positive emotions toward individuals affected by misgendering (e.g., allies to
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transgender people) as well as those with potentially more negative feelings toward those
individuals (e.g., people with authoritarian beliefs). But these were indirect tests of emotional
response. At the extreme end of the spectrum, past research has found that people are motivated
to respond violently toward transgender people as a result of their negative emotions toward
them (Stotzer, 2009). But are people motivated to misgender people as a result of having these
kinds of negative emotions? Some research has suggested that people are motivated to misgender
in order to socially maintain a heteronormative status quo (see Schilt & Westbrook, 2009). To
further understand the role of emotions in the gender attribution process, future studies may
focus deliberately on people's emotional responses to targets with stereotype-inconsistent and
stereotype-consistent gender characteristics. Hill & Willoughby's (2005) self-report measure of
transphobia may be a starting point for this analysis.
Final conclusions regarding cisgenderism in gender attributions
For this dissertation, cisgenderism was defined as the delegitmization of people’s
designations of their own genders by relying on social representations to make that designation
for them. As expected, the vast majority of participants in the current research misgendered
others because they made stereotyped associations about their biological characteristics.
Surprisingly, genitals and chromosomes were similar bases upon which people's genders were
judged. They also rejected others' genders fairly quickly despite the unexpectedness of a target's
characteristics. Knowing people who are misgendered (e.g. transgender people) lessened people's
tendency to misgender others and even helped them make a judgment faster. At the same time,
the knowledge communicated through these interactions sometimes limited people's judgments
in new ways. While they were less rejecting toward some people (e.g., people with stereotypeinconsistent chromosomes), they were still rejecting toward others (e.g., people with stereotype-
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inconsistent genitals). Both identifying as an ally to transgender people and having less gender
essentialist beliefs were associated with less rejection. People with these characteristics may
have been less rejecting because they were consciously trying to overcome the stereotypeinconsistencies in the target's gender that they automatically recognized. This hypothesis was
supported when people who tended to be more gender affirming of others became more rejecting
when conditions (via distraction) constrained their cognitive efforts not to misgender.
These findings illuminate the ways in which cisgenderism may operate implicitly, or
beyond our control, on the gender judgments that we make. Social representations of gender
cause people to judge gender based on biological characteristics above or instead of personal
gender identity, unless they consciously attempt to disregard those social representations. But
attempts to disregard them were found to be easily destabilized. The reliance on biology-based
social representations will need to be replaced by a new model in order to stabilize people's
efforts to be more gender affirming. To overcome the implicit effects of cisgenderism, current
social representations will need to be replaced by a new schematic model that prioritizes people's
own gender self-designations. Ultimately, social representations need to allow people the right to
designate their own genders, without institutionalized barriers, throughout the lifespan.
Efforts to work toward this goal may start by challenging and falsifying people's common
sense understandings that women and men are biologically distinct and that gender is simple and
stable in humans (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967). For example, educational efforts at the institutional and
interpersonal levels could focus on increasing awareness around the many kinds of chromosomal
combinations and the spectrum of genital size, shape, color, etc. in humans (see Fausto-Sterling,
2000). Additionally, educational efforts may draw attention to the multiplicity of gender selfdesignations and expressions in humans (see Wilchins, 2004). The potential benefits of these
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efforts are supported by the findings in this dissertation. Exposing people to new knowledge to
motivate them to be less gender essentialist may contribute to lowering people's tendency to
reject others' gender identities. Additionally, familiarizing people with the experiences of others
who have unfamiliar gendered backgrounds may contribute to lowering people's tendency to
reject others' gender identities.
Efforts to work toward this goal may also attempt to motivate people to focus their
attention on counteracting the assumptions that they make about other people's genders in every
day social interactions. A sense of social responsibility could be instilled to act in accordance
with ethical guidelines put forth by the APA (2008) encouraging the social and legal recognition
of people's gender identities. In keeping with these guidelines, the practice of asking people their
gender identities, and affirming those identities, should become common practice in everyday
interactions between individuals and with social services or government organizations. This
dissertation's findings suggest that we may have automated the process of assigning people to a
gender without asking them first. However, if we take the time to ask the person's gender
identity, we may be able to reverse this process. People, including those who are resistant to the
practice at first, may find that their automatic assumptions about people's genders are incorrect
more often than they would have known them to be otherwise. For example, people may not be
so quick to judge the gender of people like Balpreet Kaur whose story was described in Chapter
1 of this dissertation. Instead, gender attributions could be based on the personal gender identities
of the individual rather than on any other ascribed characteristics. Over time, a cultural
prioritization of self-designations of gender may help reduce the effects of cisgenderism both
institutionally and interpersonally.
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Appendix A:
Full measures used in moderation analyses for Study 1 & Study 2
Gender Essentialism scale (modified Essentialist Beliefs scale, Haslam& Levy, 2006)
1. Gender is a category with clear and sharp boundaries: People are either women or men.
2. Women and men each have necessary or defining characteristics, without which they
would not be women or men.
3. Women and men are not fundamentally different. (*)
4. People who do not consistently act like one gender are fooling themselves and should just
make up their minds
5. Knowing that someone is a woman or a man tells you a lot about them
6. Gender is caused by biological factors for women and men.
7. Whether a person is a girl or boy is set early on.
8. People cannot change their gender.
9. Gender has innate and genetically-based characteristics.
(*) counter-balanced items
Beliefs about gender scale (Tee &Hegarty, 2006)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

There are only two genders, women and men
Only these two genders are morally acceptable and legitimate in our society
All adults identify as either women or men
If you are either a woman or a man, then you are that gender for all time
All women have a vagina and all men have a penis.
It is just a social norm to assign babies to a gender based on what their bodies are like
Anyone who is not naturally a woman or a man is a freak of nature
If someone says they are changing their gender, they are most likely just making a joke or
play acting
9. Even a person with ambiguous genitalia is still either female or male
10. Possession of a vagina, even one that is man-made through surgery, entitles a person to
consider themselves female
Trans persons beliefs scale (Tee &Hegarty, 2006)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Gender is determined by biological factors, such as genes and hormones, before birth
Whether a person sees himself/herself as male or female is largely a matter of upbringing
Transvestites are people who gain pleasure from cross-dressing
Transsexual people are basically transvestites who wear the clothes of the opposite sex all
of the time
All mammals have a physical sex, but only humans have a gender identity
If someone wants a sex reassignment, their doctor or psychologist can talk them out of it
Male to female transsexuals are practically all attracted to men and not to women
Transsexual people are fooling themselves in believing that they, and not their bodies,
determine what their gender identity should be
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9. There are only three factors that determine gender: internal gonads (e.g. testes), external
genetalia (e.g. penis) and chromosomes ( i.e. xx—female and xy—male)
10. If someone has a sex change operation they have genuinely changed their gender
11. Transsexual people should be tolerated but it is difficult to accept them as normal people
12. In countries where sex reassignment surgery is not readily available, nobody worries
about their gender identity
Right-wing authoritarianism, short version, modified (RWA, Zakrisson, 2005)
1. Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents
prevailing in society today.
2. Our country needs free thinkers, who will have the courage to stand up against traditional
ways, even if this upsets many people. (*)
3. The ‘‘old-fashioned ways’’ and ‘‘old-fashioned values’’ still show the best way to live.
4. Our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and understanding for
untraditional values and opinions. (*)
5. God's laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it
is too late, violations must be punished.
6. It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get hold
of destructive and disgusting material.
7. Many good people challenge the state, criticize the church and ignore ‘‘the normal way
of living’’. (*)
8. Our forefathers ought to be honored more for the way they have built our society, at the
same time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it.
9. People ought to put less attention to the Bible and religion, instead they ought to develop
their own moral standards. (*)
10. There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; the society ought to stop
them.
11. It is better to accept bad literature than to censor it. (*)
12. Facts show that we have to be harder against crime and sexual immorality, in order to
uphold law and order.
13. The situation in the society of today would be improved if troublemakers were treated
with reason and humanity. (*)
14. If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil that
poisons our country from within.
(*) counter-balanced items
Conservatism (Brewer, 2003)
Egalitarianism subscale
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal
opportunity to succeed;
2. we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country(*)
3. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are(*)
4. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than
others(*)
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5. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems;
6. One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance.
Moral traditionalism subscale
1. The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society
2. The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those
changes(*)
3. We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral
standards even if they are very different from our own(*)
4. This country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional
family ties
(*) counter-balanced items
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Appendix B:
Clothing items rated in Study 4

Sun hats
Fine jewelry
Panties
Boxers
Bras
Briefcase
Dresses
Ties
Baseball Caps
Loafers
Cuff links
High heels
Tuxedos
Purse
Tight jeans
Cologne
Muted colors
Ballet flats
Stockings
Sneakers
V-neck sweater
Pants
Loose jeans
Swim trunks
Bright colors
Perfume
Bikini
Collared dress shirt
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Table 1
Study 1 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics, N = 127
Total Sample
n (%)
Gender
Female
Male
MTF
Questioning
Sexuality
Bisexual
Gay/Lesbian
Straight
Did not respond/Refused to answer
Race
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic
Middle-Eastern/Indian
White or Caucasian
Other
Did not respond/Refused to answer
Grew up in NYC
Yes
No
Household income
Under 25,000
25,001-50,000
50,001-75,000
75,001-100,000
Over 100,000
Current Religion
Atheist/Agnostic/None
Buddhist
Catholic
Hinsu/Jain
Jewish
Muslim
Protestant/Christian
Spiritual
Did not respond/Refused to answer

84 (66.1)
40 (31.5)
1 (0.8)
2 (1.6)
6(4.7)
6(4.7)
88 (69.3)
27 (21.3)
34 (26.8)
18 (14.2)
26 (20.5)
9 (7.1)
36 (28.3)
1 (0.8)
3 (2.4)
83 (65.4)
44 (34.6)
23 (18.1)
43 (33.1)
27 (21.3)
20 (15.7)
15 (118)
37 (29.1)
4 (3.1)
28 (22.0)
3 (2.4)
10 (7.9)
5 (3.9)
34 (26.8)
3 (2.4)
3 (2.4)

Table 2
Study 1 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for 2x2 Interactions Between Target Gender Characteristics on Rejection and Response
Time, N = 127
Rejection Scores
Genitals

Woman identity
Man identity
Vagina
Penis
XX Chromosomes
XY Chromosomes
Column

Vagina
M (SE)
2.11a (.08)
4.26b (.12)
-

Penis
M (SE)
4.10b (.12)
2.18a (.08)
-

Chromosomes

-

XX
M (SE)
2.24a (.08)
4.11b (.13)
3.25 (.08)
3.10 (.10)
-

XY
M (SE)
3.97b (.13)
2.32a (.08)
3.12 (.09)
3.17 (.08)
-

Sexual attraction
To women
M (SE)
3.14a (.08)
3.10a (.09)
3.18 (.08)
3.07 (.09)
3.13 (.08)
3.12 (.08)
3.12 (.08)

To men
M (SE)
3.07a (.09)
3.33b (.09)
3.19 (.08)
3.20 (.09)
3.23 (.09)
3.17 (.08)
3.20 (.08)

Row
M (SE)
3.10 (.08)
3.22 (.08)
3.18 (.07)
3.14 (.08)
3.18 (.08)
3.14 (.08)

20.71 (1.02)
21.41 (1.31)
21.08 (1.22)
21.04 (1.07)
20.22 (1.11)
21.90 (1.21)
21.06 (1.02)

21.11 (1.05)
19.91 (.93)
21.24 (1.20)
19.77 (.95)
20.46 (.97)
20.56 (1.02)
20.51 (.90)

20.91 (.92)
20.66 (.98)
21.16 (1.07)
20.41 (.84)
20.34 (.92)
21.23 (.99)

Response Times (s)
Woman identity
19.64a (1.11) 22.18b (1.00)
19.92 (.97)
21.91 (1.27)
Man identity
22.69b (1.28) 18.63a (.98)
20.77 (1.13) 20.55 (1.07)
Vagina
19.32a (.97) 23.00b (1.37)
Penis
21.36a (1.14) 19.46a (.87)
XX Chromosomes
XY Chromosomes
Column
a,b,c
significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts
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Table 3
Study 1 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for 2x2x2 Interactions Between Target Gender Characteristics on Rejection and
Response Time, N = 127

Rejection Scores
Genitals

Woman identity
Man identity
Column

Vagina
Chromosomes
XX
XY
M (SE)
M (SE)
1.24 (.05)
2.98 (.14)
5.26z (.15)
3.26y (.14)
3.25 (.08)
3.12 (.09)

Penis
Chromosomes
XX
XY
M (SE)
M (SE)
3.24 (.14)
4.95 (.16)
2.97y (.15)
1.38x (.07)
3.10 (.10)
3.17 (.08)

Row
M (SD)
3.10 (.08)
3.22 (.08)

Response Time (s)
Woman identity 16.38a (1.12) 22.89c (1.76)
23.45c (1.32) 20.92b (1.26)
20.91 (.92)
Man identity
22.26 (1.36)
23.11 (1.64)
19.27 (1.49) 17.99 (1.02)
20.66 (.98)
Column
19.32 (1.10)
23.00 (1.37)
21.36 (1.14)
19.46 (.87)
a,b,c
Note:
significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts; x,y,z marginally significant differences
between values are represented by different superscripts (p < 1.0)
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Table 4
Study 1 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for the 2x2x2 Interaction Between Target Gender Identity, Chromosomes, and
Transgender Contact, N = 127

Rejection Scores

Woman identity
Man identity
Column

Transgender contact
Yes
No
M (SE)
M (SE)
2.66 (.14)
3.26 (.08)
2.96 (.15)
3.30 (.09)
2.81 (.13)
3.28 (.08)

Transgender contact
Yes
No
Chromosomes
Chromosomes
XX
XY
XX
XY
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
2.16a (.15)
3.15b (.24)
2.27a (.09)
4.24c (.14)
b
a
c
3.56 .24)
2.36 (.16)
4.30 (.14)
2.31a (.09)
3.18 (.07)
3.14 (.08)
3.18 (.08)
3.14 (.08)

Row
M (SD)
2.96 (.08)
3.13 (.09)

Response Time (s)
Woman identity 18.59 (1.80) 21.69 (1.04) 20.10x (1.91)
17.07x (2.47)
19.85x (1.11)
23.53y (1.43)
20.14 (1.04)
Man identity
18.54 (1.92) 21.37 (1.11)
18.23 (2.24)
18.86 (2.12)
21.62 (1.30)
21.12 (1.23)
19.96 (1.11)
Column
18.56 (1.71)
21.53 (.99)
19.16 (1.82)
17.96 (1.92)
20.74 (1.05)
22.33 (1.11)
a,b,c
significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts; x,y marginally significant differences between
values are represented by different superscripts (p < 1.0)
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Table 5
Study 2 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics, N = 190
Total Sample
n (%)
Gender Identity independent from birth-assignment
Yes
No
Unsure of gender identity
Did not respond
Gender assigned at birth
Female
Male
Intersex
I was not assigned a gender
Did not respond
How they think others perceive their gender
Correctly
Incorrectly
Did not respond
Sexual attraction
A constant and clear attraction to other gender
A constant and clear attraction to same gender
A constant and clear attraction to both women and men
A variable or fluid attraction to women and men
A constant, clear attraction to people regardless of gender
identity/expression
I am asexual/have no attraction to any gender
I am unsure about which gender(s) I am attracted to
Did not respond
Area surrounding current residents
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Did not respond
Ethnicity
Hispanic or of Latin American decent
Not Hispanic or of Latin American decent
Unknown
Did not respond
Race
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Black or African American
Asian

7 (3.7)
180 (94.7)
1 (.5)
2 (1.1)
100 (52.6)
84(44.2)
1(.52)
3 (1.6)
2 (1.1)
185 (97.4)
3 (1.6)
2 (1.0)
153 (80.5)
7 (3.7)
8 (4.2)
9 (4.7)
8 (4.2)
1 (.5)
2 (1.1)
2 (1.1)
65 (34.2)
85 (44.7)
38 (20.0)
2 (1.1)
10 (5.3)
176 (92.6)
2 (1.1)
2 (1.1)
2 (1.1)
10 (5.3)
4 (2.1)
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Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian
Other (Persian, Multi-racial, Hispanic, Arab)
Did not respond
Education
Less than a 4-year degree
A 4-year degree or higher
Did not respond
Consider themselves to be an "ally" to Transgender people
Yes
No
Did not respond
Consider themselves to be an "ally" to LGB people
Yes
No
Did not respond

1 (.5)
165 (86.8)
6 (3.2)
2 (1.1)
103 (54.2)
85 (44.8)
2 (1.1)
93 (48.9)
95 (50.0)
2 (1.1)
113 (59.5)
75 (39.5)
2 (1.1)

Table 6
Study 2 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects of and Interaction between Target Gender Identity and Genitals on
Rejection and Response Time time, N = 190
Rejection

Response time

Vagina
Penis
Row
Vagina
Penis
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
Woman M (SE)
1.19a (.05)
5.26b (.13) 3.22 (.07) 17.87a (0.92)
23.56b (1.97)
Man M (SE)
5.33b (.13)
1.15a (.05) 3.24 (.07) 23.53b (1.27
18.08a (0.98)
Column M (SE)
3.26 (.07)
3.20 (.07)
20.70 (0.83)
20.82 (1.18)
a,b
significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts

Row M (SE)
20.72 (1.12)
20.81 (0.89)
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Table 7
Study 2 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects of and Three-Way Interaction Between Perceiver Gender Essentialism,
Target Gender Identity and Target Genitals on Rejection and Response Time, n = 188
Rejection

Woman M (SE)
Man M (SE)
Column M (SE)

Vagina
M (SE)
1.20a (.06)
5.47b (.12)
3.34 (.06)

Penis
M (SE)
5.38b (.12)
1.18a (.05)
3.28 (.06)

Low Essentialism
M (SE)
Vagina
Penis
M (SE)
M (SE)
1.13a (.08)
4.81b (.17)
4.80b (.16)
1.12a (.07)
2.96 (.08)

High Essentialism
M (SE)
Vagina
Penis
M (SE)
M (SE)
1.28a (.08)
5.95c (.18)
6.14c (.17)
1.24a (.08)
3.65 (.08)

Row
M (SE)
3.29 (.06)
3.33 (.06)

Response time (s)
Low Essentialism
High Essentialism
M (SE)
M (SE)
Vagina
Penis
Vagina
Penis
Vagina
Penis
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
Woman M (SE) 17.30a (1.01) 24.88b (2.16) 16.32 (1.37) 22.70 (2.95) 18.29 (1.47) 27.06 (3.16)
Man M (SE)
22.66b (1.40) 18.61a (1.08) 22.80 (1.91) 18.36 (1.48) 22.53 (2.05) 18.87 (1.58)
Column M (SE)
19.98 (.91)
21.75 (1.29)
20.05 (1.22)
21.69 (1.30)
a,b,c
significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts

Row
M (SE)
21.09 (1.23)
20.64 (.99)
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Table 8
Study 2 means (M) and standard errors (SE) for main effects of and three-way interaction between perceiver transgender ally status,
target gender identity, and target genitals on rejection and response time, n = 188
Rejection
Ally

Woman M (SE)
Man M (SE)
Column M (SE)

Vagina
M (SE)
1.20a (.06)
5.47b (.12)
3.34 (.06)

Penis
M (SE)
5.38b (.12)
1.18a (.05)
3.28 (.06)

Vagina
Penis
M (SE)
M (SE)
1.21a (.08)
4.70b (.18)
b
4.88 (.17)
1.27a (.08)
3.02 (.08)

Not Ally
Vagina
Penis
M (SE)
M (SE)
1.19a (.08)
6.06c (.17)
c
6.07 (.16)
1.08a (.07)
3.60 (.08)

Row
M (SE)
3.29 (.06)
3.33 (.06)

Response time (s)
Ally
Not Ally
Vagina
Penis
Vagina
Penis
Vagina
Penis
Row
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
M (SE)
Woman M (SE) 17.30a (1.01) 24.88b (2.16) 17.81 (1.46)
28.54 (3.14)
16.79 (1.38) 21.22 (2.97) 21.09 (1.23)
Man M (SE)
22.66b (1.40) 18.61a (1.08) 23.54 (2.04)
19.79 (1.57)
21.79 (1.93) 17.44 (1.49)
20.64 (.99)
Column M (SE)
19.98 (.91)
21.75 (1.29)
22.42 (1.29)
19.31 (1.22)
a,b
significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts (p < .001); Ally = identified as an ally to
transgender people; Not Ally = did not identify as an ally to transgender people
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Table 9
Study 2 Order Effects of Vignettes Presented First on Response Time (Log Transformed) for Each Subsequent Vignette
Vignette:
Targets who identify as women
First
Not first
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
t
df
p
MP response time
1.12
.20
89
1.26
.20
101
-4.78
188
< .001
MV response time
1.22
.20
89
1.36
.26
101
-3.93
185.03
< .001
Vignette:
Targets who identify as men
First
Not first
M
SD
n
M
SD
n
t
df
p
WV response time
1.13
.20
89
1.26
.23
101
-4.29
188
< .001
WP response time
1.26
.24
89
1.30
.28
101
-1.23
188
ns
Note: Degrees of freedom in italics were derived from a significant Levene's Test such that equal variance
was not assumed; MP = vignette describing targets who identify as men and has a penis; MV = vignette
describing targets who identify as men and has a vagina; WV = vignette describing targets who identify as
women and has a vagina; WP = vignette describing targets who identify as women and has a penis

159

160
Table 10
Study 3 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics and Differences Between
Adjusters and Defaulters, N = 176

Gender Identity independent
from birth-assignment
Yes
No
Gender assigned at birth
Female
Male
Did not respond
How they think others perceive
their gender
Correctly
Incorrectly
Sexual attraction
A constant and clear
attraction to other gender
A constant and clear
attraction to same gender
A constant and clear
attraction to both women
and men
A variable or fluid
attraction to women and
men
A constant, clear attraction
to people regardless of
gender identity/expression
I am unsure about which
gender(s) I am attracted to
Area surrounding current
residence
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Ethnicity
Hispanic or of Latin
American decent
Not Hispanic or of Latin

Total Sample
(N = 176)
n (%)

Defaulters
(n = 151)
n (%)

Adjusters
(n = 25)
n (%)

X2 for Defaulters
and Adjusters

4 (2.3)
172 (97.7)

2 (1.3)
149 (98.7)

2 (8.0)
23 (92.0)

4.30*

91 (51.7)
84 (47.7)
1 (0.6)

73 (48.7)
77 (51.3)
0 (0.0)

18 (72.0)
7 (28.0)
0 (0.0)

4.67*

174 (98.9)
2 (1.1)

150 (99.3)
1 (0.7)

24 (96.0)
1 (4.0)

2.13

151 (85.8)

134 (88.7)

17 (68.0)

10 (5.7)

8 (5.3)

2 (8.0)

1 (0.6)

1 (0.7)

0 (0.0)
14.09*

2 (1.1)

1 (0.7)

1 (4.0)

11 (6.3)

7 (4.6)

4 (16.0)

1 (0.6)

1 (0.0)

1 (4.0)

49 (27.8)
96 (54.5)
31 (17.6)

42 (27.8)
82 (54.3)
27 (17.9)

7 (28.0)
14 (56.0)
4 (16.0)

11 (6.3)
164 (93.2)

10 (6.6)
140 (92.7)

1 (4.0)
24 (96.0)

0.06

0.43
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American decent
Unknown
1 (0.6)
1 (0.7)
Race
American Indian or
Alaskan Native
1 (0.6)
1 (0.7)
Black or African American
13 (7.4)
11 (7.3)
Asian
17 (9.7)
15 (9.9)
Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
White or Caucasian
138 (78.4)
118 (78.1)
Other (Persian, Multiracial, Hispanic, Arab)
7 (4.0)
6 (4.0)
Education
Less than a 4-year degree
101 (57.4)
87 (57.6)
A 4-year degree or higher
75 (42.6)
64 (42.4)
Trans ally status
Yes
106 (60.2)
88 (58.3)
No
70 (39.8)
63 (41.7)
LGB ally status
Yes
123 (69.9)
105 (69.5)
No
53 (30.1)
46 (30.5)
Knows or has known a trans or
genderqueer person(s)
Yes
57 (32.4)
47 (31.1)
No
119 (67.6)
104 (68.9)
Know transgender
person who identifies
as woman
46 (80.7)
37 (78.72)
Know transgender
person who identifies
as man
24 (42.1)
15 (31.91)
Know transgender
person who identifies
as genderqueer
14 (24.6)
8 (17.02)
Know transgender
person who identifies
some other way
4 (7.0)
2 (4.26)
ƚ
= marginal significance (p < 1.0); * p< .05, **p < .01

0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)
2 (8.0)
2 (8.0)
0.27
0 (0.0)
20 (80.0)
1 (4.0)
14 (56.0)
11 (44.0)

0.02

18 (72.0)
7 (28.0)

1.69

18 (72.0)
7 (28.0)

0.06

10 (40.0)
15 (60.0)

0.77

9 (90.0)

0.67

9 (90.0)

11.05**

6 (60.0)

8.22**

2 (20.0)

3.03ƚ

Table 11
Study 3 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) Among Adjusters for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Target Characteristic
and Distraction Task on Rejection and Response Time, n = 25

Rejection Scores
Distraction Task

Genitals

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

Absent
M (SE)
1.32a (.21)
1.06a (.03)
1.19a (.09)

Present
M (SE)
1.10a (.06)
2.72b (.48)
1.91b (.12)

Row
M (SE)
1.21a (.12)
1.89b (.25)

Response Times (s)
Genitals

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

16.62 (1.61)
20.51 (1.98)
18.56 (1.42)

15.88 (1.23)
21.10 (2.05)
18.49 (1.38)

16.25a (1.25)
20.80b (1.77)

Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts
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Table 12
Study 3 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) Among Defaulters for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Target Characteristic
and Distraction Task on Rejection and Response Time , n = 150
Rejection Scores
Distraction Task

Target
Characteristics

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

Absent
M (SE)
1.52 (.08)
5.12 (.14)
3.32 (.07)

Present
M (SE)
1.53 (.09)
4.88 (.16)
3.20 (.09)

Row
M (SE)
1.52a (.07)
5.00b (.13)

Response Times (s)
Target
Characteristics

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

29.20 (5.41)
25.94 (1.69)
27.57 (2.94)

19.91 91.60)
23.57 (1.86)
21.74 (1.65)

24.56 (2.98)
24.76 (1.43)

Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts
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Table 13
Study 4 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics, N = 68
Total Sample
n (%)
Gender Identity independent from birth-assignment
Yes
No
Gender assigned at birth
Female
Male
Intersex
I was not assigned a gender
How they think others perceive their gender
Correctly
Incorrectly
Sexual attraction
A constant and clear attraction to other gender
A constant and clear attraction to same gender
A constant and clear attraction to both women and men
A variable or fluid attraction to women and men
A constant, clear attraction to people regardless of gender
identity/expression
I am unsure about which gender(s) I am attracted to
I am asexual/have no attraction to any gender
Area surrounding current residence
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Ethnicity
Hispanic or of Latin American decent
Not Hispanic or of Latin American decent
Unknown
Race
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Black or African American
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian
Other (Mixed)
Education
Less than a 4-year degree
A 4-year degree or higher

4 (5.88)
64 (94.12)
28 (41.2)
38 (55.9)
1 (1.5)
1 (1.5)
67 (98.51)
1 (1.49)
52 (76.47)
3 (4.41)
3 (4.41)
3 (4.41)
2 (2.94)
1 (1.47)
1 (1.47)
14 (20.6)
33 (48.5)
21 (30.9)
6 (8.8)
60 (88.2)
2 (2.9)
2 (2.9)
2 (2.9)
3 (4.4)
2 (2.9)
58 (85.3)
1 (1.5)
33 (48.6)
35 (51.4)
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Table 14
Study 4 Mean Differences for Clothing Items on Gender Exclusivity and Social Desirability, N =
68

Clothing item
Dresses
Bras
Purse
High Heels
Panties
Perfume
Ballet Flats
Stockings
Fine Jewelry
Sun Hats
Bikini
Bright Colors
Tight Jeans
Pants
Muted Colors
Sneakers
V-neck Sweaters
Collared Dress Shirt
Baseball Caps
Loose Jeans
Briefcase
Loafers
Boxers
Ties
Cuff Links
Swim Trunks
Cologne
Tuxedos

Gender Exclusivity
MD
5.05
5.41
5.07
5.12
5.13
5.13
4.50
4.69
2.68
3.50
5.18
1.39
2.42
-0.52
-0.56
-0.51
0.34
-1.80
-2.01
-1.57
-2.33
-2.46
-3.90
-3.74
-4.25
-4.20
-4.44
-4.48

Social Desirability
MD
5.49
5.36
5.22
5.42
5.32
5.26
4.99
5.09
2.54
4.02
4.96
1.56
2.57
-0.45
-0.15
-0.49
0.67
-1.01
-1.26
-1.40
-1.93
-1.86
-3.31
-3.50
-3.49
-3.90
-4.05
-4.00

Table 15
Study 4 Correlations Between Gender Exclusivity and Social Desirability of Dresses, Tuxedos, Bras, and Cologne for Women and
Men, N = 168
Gender Exclusivity
Gender exclusivity
Dresses for women
Tuxedos for women
Dresses for men
Tuxedos for men
Bras for women
Cologne for women
Bras for men
Cologne for men

Dresses for
women
-

Tuxedos for
women
-.20
-

Dresses for
men
-.12
.54**
-

Tuxedos
for men
.61**
-.35**
-.15
-

Bras for
women
.52**
-.61**
-.42**
.33**
-

Cologne for
women
-.20
.48**
.17
-.19
-.39**
-

Bras for
men
-.21
.63**
.57**
-.35**
-.67**
.35**
-

Cologne for
men
.41**
-.41**
-.11
.34**
.46**
-.70**
-.33**
-

Cologne for
women
-.25*
.15
.09
-.31**
-.09
.49**
.17
-.39**

Bras for
men
-.34**
.30**
.28*
-.38**
-.35**
.29**
.46**
-.10

Cologne for
men
.29**
-.39**
-.27*
.27*
.57**
-.48**
-.57**
.51**

Social Desirability
Gender exclusivity
Dresses for women
Tuxedos for women
Dresses for men
Tuxedos for men
Bras for women
Cologne for women
Bras for men
Cologne for men

Dresses for
women
.53**
-.47**
-.34**
.34**
.74**
-.42**
-.49**
.50**

Tuxedos for
women
-.27*
.44**
.22*
-.30**
-.32**
.35**
.25*
-.24*

Dresses for
men
-.44*
.41**
.39**
-.44**
-.44**
.42**
.56**
-.17

Tuxedos
for men
.28*
-.24*
-.13
.71**
.45**
-.30**
-.34**
.41**

Bras for
women
.47**
-.42**
-.28*
.38**
.74**
-.37**
-.45**
.41**
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Table 15 (continued)
Study 4 Correlations Between Gender Exclusivity and Social Desirability of Dresses, Tuxedos, Bras, and Cologne for Women and
Men, N = 168
Social Desirability
Social Desirability
Dresses for women
Tuxedos for women
Dresses for men
Tuxedos for men
Bras for women
Cologne for women
Bras for men
Cologne for men

Dresses for
women
-

Tuxedos for
women
-.27*
-

Dresses for
men
-.44**
.41**
-

Tuxedos
for men
.28**
-.24*
-.13
-

Bras for
women
.47**
-.42**
-.28*
.38**
-

Cologne
for women
-.25*
.15
.09
-.31**
-.09
-

Bras for
men
-.34**
.30**
.28*
-.38**
-.35**
.29**
-

Cologne for
men
.29**
-.39**
-.27*
.27*
.57**
-.48**
-.57**
-
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Table 16
Study 5 descriptives of categorical participant characteristics and differences between adjusters
and defaulters, N = 210

Gender Identity independent from
birth-assignment
Yes
No
Gender assigned at birth
Female
Male
How they think others perceive
their gender
Correctly
Incorrectly
Sexual attraction
A constant and clear attraction
to other gender
A constant and clear attraction
to same gender
A constant and clear attraction
to both women and men
A variable or fluid attraction
to women and men
A constant, clear attraction to
people regardless of gender
identity/expression
I am asexual/have no
attraction to any gender
Area surrounding current residence
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Ethnicity
Hispanic or of Latin
American decent
Not Hispanic or of Latin
American decent
Unknown
Did not respond

X2 for
Defaulters
and
Adjusters

Total Sample
(N = 210)
n (%)

Defaulters
(n = 195)
n (%)

Adjusters
(n = 15)
n (%)

0 (0.0)
210 (100.0)

0 (0.0)
195 (100.0)

0 (0.0)
15 (100.0)

0.00

120 (57.1)
90 (42.9)

112 (57.4)
83 (42.6)

8 (53.3)
7 (46.7)

0.10

208 (99.0)
2 (1.0)

193 (99.0)
2 (1.0)

15 (100.0)
0 (0.0)

0.16

179 (85.2)

170 (87.2)

9 (60.0)

6 (2.9)

5 (2.6)

1 (6.7)

7 (3.3)

6 (3.1)

1 (6.7)
11.37*

5 (2.4)

4 (2.1)

1 (6.7)

11 (5.2)

9 (4.6)

2 (13.3)

2 (1.0)

1 (0.5)

1 (6.7)

66 (31.1)
97 (45.8)
47 (22.4)

57 (28.9)
93 (47.2)
45 (23.1)

9 (60.0)
4 (26.7)
2 (13.3)

14 (6.4)

12 (6.1)

2 (13.3)

193 (92.1)
2 (1.0)
1 (0.5)

180 (92.4)
2 (1.0)
1 (0.5)

13 (86.7)
0 (0.0)
0 (0.0)

6.12*

1.21
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Race
American Indian or Alaskan
Native
Black or African American
Asian
White or Caucasian
Other (Dominican , Latin,
Mixed-White and American
Indian/Alaskan Native)

0 (0.0)
3 (1.4)
10 (4.8)
6 (2.9)
187 (89.0)

3 (1.5)
7 (3.6)
6 (3.1)
175 (89.7)

3 (20.0)
0 (0.0)
12 (80.0)

4 (1.9)

4 (2.1)

0 (0.0)

115 (59.0)
80 (41.0)

9 (60.0)
6 (40.0)

0.01

104 (53.3)
91 (46.7)

12 (80.0)
3 (20.0)

4.01

124 (63.6)
71 (36.4)

13 (86.7)
2 (13.3)

3.18

50 (25.1)
147 (74.9)

7 (46.7)
8 (53.3)

3.30

Education
Less than a 4-year degree
124 (59.0)
A 4-year degree or higher
86 (41.0)
Trans ally status
Yes
116 (55.2)
No
94 (44.8)
LGB ally status
Yes
137 (65.2)
No
73 (34.8)
Knows or has known a trans or
genderqueer person(s)
Yes
56 (26.7)
No
154 (73.3)
Know transgender
person who identifies
as woman
44 (78.6)
Know transgender
person who identifies
as man
20 (35.7)
Know transgender
person who identifies
as genderqueer
10 (17.9)
Know trans person who
identifies some other
way
2 (3.6)
ƚ
= marginal significance (p < 1.0); * p< .05, **p < .01

9.03ƚ

6.06*
41 (83.7)

3 (42.9)
4.44*

15 (30.6)

5 (71.4)

6 (12.2)

4 (57.1)

8.42**

2.67
1 (2.0)

1 (14.3)

Table 17
Study 5 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Genitals and Clothing Among Adjusters
on Rejection and Response Time, n = 15
Rejection Scores
Clothing

Genitals

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

Absent
M (SE)
1.33a (.5)
1.10a (.05)
1.22a (.13)

Present and Consistent
M (SE)
1.07a (.07)
3.40b (.66)
2.23b (.34)

Present and Inconsistent
M (SE)
1.33a (.21)
3.33b (.63)
2.33b (.32)

Row
M (SE)
1.24a (.15)
2.61b (.43)

Response Times (s)
Genitals

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

20.32 (1.57)
24.11 (3.92)
22.21a (2.07)

15.86 (1.98)
15.34 (1.41)
15.60b (1.30)

14.52 (1.17)
21.67 (2.96)
18.10 (1.63)

16.90ƚ (.96)
20.37ƚ (1.78)

Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts; ƚ marginal significance (p < 1.0) was found
between values
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Table 18
Study 5 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Genitals and Clothing Among Defaulters
on Rejection and Response Time, n = 195
Rejection Scores
Clothing

Genitals

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

Absent
M (SE)
1.56 (.09)
5.15 (.11)
3.35ƚ (.07)

Present and Consistent
M (SE)
1.38 (.06)
4.96 (.13)
3.17ƚa (.07)

Present and Inconsistent
M (SE)
1.81 (.09)
5.21 (.12)
3.51b (.07)

Row
M (SE)
1.58a (.06)
5.11b (.10)

Response Times (s)
Genitals

Consistent
Inconsistent
Column

22.82 (1.96)
26.75 (1.17)
24.78a (1.21)

17.98 (1.33)
19.95 (.89)
18.97b (.90)

19.36 (.91)
22.01 (1.30)
20.69b (.94)

20.05a (.93)
22.90b (.85)

Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts; ƚ marginal significance (p < 1.0) was found
between values
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Figure 1
(In)consistency processing model of gender attribution

X

Individual differences in cognitive processing
1. Contact with transgender
2. Openness to experience & agreeableness
3. Essentialism
4. Biological gender beliefs
5. Authoritarianism
6. Moral traditionalism & Egalitarianism

Gender visualization (automatic)
Consistency between target biology and identity

A

Default Schema (automatic)
Biology determines gender

Gender attribution (Outcome)
1. Rejection of target gender identity
2. Acceptance of target gender identity

Schema adjustment (explicit)
Identity determines gender

B

C
Moderating cognitive factor
Presence of distraction

Y

D
Moderating target factor
Consistency between additional target
characteristic and identity

Z
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Figure 2
Study 1 Interaction Between Chromosomes, Genitals, and Gender Identity Interaction on Rejection and Response Time
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Target Characteristics

Note : XX = XX chromosomes; XY = XY chromosomes; V = vagina, P = penis; W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as a man
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Figure 3
Study 1 Interaction Between Transgender Contact, Chromosomes and Gender Identity on Rejection and Response Time
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Note: C = contact with transgender people, NC = no contact with transgender people; XX = XX chromosomes. XY = XY
chromosomes; W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as a man
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Figure 4
Study 2 Interaction Between Target Gender Identity and Genitals on Rejection and Response
Time
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Note: The lines depicting targets who identify as women and targets who identify as men may be
difficult to distinguish because they are so similar. W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as
a man; V = has a vagina; P = has a penis
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Figure 5
Study 2 Interaction Between Essentialism, Target Gender Identity, and Genitals on Rejection and
Response Time
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Note: The lines for rejection are included for both targets who identify as women and targets
who identify as men in this graph, but they may be difficult to distinguish because they are so
similar. LE = low essentialism; HE = high essentialism; W = identifies as a woman; M =
identifies as a man; V = Vagina; P = Penis
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Figure 6
Study 2 Interaction Between Transgender Ally Status, Target Gender Identity and Genitals on
Rejection and Response Time
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they are so similar. A = Identifies as an ally to transgender people; NA = Does not identify as an
ally to transgender people; W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as a man; V = Vagina; P =
Penis

Figure 7
Study 3 Interaction Between Schema Group, Target Characteristics, and Distraction Task on Rejection and Response Time
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Figure 8
Study 5 Interactions Between Genitals and Clothing on Rejection and Response Time for Adjusters and Defaulters
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